SEXTUS POMPEIUS



edited by

ANTON POWELL

and

KATHRYN WELCH

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Frontispiece. Head of Sextus Pompeius, with oak wreath: *aureus* of Sextus Pompeius from 42 BC or shortly thereafter (Crawford no. 511/1). Photo: British Museum.

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INTRODUCTION

Anton Powell

SEXTUS POMPEIUS:
If the great gods be just, they shall assist
The deeds of justest men…
I shall do well:
The people love me and the sea is mine;
My powers are crescent, and my auguring hope
Says it will come to the full.
(Shakespeare, *Antony and Cleopatra*, Act II, Scene 1)

General and politician, son of Pompey the Great, in his day Sextus Pompeius was the most popular leader in Rome's civil wars of the 40s and 30s BC. Yet to modern readers of Latin texts, Sextus is familiar, if at all, not as the last plausible champion of Republicanism but as a somewhat ghostly villain. In Augustus' *Res Gestae*, Sextus is the defeated and unnamed opponent in the war against 'pirates' and 'runaway slaves'.[1] He is – again unnamed – the object of sneers from Horace, about a naval war against 'pirates and a gang of slaves' and about a 'Neptunian admiral' who fled at sea; Sextus had styled himself the son of Neptune.[2] He had also taken the cognomen *Pius*; that in turn was mocked by Virgil. It has been agreed since antiquity that the *arma...impia* punished in Virgil's Underworld refer ironically, but without explicit naming, to Sextus Pompeius.[3] Livy was similarly negative, it seems, though at great and significant length. Sextus' war against Octavian loomed large in several Livian Books (127–9, 131) and seems to have dominated Book 129, now reduced to some eighty words among the *Periochae*. Lucan has a conspicuous and (largely) negative portrayal of Sextus as necromancer; the poet assured his audience that Sextus was a 'son unworthy of his great father'.[4] Only Suetonius, writing a century and a half after the relevant events, concedes that among his contemporaries (who included Brutus, Cassius, Antony and Lepidus) Sextus Pompeius was unsurpassed in the number and acuteness of dangers which he posed to Octavian.[5]

With Greek literature, in particular the histories of Appian and Dio, the student of Sextus Pompeius may seem once more to be drawing from a poisoned well. An influential ancestor of both works, it is often thought,

may have been the *Histories* of Asinius Pollio, who, as a Caesarian leader active in the Civil Wars of the 40s, was an enemy of Pompeian causes. Indeed, Pollio as general in Spain had been defeated by Sextus Pompeius in humiliating circumstances.[6] Pollio's historical writing could have presented the opportunity of a well-considered literary revenge. Yet, as Kathryn Welch has observed, given the influential antipathy of the Caesarian tradition, it is striking how much evidence survives in Appian and Dio for the actions, and the public standing, of Sextus Pompeius. Understanding of these two writers, their mentality and methods, has recently been advanced by a historian represented in the present volume, Alain Gowing.[7] Both Appian and Dio show signs of hostility towards Sextus. But the position of each is complicated; the concessions they make to the achievements of Sextus are the more telling for the unfriendly context in which they are made.

According to Dio, Sextus at his zenith, in 40 BC, was seen by Octavian as both more powerful militarily, and more trustworthy, than Antony.[8] Here we touch on the aspect of Sextus which was most dangerous to Octavian-Augustus, because most appealing to the Roman people: his perceived morality. Even more than Sextus' military career, his image of virtue needed to be obscured in the public memory. An informed comparison, in moral terms, of the careers of Octavian and of Sextus would weaken, if not remove, public belief in the idea of Augustus as divinely-favoured ruler, as founder of an assured dynasty. Sextus, the true son of Pompey the Great, was – according to contemporary Roman values – quite simply a better man than Octavian, the adopted son of Julius Caesar. Appian and Dio reveal that, so long as Sextus' forces from Sicily resisted and defeated those of Octavian, the Roman populace publicly hailed Sextus as they execrated Octavian.

The advertised ideals of Sextus are illuminated for us by a further, and traditionally undervalued, class of evidence: coinage. Numerous examples, in several types, survive of coins struck for Sextus, first in Spain then in Sicily. They reveal an original and concentrated use of symbols, moral and political in their appeal. These coins are the only surviving contemporary utterance from the man himself, uncontaminated by enemies or sceptics. Their value as evidence is fundamental. We have therefore included a special section of photographs, showing some of the most important Sextan issues, in magnification. This volume, in making extensive use of the coinage to cast light on Sextus' career, runs risks inevitable in pioneering; numismatic work of the future will hopefully shed new light and may modify the findings expressed here. Our own approach to the Sextan coinage has suggested to us, sadly but engagingly, that the

general practice of Roman numismatics is in important ways notably less developed than that of literary palaeography; clear-cut errors can be found in some existing interpretations of Sextan coinage. A single coin, even an inferior specimen according to modern values, may preserve detail missing from more impressive specimens. The reconstruction of what coins showed, in words, letters and iconography, clearly should involve thorough comparison and the most rigorous palaeographic techniques. Yet coinage is hard to collate. Most individual coins have not been published photographically; many are untraceable, dispersed world-wide in private collections. Even when published, small or poor-quality photographs may obscure crucial detail. Examination of coins under the lens, or in magnified photographs, reveals that they were frequently designed to repay close attention to very small-scale work. And, while the numismatist has to acquire a specialist experience of the medium, the interpretation of coins on the grand scale and in relative isolation is a perilous undertaking. Rather as palaeography applied to a literary manuscript requires, in addition to general palaeographic skills, an expert knowledge of the particular author, so numismatics often requires special study of the ancient individual responsible for the issue of a coin. The history of Sextus Pompeius has in general been somewhat neglected in recent times; correspondingly – and with at least one distinguished exception[9] – study of Sextan coinage has until now suffered from lack of historical context. The present work is offered in part as a contribution towards correcting this.

In shaping recent attitudes towards Sextus Pompeius in the English-speaking world,[10] two scholars stand out: the American Moses Hadas and the New Zealander Ronald Syme. Hadas' book *Sextus Pompey*, published in 1930, is still the only full-scale monograph on the subject. Its extensive reproduction, and usually sensible interpretation, of the ancient literary evidence have made it an invaluable aid to study. Hadas' willingness, as a young scholar, to suggest that Sextus should be taken seriously as a competitor of Octavian in both the moral and military spheres, may even have involved a certain courage, given the dismissive attitude predominant at the period – a period noteworthy for, in Orwell's phrase, power-worship. (One thinks of Rice Holmes, openly hostile,[11] or of Charlesworth in the *Cambridge Ancient History*.[12]) Hadas set out 'to make it clear that he [Sextus] was not merely the corsair chief that history has painted him, but...the active representative of a considerable section of Roman sentiment' (p. 2). However, Hadas' project is not consistently extricated from the judgements of Sextus' ancient opponents; Hadas can, without obvious irony, express surprise that 'a roving buccaneer against the great public interest of the Roman world' could hold out

so long (p. 83). He accepts uncritically the hostile portrayal of Sextus as apparently waging war 'in his personal interest only', as culpably unwilling to expand his power beyond Sicily (pp. 81–2), as one who 'did not know how to use a victory' (p. 111) and who 'hardly deserves to be praised for his abstinence' (pp. 61–2). And yet he can write, 'The suggestion may be offered that Sextus was...a truer patriot than Octavian. He hoped, we may suppose, that popular pressure would enforce his claims, and felt that further violence would be needless and therefore criminal, and would only alienate the sympathies of Italy' (pp. 115–16). Then again: 'Without doubt it was to the interest of civilization that Octavian prevail.' (p. 147) In short, Hadas offers an undigested mixture of intelligent, independent reconstruction and of traditional condemnation. To explain his approach, it may help to recall Hadas' sense of his own position, as reflected in one noteworthy remark. He imagines the task of the modern source-critic, if Sextus had finally triumphed over Octavian: '...if the scales had turned otherwise than they did turn, *some obscure student* [my italics] might be defending Octavian against the slurs of courtly Pompeian writers' (pp. 114–15). In defending Sextus, did Hadas *dare* to be consistent?

The influence of Hadas' tentative rehabilitation of Sextus was overborne by the publication shortly afterwards of Ronald Syme's *The Roman Revolution* (1939). This masterly work of scholarship attained among historians, and still enjoys, a position of authority which sometimes resembles that of a superior ancient source. For Syme, Sextus was 'in reality an adventurer' (p. 228), a 'brigand' (p. 232). The enthusiasm for him of the Roman populace is explained away: 'Pompeius might sweep the seas, glorying in the favour and name of Neptune; the Roman *plebs* might riot in his honour – it was only from hatred of Caesar's heir.' (p. 228) The unsatisfactory nature of this approach can be demonstrated briefly. To claim to know the motives in full for actions of the Roman populace is over-ambitious; to reduce them to one, hatred of the person of Octavian, not only conflicts with our experience of humanity in better-documented circumstances, it also disregards silently the evidence of a source which Syme in other respects is willing to follow. Sextus Pompeius was admired, and for positive reasons; Appian has him (in 42 BC) 'beloved by all at the time';[13] he reports that Sextus' morality was seen by contemporaries (of 41 BC) as superior to that of rival dynasts.[14] And in Syme's sentence just quoted, the repeated use of the word 'might', importing an overtone of doubt to the description of relatively well attested events which were to Sextus' credit, is misleading; if used by a less revered writer, the device might be discounted as unfair rhetoric.

However, it is not so much Syme's low opinion of Sextus which has shaped modern reactions, rather it is his neglect of the man and of what he represented. Contrast Antony, lavishly dealt with by Syme, presented as *the* great opponent of Octavian. The morality of Antony is viewed by Syme with extraordinary indulgence; the large programme of political killing in which Antony took the lead, and which is still described by historians somewhat delicately as 'the Proscriptions', evidently for Syme did not exclude Antony from general sympathy.[15] In boosting Antony and writing down Sextus, Syme proceeded in a spirit remarkably close to that of ancient propaganda. The victorious Augustus chose in retrospect which defeated opponent to highlight. He chose Antony – with Cleopatra, and supportive writers followed his lead. Actium, not Naulochus, was the victory which most mattered. The taunt of 'foreign enemy' was available against Sextus; that was implicit in Augustus' claim about a war against pirates and slaves, and in the hostile focus on Sextus' use of commanders who were freedmen with Greek names. But Sextus' Roman virtues obstructed the picture; Antony with his eastern base and foreign queen lent himself far better to the claim of 'unRoman vices',[16] and thus made a better foil than Sextus for the image of Augustus as true Roman. It was because Antony became the explicit antitype that Sextus had to become a ghost, a figure to be exorcised – but implicitly.[17] Syme, writing in the 1930s with anti-dictatorial intent, treating Augustus with chill distaste, has yet allowed the emperor's choice of explicit propaganda to dictate his own analysis of the Civil Wars.

Syme's august judgement lives on, in various fields of study. For Woodman, Sextus is still 'the pirate king',[18] for Zanker a 'second-rate figure'.[19] Sear, reflecting on the one surviving coin-type that bears Sextus' own portrait, ventures a psychological reconstruction: 'In marked contrast to the sensitive features of his elder brother the effigy of Sextus reveals just what we might have expected from our knowledge of his character and career. His is the quintessential portrait of the rough but cunning buccaneer…'[20] Overlooked is the defensive general and politician who, advertising traditional values, exerted himself, with his ships, his gold and his attentive hospitality, to rescue and provide for refugees from Octavian's and Antony's campaign of political murder.

To sketch some of the contents of the present volume: Kathryn Welch lays a foundation from the best-documented period of Sextus' career, his years – or rather months – in Spain and Gaul for which we have Cicero's contemporary comments, public and private. She explores the varying interests of those opposed to the political legacy of Julius Caesar. Cicero's less-than-wholehearted sympathy for the cause of Sextus was obstructed, she shows, by fear of the rhetoric of Antony. The latter aimed astutely at

making an *amalgame*, at persuading Caesarian veterans and civilians that to oppose Antony was in effect to be a Pompeian. Only by public coolness towards Sextus could Cicero avoid having the whole Republican cause tarred with the Pompeian brush. Yet Cicero did eventually in the *Philippics* come to endorse openly the cause of Sextus' restoration to Rome.

In a second chapter, Welch makes a case for seeing Sextus as a defender of the traditions and constitution of the Republic. Although in his off-shore opposition Sextus had no access to Roman institutions, he showed significant respect for such allies as did still have titles conferred under the former Republic, and was himself sought out for co-operation by members of the former Republican elite. Welch demonstrates the Roman (rather than piratical and foreign) nature of Sextus' navy; she also argues that the Treaty of Misenum, which marked Sextus' zenith, contained the seeds of his defeat.

Benedict Lowe describes a traditionally neglected episode, which he shows to have been fundamental for Sextus' career: the making of his army and navy, and of his reputation as a successful commander – in Spain. He traces, with topographic detail, the rise of Sextus from the status of refugee after the defeat of his brother's force at Munda. With revealing use of evidence from coins, Lowe examines how Sextus exploited two traditions of Spain: the positive memory among Spaniards of his father, and Hispanic reverence for a charismatic military leader. At the end of his 'Spanish episode', the former refugee had defeated the Caesarian chief Asinius Pollio and stood poised for his move to Sicily, and his interventions in the affairs of Italy.

The chapter by the present writer examines two apparently separate questions. First, what was Sextus' strategic thinking on Sicily? The question has traditionally been discouraged by pro-Augustan miasma, by condemnation of Sextus' activity. Second, how did Sextus deploy the imagery – especially on coins – of reverent subordination, of *pietas*? It is argued that Sextan strategy was closely inspired by that of Pompey the Great, with deviations imposed by the son's far lower level of material resources. The respectful strategic imitation of father by son is linked with the themes of Sextus' coinage issued from Sicily (as, earlier, from Spain). Sextus' coins stressed his devotion to his father, far more than Octavian's coins deferred to Julius Caesar. That filial devotion was implicitly but unmistakeably allied by the coins with a wider *pietas*: Sextus also revered and saved the lives of his fellow-citizens, in contrast once more to the proscriber Octavian. His gold coins, which might reward rescuers, were themselves an instrument of *pietas*. I argue that Sextus' coinage shows an intricate exploitation of traditional Roman – and Sicilian Greek –

images; that it spread ideas of Sextan morality which would haunt the Augustan cause.

Shelley Stone, in a revised version of a paper from 1983, uses an archaeological approach to deepen our understanding of political history. How was Sicily treated by Octavian-Augustus, after the defeat of Sextus? What does that treatment suggest about Sicily under Sextan rule? With a detailed examination of the inland site identified as Morgantina, Stone argues for an Augustan policy of systematic and severe reprisal. At Morgantina, a substantial settlement was deliberately wrecked and burned. This action is connected by Stone with the punishment, recorded in literary sources, of Sicilian towns which had supported Sextus, most notably Tauromenium. Sicily, it seems, had shown firm and widespread support for the Sextan cause, suggesting that Sextan rule was widely perceived on Sicily as desirable. Augustan counter-measures, which included wholesale evictions and the establishment of Roman colonies, attest to the insecurity of the victor; an event as threatening as Sicily's uprising under Sextus must in no circumstances be allowed to recur.

The chapter by Hugh Lindsay reflects a different kind of imperial unease about the Sextan legacy. He traces the sufferings under Julio-Claudian emperors of aristocrats who could boast of links with the families of Pompey and of Scribonius Libo, who had been the chief supporter, as well as the father-in-law, of Sextus Pompeius. Such relatives of the Pompeian chiefs were evidently seen as a continuing danger, from Libo Drusus, persecuted to death early in the reign of Tiberius, to L. Arruntius Camillus Scribonianus who made an abortive and (to himself) fatal rising against Claudius. While it is hardly possible to make a separate evaluation here of the influence of Sextus Pompeius as against that of his father, Sextus' long and stubborn continuation of the Pompeian war against the House of Caesar is likely to have enhanced anxieties in emperors after Augustus, that the ambitions of Pompey the Great were not to be seen in stellar isolation; there was indeed a threat from a House of Pompey.

In the first of the chapters on Sextus' literary afterlife, Alain Gowing begins with an eloquent demonstration: among the opponents of Octavian in civil war, Sextus Pompeius, while in some ways the most successful in his own time, later fell victim to the deepest underestimation. Gowing traces the deliberate erasure of Sextus' name in Augustan literature, with coded attacks from Virgil and Horace followed by cryptic use of Sextus' memory against Augustus by the subversive Ovid. Under the emperor Tiberius, Valerius Maximus carefully omitted Sextus' claim to honourable mention in connection with the proscriptions and with *pietas*. Under Nero, Gowing suggests the poet Lucan could still reckon with much public knowledge

about Sextus' struggle against Octavian; he detects an element of sympathy in Lucan's notoriously chilling portrayal of Sextus. Among historians in antiquity, Tacitus drew on a tradition which played down the memory of Sextus. Dio, Gowing argues, was impatiently sketchy on the history of Sextus, seeing him as 'an irritating pothole on the road to monarchy' (an attitude, one might add, still familiar from modern textbooks). Earlier, Appian had done a more complex portrayal of Sextus, with both appealing and offputting episodes given in some detail, and a significant eulogy to mark his death. But, Gowing argues, 'Romans were never much interested in preserving history merely for history's sake'. And the history of Sextus was too complex to be preserved as a symbol for later times.

Lindsay Watson, in his chapter, focuses on a poem of Horace, the fourth *Epode*, in which is mentioned a war against 'pirates and a gang of slaves'. Its dramatic date is shortly before Sextus' defeat at sea, at Naulochus. Watson examines both rhetorical and historical context: such charges of robbery were conventional, devalued, elements of political abuse; Octavian conducted irregular seizures of property, and recruited slaves for his own navy against Sextus; Sextus had an official title to naval command. But Watson subtly detects a more unusual move by Horace, the poet's matter-of-fact suggestion that the Roman man-in-the street shared the official view that the war against Sextus was one against pirates. Watson reminds us that, in reality, contemporary Romans tended to see Octavian, not Sextus, as guiltily responsible for the war. But he also suggests that, in imputing the anti-Sextan view to ordinary Romans, Horace may have been delicately reserving his own position.

The final two chapters return to the extraordinary section of Lucan's *Pharsalia*, in which Sextus Pompeius is portrayed as invoking necromancy to learn how the battle between Julius Caesar and Pompey the Great would turn out. Charles Tesoriero, in his chapter, asks why the poet chose Sextus for this unhistorical episode; why he presented 'a truly vile Sextus', and endorsed definitively the pro-Augustan assertion that Sextus was a lesser man than his father. In an attractive argument, Tesoriero finds the answer in Lucan's view that after the battle of Pharsalus no further Republican opposition was to be looked for. Sextus, who clearly did represent future opposition to Caesar's heir, must be shown as himself stained with the vices of Caesarism, as no more than another selfish competitor for the role of autocrat. The emphasis with which Lucan asserted that Sextus was immoral is evidence that a very different tradition about Sextan morality also survived, which the poet needed to counter memorably.

Daniel Ogden applies to the study of Lucan's Sextus an expertise in the study of ancient necromancy. He shows that by Lucan's day the

Pompeian family probably had a reputation for necromantic practice. Sextus himself had been linked in story, seemingly from his own time, to prophecy purveyed by the living dead about the outcome of war. Libo Drusus, usually believed to be Sextus' grandson or grand-nephew, was to be memorably accused under Tiberius of politically subversive divination. Ogden thus succeeds in adding to the explanation of Lucan's literary choice of Sextus. After the *Odyssey* and the *Aeneid*, the epic tradition demanded a scene of necromancy: pre-existing stories about Sextus and his line brought the scent of appropriateness to an unhistorical episode.

Reflection on Lucan's contrivance makes a fitting end to a study of Sextus Pompeius, by prompting a general reflection on the quality of the historical evidence for the man. Given the eagerness, and the power, of the pro-Augustan tradition to vilify Octavian's most threatening opponent, it is noteworthy how little tenacious and damaging historical *detail* was pressed into service. Apart from the obscure episode involving the death of Staius Murcus, anti-Sextan writing is shown in the various studies here to consist mainly of generalities, and of indirectness (in the references to his freedmen). Was that because legitimately offputting material was from the first in very short supply? It may be an appropriate development for anti-Sextan literature that it led so directly to frank and extensive fiction.

In exploring, as these collected studies intend, the depth and longevity of Roman interest in Sextus Pompeius, we have hoped to open windows on aspects of Roman history which go far beyond this one man. If the Civil Wars and the culture which went with them have been as widely misrepresented as we suggest, it is certain that further study of this period would be repaid. Much Augustan literature, including its most famous elements, should be re-examined; the ghost of Sextus Pompeius may, for example, be found in the architecture of Virgil's *Eclogues* and *Aeneid*.[21] The study of coinage should be revived, as one element in the writing of history. The relations of Rome with Sicily may be re-examined; measures taken by government in Rome, after and because of Sextus, to prevent a recurrence of an assertive Sicily had effects which lasted for centuries, with possible implications even for the Sicilian politics of today.[22] Roman morality and religion under the Principate should be reconsidered. According to the old values, there had been a great gulf between Sextus Pompeius and Octavian. For traditional religion, for the belief that *pietas* would bring *felicitas*, the wrong man had won.

Anton Powell
Swansea, 1st March 2002

Notes

[1] 25.1.

[2] *Epodes* 4.17–20 and 9.7–10, with Lindsay Watson (below, ch. 8).

[3] *Aeneid* 6.612–13, with Servius and (e.g.) Austin ad loc.

[4] *Pharsalia* 6.420 with Charles Tesoriero (below, ch. 9) and Daniel Ogden (below, ch. 10).

[5] *DA* 16.3.

[6] See Benedict Lowe (below, ch. 3).

[7] A.M. Gowing, *The Triumviral Narratives of Appian and Cassius Dio* (Ann Arbor, 1992).

[8] 48.16.2–3.

[9] T.V. Buttrey, 'The "Pietas" denarii of Sextus Pompey', *Num.Chron*. 20 (1960), 83–101.

[10] Recent Italian scholarship has taken a more realistic view of Sextus; see in particular the work of E. Gabba and colleagues cited below (in Ch. 4, n. 4 and elsewhere).

[11] T. Rice Holmes, *The Architect of the Roman Empire* (Oxford, 1928): 'If this is true [sc. Appian's account of the killing of Staius Murcus], ancient history knows no more abominable scoundrel [sc. than Sextus Pompeius]' (p. 107 n. 1); 'The struggle between Octavian and Sextus has not the same interest either for general readers or for students of war as the campaigns of Julius Caesar' (p. 110); 'The last adventures of the defeated corsair [i.e. Sextus Pompeius], to which Appian devoted twelve tedious paragraphs, have no historical importance' (p. 129).

[12] vol. 10 (1934), 55: 'it is hard to find much in his [Sextus'] favour'.

[13] 4.85.

[14] 5.25.

[15] As Kathryn Welch observes, below p. 54 n. 5.

[16] Sen. *Epist*. 83 25.

[17] Comparable is the way in which the victorious Franco, after the Spanish Civil War, defined the (Russian-controlled) Communists as his great defeated enemy, rather than the far more numerous and more intimately Spanish opposition offered by Anarchists.

[18] A.J. Woodman (ed.) *Velleius Paterculus: the Caesarian and Augustan Narrative* (Cambridge, 1983), 175.

[19] P. Zanker, *The Power of Images in the Age of Augustus* (Ann Arbor, 1988), 44.

[20] D.R. Sear, *The History and Coinage of the Roman Imperators, 49–27 BC* (London, 1998), 201.

[21] For elements of such study see Powell, works cited below, p. 61. A wider study of Virgil as partisan is forthcoming.

[22] Compare the findings of a recent authority on Sicilian history, reviewing centuries of quiescence under the Principate: 'events in Sicily were of major concern to central authority for the first time since Sextus Pompey's occupation of the island four and three quarter centuries before' (R.J.A. Wilson, *Sicily under the Roman Empire* (Warminster, 1990), 330).

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I am grateful also to James Buckman, whose generous support and hospitality helped to make the project possible, and to Patrick Tansey, whose scholarly eye brought substantial improvements to the proofs. Finally, there are two acknowledgements of help given over many years. Ernest Buckley, typesetter and adviser, has brought learning and commitment to this and to all CPW's publications. And Stephen Mitchell, Chairman of UWICAH from its inception in 1993 to 2001, guided with wisdom and integrity.

A.P.

I

BOTH SIDES OF THE COIN:
Sextus Pompeius and the so-called *Pompeiani*

Kathryn Welch

We have clear evidence for the exact title by which from 43 Sextus Pompeius claimed the right to act as a Roman Republican general. It was as *praefectus classis et orae maritimae ex senatus consulto*: 'Prefect of the Fleet and the Coastlines by decree of the Senate'.[1] The placing of the title and its origin on each issue of Sextus' precious-metal coinage from Sicily (*Plates* 10–13) immediately alerts us to the fact that this is a man who has something to prove.

The title granted to Sextus by the Senate is unusual for it adds the coastlines to the already existing office of the *praefectura classis*.[2] Those who write of it do not always understand it. Velleius Paterculus, for example, ignores the fleet, merely saying that the Senate entrusted to him the *ora maritima*.[3] If, as Woodman argues,[4] Sextus was given the command on 27 April 43, the Senate chose to confer proconsular *imperium* on the former praetor and assassin Cassius but constructed an odd, possibly unprecedented, hybrid for Sextus.

The unusual nature of the appointment and its proud advertisement provide a starting-point in highlighting the problematic relationship between Sextus Pompeius and others opposed to the Caesarian regime. The deliberate elimination of Sextus from the record by Octavian (Augustus) and the minimization of his achievement are facets examined by other contributors to this volume. This paper explores the impact of negative attitudes to Pompey the Great in Rome during Caesar's Dictatorship and in the two years following his death. It attributes Sextus' slow start partly to the prejudices and fears which Sextus and his father aroused among those who opposed Caesar as well as those who became the Caesarian party. It rests on a belief that only in an atmosphere of a fractured tradition in the circles of the opposition, especially that group which wrote the histories of the period, could Octavian succeed in diminishing the valuable contribution which Sextus made in the fight against the Triumvirate and his right to be called a defender of the *res publica*.

The *partes pompeianae*?

Velleius Paterculus (2.73.2) describes the Senate which gave Sextus his command as *paene totus adhuc e pompeianis constans partibus* ('almost wholly made up at that time of the Pompeian faction'). Livy's epitomator (*Per.* 113) also refers to *Pompeiani* and *partes pompeianae*: *confirmatis in Africa pompeianis partibus, imperium earum P. Scipioni delatum est, Catone, cui ex aequo deferebatur imperium, cedente* ('Once the Pompeian party had entrenched itself in Africa, *imperium* was conferred on P. Scipio. Equal *imperium* had been offered to M. Cato but he declined it'). Both Livy and Velleius use *Pompeiani* in a general sense to mean 'those who opposed Caesar'. Although both authors were close in time to the events of the civil war, they write after the period when such terms were contentious. Most modern authors accept the generalization as a convenient shorthand,[5] rarely stopping to examine what it actually meant to different audiences, how it developed or how little it would have been accepted by many to whom it was applied. Yet it is as readily accepted that the terminology of *partes* and *factio* was more often than not the language of one's political enemies in Rome and in any case never a neutral descriptor.[6]

To begin to understand the nature of this problem, we might ask how many of Caesar's assassins would have happily described themselves as *Pompeiani*. Obviously not his generals who had been enticed into the net. C. Trebonius and D. Brutus were Caesar's men, won over to the idea of Republican government but with no ideological link to Pompey at all,[7] even though D. Brutus appeared readier than some to appreciate the possibility of refuge Sextus offered in the months following the assassination (*Fam.* 11.1[325].3). Some former opponents of Caesar would equally have bridled at the description. The most prominent member of the conspiracy, M. Brutus, had joined those opposed to Caesar in 49 through allegiance to his uncle Cato (Plut. *Brut.* 4). Afterwards, he swung between the advantages of an alliance with the dictator and the seductive voice of the conservatives (Welch 1998). There is no observable relationship, friendly or otherwise, between M. Brutus and Sextus at any period. His young relative, Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, inherited animosity towards Pompey. Later, when he had the opportunity to join Sextus in Sicily, he preferred to take his chances alone (Vell. Pat. 2.73). C. Cassius might have accepted the title. Plutarch describes him turning his face towards the statue of Pompey at the moment of the assassination (Plut. *Brut.* 17.1). But Cassius had also deserted the cause early and during 45 had stated that he feared a victory by Pompey's sons in Spain.[8] The dead body of Caesar had fallen at the feet of Pompey's statue in Pompey's Senate House but those who effected the murder of Caesar in

March 44 would not have called themselves the *partes pompeianae* nor, moreover, did they justify their deed by figuring it as revenge for the death of Pompey the Great.

The group which killed Caesar was an amalgam, as was the group which had formerly opposed him. As the greater number of senators in 44 had been placed there by Caesar, a greater number of the conspirators came from the Caesarian side. Velleius could not have been more wrong. The Senate in 43 was made up of supporters of Caesar and those whom Caesar had pardoned, and was bound much more by opposition to Caesar than by loyalty to Pompey.[9]

No *Pompeiani* in Africa?

In fact, whether Pompey was the leader of the *partes* or the *princeps ciuium* was a hotly contested idea within the ideological struggles of the civil war. Our evidence suggests that Caesar's opposition consciously rejected his attempts to personalize the struggle, which in fact undermined the cause they stood for. Caesar himself had tried to figure Pompey as *the* leader opposing Caesar in the civil war (*BC* 1.22, 35; Hellegouarc'h 1963, 111). The opposition responded by claiming that Pompey was only one of the defenders of the *res publica*.[10] Lucan, for whom both Pompey and Cato are heroes of the resistance, states his position clearly (5.12–14):

> *nam quis castra uocet tot strictas iure secures,*
> *tot fasces? docuit populos uenerabilis ordo*
> *non Magni partes sed Magnum in partibus esse.*[11]

For who can give the name of 'camp' to so many Rods, so many Axes bared legally? The venerable order taught the nations that they were not Magnus' party but that Magnus was in theirs.

The political ideology of the African War in 47–46 illustrates well how carefully the term *pompeianus* was used or avoided by the participants. Q. Metellus Scipio, Pompey's erstwhile father-in-law and adherent, leaves no trace of any attempt to commemorate his former *adfinis*. His coinage, preserved from 47 and 46, commemorates his Scipionic background and his own status as Imperator (Linderski 1996, 167–84; *Plate* 1). Cato's coinage signifies his respect for traditional Roman representations.[12] Florus captures the mood when he states at 2.13.65: *quippe satis ample sonabant in pompeiani nominis locum Cato et Scipio* ('Indeed, Cato and Scipio resounded with enough force to replace the name of Pompey'). The ideology of the opposition, therefore, rejected Caesar's suggestions that he was opposed to a personal faction and, whatever the actual truth of the matter, proudly represented itself as the defence of the *res publica*.

The sentiments of both Lucan and Florus indicate that Livy's full text would reveal a far more nuanced examination of the African War than the use of the term *Pompeiani* in *periocha* 113 would suggest. The actual evidence of the *periochae* for the civil war period is mixed. The epitome covering the Senatorial evacuation of Italy (*Per*. 109) speaks of Caesar driving Pompey and the others of his faction (*Cn. Pompeius ceterique partium eius*) out of Italy; there are *Pompeiani* in Illyria and Varus is a *pompeianarum partium dux* ('leader of the Pompeian party', *Per.* 110). Those who lose at Pharsalus are the *partes uictae* (*Per.* 112). Thus far the text agrees with what we might expect from a Caesarian author.[13] Yet the epitomes for 48–46 also reveal a tendency to heroize both Pompey and the generals who succeeded him. Pompey's miserable death was obviously related at length and with sympathy and Cato's battles with the desert are described (*Per.* 112). Livy's *Pompeiani* debate the succession of Scipio and Cato with a view both to moral and constitutional rectitude, and vote to defend Caesarian Utica from the designs of the non-Roman Juba (*Per.* 113). Livy devotes Book 114 to the activities of Caecilius Bassus and the African War and, significantly, to the deaths of both Cato and Scipio. The gory details of Cato's suicide take up four lines and Scipio's *honesta mors* ('honourable death') is accompanied by the famous last response to his Caesarian tormenters, *imperator se bene habet* ('The Imperator is doing well').[14] Both the heroism displayed and the emphasis on Scipio's claim to being the *imperator* indicate that Livy respected the ideological claims of the African commanders to be defenders of the *res publica* and not part of anyone's personal faction. By contrast, both Gnaeus Pompeius and Sextus draw at best neutral and at worst positively hostile comment.[15]

The Livian tradition therefore appears to have recognized Pompey and Cato as heroes fighting in the cause of the *res publica* and Scipio also because he ultimately showed himself worthy by his death. The younger Seneca espoused a more selective tradition than his nephew Lucan. For him, Cato was the *uir magnus* because he challenged both Caesar and Pompey for the good of the *res publica* (*Ep.* 95.70):

> *altius certe nemo ingredi potuit quam qui simul contra Caesarem Pompeiumque se sustulit et aliis caesareanas opes, aliis pompeianas fouentibus utrumque prouocauit ostenditque aliquas esse et rei publicae partes.*
>
> Surely no-one could march more proudly than he who held out against Caesar and Pompey at the same time and, when some showed support for Caesar's side and others for Pompey's, issued a challenge to both, thus showing that there were also some defenders of the *res publica*.

Within this framework, the origin of which can be found in Cicero's writings, as we will see, Pompey is not even in the right *partes,* let alone its leader.

The tradition put forward by the opposition is, on reflection, logical. What is surprising is that the Caesarian author of the *Bellum Africum* also refrains from labelling the opposition as *Pompeiani*. He describes Cato ordering Gnaeus Pompeius to Spain to raise troops because of the power of his father's popularity but there is no more heard of Gnaeus or the Pompeian name in Africa.[16] The term *pompeianus* is used specifically to describe the battle of Pharsalus (*B.Afr.*19: *proelium pompeianum*) and soldiers who had actually previously served with Pompey (*B.Afr.* 23), in other words, men and incidents connected directly to Pompey himself, not his successors. This is more remarkable when one considers that, of all the Continuators, this author most frequently uses the corresponding term *caesariani*.[17] The author certainly speaks in terms of *partes,*[18] but the word *pompeianae* does not accompany it.

Moreover, in the wider Caesarian corpus, only soldiers who served under Pompey in Thessaly or with his sons in Spain in 45 are *milites pompeiani*. We find the term also used of provincial communities and kings who were attached by personal ties of *clientela* to Pompey and who demonstrated their loyalty by fighting on his side (*BC* 3.35; *B.Alex.* 59). They make concerted attempts to characterize the opposition as Pompey's personal following, a *factio* opposed to Caesar's own, and slanted the language by calling their own men not *caesariani* but *nostri* as they had been in Gaul, as part of the careful encoding in Caesar's description of the civil war where his opponents are always figured as opponents (*aduersarii*), not enemies (*hostes*).[19]

The Caesarian authors might have chosen otherwise, for personalizing factions as a tool of delegitimization had a prior history in Rome.[20] In the turbulent years of the sixties, when Roman society attempted to come to terms with civil war and its aftermath, the forces of reform smeared their opposition with the hatred and fear still connected to Sulla. Cicero rejects the epithet *sullanus* for himself and his friends (*Rull.* 3.7) because in 63 it was principally meant to brand him as a former proscriber and anti-*popularis*. A similar phenomenon occurred in informal settings during the civil war. In 49 (during Pompey's lifetime), Caelius, bemoaning the fact that he hated his own side, suggested that everybody and all orders would be *pompeianus* if there was less fear that a victory for that side would bring proscription and carnage (*Fam*. 8.17[156].2). Hirtius allegedly referred to a *pompeianus Senatus* at some stage during 49–48 (*Phil.* 13.26–8). The language of personalized *factio*, with which Caelius was very familiar, and

which Cicero well understood[21] was waiting for those who wanted to use it but Caesar and the Continuators were not responsible for the generalizing of the term to mean all opposition regardless of the actual leader.

It was Mark Antony who called the *partes uictae* which stood against him during 44 and 43 the *partes pompeianae,* whether it was true or not. That way, the proscriptions could be justified as revenge for the murder of Caesar by ungrateful former enemies who were fighting only for personal motives.[22] By the end of 44, when he began the process, he had also learnt (or developed) what it meant to be a committed 'Caesarian'. However, before we turn to an examination of his role in the formation of the *partes pompeianae*, we should note the way that both Pompey and Cato figure in Cicero's thinking from 47 to 43.

Cicero the *Pompeianus*?

Cicero was certainly a self-confessed friend of Pompey and via his own public rhetoric could justly be called a *pompeianus*. Yet in the years 47–45 his complex treatment of the tragically dead *princeps ciuium* was affected by several factors: the status of his relationship to Caesar, the genre within which he expressed his view and the attitude he held at any one time to the state of the *res publica* and its future. In 46, a period when through his actions on behalf of M. Marcellus and Q. Ligarius he showed a willingness to influence the dictator from within his own circle, he publicly justified his decision to go to Greece by means of a personal tie to Pompey and publicly rejected ideological imperatives (*Marc.* 14). This was of course only part of the truth as his anguished letters of 49 reveal (*Att.* 8.1[151].4; 9.19[189].2). Cicero had used friendship and respect for Pompey to justify his deeds in the past (*Fam.* 1.9[20].11), but the decision to join him in 49 had not been made because of *officium*. In the bitter months of January to April, Cicero had viewed Pompey with a mixture of frustration and disappointment.[23] He had expressed the belief that Pompey's associates were capable of instituting proscription[24] and that Pompey was capable of becoming another Sulla.[25] The view had been restricted to the privacy of his letters to Atticus. However, for all his frustration with Pompey, when he had come face to face with Caesar he decided that he could not remain in Italy.[26] After Caesar had won at Pharsalus and Cicero had had to make his peace, his earlier private sentiments could hardly be made public. Expressions of personal friendship, acknowledgment of honourable mistakes, public respect for Pompey's former *dignitas,* even reminders of the tremendous position Pompey had previously held, along with appeals to adverse fortune, should all be understood as the language through which the vanquished could honourably address, and even hope

to influence, the victor (*Lig*. 18–22; *Deiot.* 9–13) and, moreover, which masked the ideological dilemmas and the despair caused by both leaders at the outbreak of war.

Those of Cicero's treatises written during Caesar's Dictatorship offer a mixture of sorrow, resignation and ambivalence in dealing with Pompey's memory.[27] The degrading and disturbing nature of Pompey's death, first reported in a letter to Atticus with profound sorrow and resignation (*Att.* 11.6[217].4), had impressed itself deeply upon his psyche. The *Tusculan Disputations*, a work dealing with the good death, sees Cicero wishing for his friend's sake that he could have died from his illness in Naples with his great *dignitas* intact rather than face the sands of Egypt.[28] Other references in the same work contain less than wholehearted praise: Pompey's strategy had been ill-prepared (*TD* 1.86); his theatre-building and holding games deserved respect but he would have served the people of Rome better with monuments which were more useful and less luxurious (*TD* 2.57, 2.60). In the first book of *de Diuinatione,* Cicero describes Pompey as a man who was capable of many blunders (*Div*. 1.24) and in the second, written after Caesar's assassination, he suggests that the deaths of all three *principes* were linked in their miserable circumstances and that even prior knowledge of them would not have stopped the actions which brought them about (*Div.* 2.22–4).

Fear of, or even a desire to please, Caesar cannot explain Cicero's attitude. Caesar's public stance had suggested a lingering fondness and respect for Pompey which Cicero could use on public occasions (*Reg. Deiot.* 8–12). Cato was Caesar's far more bitter enemy, but this did not stop Cicero from figuring him as the hero of the *res publica*.[29] In the very year of Cato's death, Cicero had famously risked the anger of the Dictator by producing an extensive laudation which had attracted replies from Caesar and Hirtius. Nothing of this nature was attempted or suggested for Pompey. In the philosophical works of 45, Cicero especially complimented Cato's expertise as an orator in spite of his allegiance to Stoicism (*Brut*. 118–19; *Or.* 35, 41; *Par.* 1–3), even to the extent of giving him the pivotal role in *de Finibus* and recalling the debate in a later work (*TD* 5.32). Unlike Pompey, Cato had died a death worthy of comparison with Socrates' (*TD* 1.74). Throughout these works, all dedicated to Cato's nephew Brutus,[30] it was Cato who defined *uirtus*, who was the symbol of hope to the 'present' age (*TD* 5.4). Thus it was Cato who became the hero of the new Optimate group, not Pompey. The fashion for contrasting Caesar and Cato was to bear fruit in Sallust's *Bellum Catilinae* in which Pompey is deliberately omitted from the syncrisis (*BC* 53.6). When we add Brutus' own eulogy of Cato, also written in 45 and which will not have contained any laudation

of Pompey, to Cicero's treatment, we can perhaps see the origins of the tradition espoused by Seneca. On the other hand, during the dictatorship, Pompey's political capital was at an all-time low.

Cicero's privately expressed attitude to Pompey's elder son is also relevant. There was little love lost between Cicero and Gnaeus Pompeius, leading the orator to state in 45 that he had no interest at all in the outcome of the Battle of Munda.[31] The attitude he displayed towards Sextus in the first part of 44 indicates that while Cicero was conscious of Sextus' success in Spain and even hoped that he might be useful in Italy,[32] for him Pompey's younger son was an unknown quantity. Even though Sextus, through his father-in-law Libo, attempted to communicate with Cicero and Brutus, the response in 44 was sluggish.

Cicero's attitude to Sextus himself at the end of the first half of 44 is best seen in the last letter in which Sextus is mentioned (*Att.* 16.4[411], 10 July 44). This letter also contains the only comments which come, however indirectly, from Sextus himself. They were made soon after Antony had unsuccessfully moved to recall him.

> (1) Libo interuenit. is Philonem Pompei libertum et Hilarum suum libertum uenisse a Sexto cum litteris ad consules siue quo alio nomine sunt. earum exemplum nobis legit, si quid uideretur. pauca παρὰ λέξιν, ceteroqui et satis grauiter et non contumaciter. tantum addi placuit, quod erat 'coss.' solum, ut esset 'pr., tr. pl., senatui', ne illi non proferrent eas quae ad se ipsos missae essent… ad ipsum autem Libonem scripsit nihil esse nisi ad larem suum liceret. summa postulatorum ut omnes exercitus dimittantur qui ubique sint. haec fere de Sexto.
>
> Libo came in as we were talking. He said that Pompey's freedman Philo and his own freedman Hilarus had arrived from Sextus with letters to the Consuls, or whatever else they are called. He read us a transcript for our comments. There were a few faults of diction, otherwise the style was dignified enough and free from truculence. The only change we thought necessary was to add 'Praetors, Tribunes of the Plebs and Senate', Sextus having put 'To the Consuls' only. Otherwise they might not have produced the letter on the ground that it was addressed to themselves personally… To Libo himself he has written that there is nothing doing unless he is allowed to go back to his family home. The long and short of all his demands is that all armies, wherever they are, be disbanded. That's about it for Sextus.

First we should note that Antony had thought it would be generally popular with the conservatives to recall Pompey's son. In fact meaningful negotiations with Sextus in 44 are the province of the Caesarians, Antony and, later and more successfully, Lepidus, for all Cicero's compliments in *Philippic* 13. Then we should also note that Sextus refused Antony's offer

(*nihil esse nisi ad larem suum liceret*).[33] There is a general call for a cessation of fighting, to which Cicero offers no comment beyond approval of the overall tone. *haec fere de Sexto* ('that's about it for Sextus') is the last comment which Cicero makes directly about Sextus in his correspondence, although Libo at least has continued to make contact with him as late as December 44 (*Fam*. 11.7[354].1). From Brutus, although present at the meeting in July, there is no recorded comment.

Cicero was not hostile to Sextus but neither was he over-energetic in promoting Sextus' position. As political events moved on in 44, the potential for Sextus to be an embarrassment increased rather than diminished. Cicero returned to open political activity at the end of the year. He had committed himself to a policy of support for Brutus but at the same time he had developed his connections with the inner circle of anti-Antonian (pro-Octavianic) Caesarians.[34] This group, especially Balbus, Oppius and Hirtius, had all been extremely active between April and November 44 in achieving the seemingly improbable alliance between Cicero and Caesar's heir.[35] The alliance which opposed Antony at the beginning of January thus was made up of those who had killed Caesar and of Caesar's inner circle, with Cicero as the vital link. Cicero's best chance of success depended on persuading the Caesarians both in the Senate and in the army to fight against a Caesarian commander in a new *concordia*. The name of Pompey could only complicate further an already complicated arrangement.

Antony and his friends appear to have realized the weakness in Cicero's strategy. The Antonian group first found the rhetoric of the *partes uictorum* and then refigured it as the *partes pompeianae* in order to remind wavering Caesarians who the real enemy was. As with all good political propaganda, these two rhetorical battles were based on truth. They were critical weapons in the struggle between Antony and Cicero in 44–43 and it is to them that we should now turn our attention.

Antony as creator of the *partes pompeianae*?

Throughout 44, Antony had vacillated between a policy of friendship with tyrannicides and one of garnering support among those most committed to Caesar.[36] By the very end of the year, he had realized that to be a 'Caesarian' leader he had to espouse the cause of avenging the death of Caesar, to settle the veterans profitably and to encourage the cult of the dead dictator.[37] In order to break the nexus being created by Cicero, he reminded Rome that it was indeed divided into two parties. The evidence comes from *Philippic* 5 (5.32), delivered in January 43, where Cicero vigorously attempts to argue against it:

> nam nunc quidem partium contentionem esse dictitat. quarum partium? alteri uicti sunt, alteri sunt e mediis C. Caesaris partibus; nisi forte Caesaris partis a Pansa et Hirtio consulibus et a filio C. Caesaris oppugnari putamus. hoc uero bellum non est ex dissensione partium, sed ex nefaria spe perditissimorum ciuium ex[er]citatum, quibus bona fortunaeque nostrae notatae sunt et iam ad cuiusque optionem distributae.
>
> For at this stage he is going about saying there is but a struggle between two parties. What parties? On the one side are the conquered, the others are from the heart of Gaius Caesar's party- unless he thinks Gaius Caesar's party is being attacked by the consuls, Hirtius and Pansa, and by Gaius Caesar's son. This war has not been stirred up by the civil discord of parties, but by the unspeakable hopes of irrevocably lost citizens for whom our possessions and fortunes have already been itemised and distributed according to each man's preference.

Cicero had already moved the terms of the dispute when he claimed that the struggle with Antony was *bellum* against a *hostis* (*Phil*. 2.1). Antony, recalling the language of Caesar, had replied that the struggle with Cicero was *dissensio* or *contentio partium*. Cicero's counter-attack rejected all reference to *partes*. Rather, the united *res publica* was opposed to a brigand (*latro*). Former *aduersarii*, said Cicero, had united in common hatred of the tyrant and the universal wish to extinguish the still-living tyranny (*Phil*. 3.36). The new struggle was not *bellum ciuile* because it differed from the four which had preceded it. Antony was not a new Caesar: he was a new Catiline, but posing a greater threat to the *res publica* than Catiline had done (*Phil.* 8.8). Cicero stressed the central place in this new unified anti-Antonian *res publica* of leading Caesarians such as Pansa who stood in alliance with the tyrannicides (*Phil.* 10.17).

Antony eventually countered with a powerful appeal to former Caesarians to consider the incongruity of their situation. Their alliance was not for the *res publica,* he suggested*,* but solely to the advantage of defeated Pompeians. In the letter from March 43 addressed to Hirtius and Octavian, the answer to which forms the basis of the central part of *Philippic* 13, Antony concludes by telling his correspondents that their friendship with Cicero, their leniency towards the Liberators and their foolish support for common enemies, whom they have already defeated, will provide the means by which those enemies, the *Pompeiani,* will laugh at them all (13.38).

> quam ob rem uos potius animaduertite utrum sit elegantius et partibus utilius Treboni mortem persequi an Caesaris et utrum sit aequius concurrere nos quo facilius reuiuiscat pompeianorum causa totiens iugulata an consentire ne ludibrio simus inimicis…

> So you should rather consider which is in better taste and more beneficial to your party, to avenge the death of Trebonius or that of Caesar; and what is more sensible: that we fight against each other so that all the more easily the cause of the Pompeians, so many times strangled, is resurrected, or that we agree and so avoid being ridiculed by our enemies…

Cicero responded (13.38–9):

> 'utrum' inquit, 'elegantius'? atque hoc bello de elegantia quaeritur! 'et partibus utilius'. partes, furiose, dicuntur in foro, in curia. bellum contra patriam nefarium suscepisti, oppugnas Mutinam, circumsedes consulem designatum; bellum contra te duo consules gerunt cumque eis pro praetore Caesar; cuncta contra te Italia armata est. istas tu partis potius quam a populo Romano defectionem uocas?[38]

> 'Which is in better taste?', he says, (And so in this war there is a question of taste!) 'and more beneficial to your party.' Party, madman, is a word used in the Forum, in the Senate House. It is a war, an unspeakable war, you have undertaken against your country; you are blockading Mutina; you are besieging a designated consul; it is war against you two consuls are waging and with them the propraetor Caesar; all Italy is in arms against you. Do you call that a party or rather a revolt from the Roman people?

Antony's creation of the *partes pompeianae* struck a chord in the largely Caesarian coalition Cicero had gathered against him, not to mention a wider audience of veterans. The fact was that many were uncomfortable about attacking their former comrade. That Cicero eventually persuaded them to do so suggests that they did see his point (and that there was indeed a point to be seen); that they refused to grant Cicero's most extreme request (that Antony be named a *hostis*) until the very end bespeaks Antony's continuing support in the Senate and the strength of his counter-attacks. Cicero had been closely connected to Pompey and could with good reason be constructed as a *Pompeianus*. Those senators who had sided with the opposition, whether friends of Pompey or not, were all allies of Cicero. This caused consternation in Cicero because in 43 it was entirely contrary to his strategy to have his fragile alliance of Liberators and Caesarians tagged with such a title.

Under the pressure of Antony's strategy, Cicero had to take increasing care as to how Pompey was used in his public rhetoric.[39] In the first two *Philippics*, written before Antony had really seen the possibilities of the '*Pompeiani*' strategy and before Cicero was wholly committed to his alliance with Hirtius and Octavian, the orator openly stressed the memory of Pompey's former greatness: lingering praise of Pompey, he suggested, was indicative of the Roman People's dissatisfaction with Caesar's tyranny (1.36); Pompey's *auctoritas,* not Antony's *gratia,* had secured Cicero's