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Francesco Fiorentino (Ed.)

William of Alnwick

Questions on Science and Theology

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by Francesco Fiorentino

English Translation
by John Scott

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The critical edition derives from my project of research 'Le trasformazioni dello statuto scientifico della teologia agli inizi del XIV secolo: il caso di Guglielmo di Alnwick, socius di Giovanni Duns Scoto e vescovo di Giovinazzo', ended in 2012 at the university of Bari 'Aldo Moro', in collaboration with the Town of Giovinazzo.

The translation of the critical edition belongs to John Scott; the introduction, the critical edition, the bibliography and the tables are mine.

I devote the introduction and the critical edition of this book to my father Mimmo.

Francesco Fiorentino

William of Alnwick
Questions on Science and Theology.

Introduction and Critical Edition by Francesco Fiorentino
Translation of Latin Text by John Scott

Introduction. William Alnwick and the Editing Criteria

William Alnwick was a key figure in the history of late medieval philosophy. On one hand as John Duns Scotus' colleague in Paris under the mastership of Gonsalvus of Spain and on the other, as the master of John Reading and William Ockham at Oxford. Alnwick's vicinity to Scotus in Paris has always aroused great interest among scholars, ever since Athanasius Ledoux, although he saw Alnwick as an independent Scotist.[1] It was as a student of Gonsalvus of Spain that Alnwick had first met John Duns Scotus, and then he acted as his secretary, and editor of his *Ordinatio* and *Additiones Magnae*. A long period of study in Paris began as from June 1303, when Alnwick registered as a student under the mastership of Gonsalvus of Spain, and continued until his mastership in 1316. This stay was not interrupted during Scotus' enforced exile because Alnwick decided to take the part of the king of France, Philippe le Beau, not of Pope Boniface VIII. During this long stay in Paris, Alnwick was appointed bachelor in theology in 1313–1315 and lectured on the *Sentences*. Of this work we still have the commentary in four books, with two drafts of the first two books. In 1316 Alnwick became the forty-second regent Franciscan master in theology in Oxford at the end of Henry of Harclay's Chancellorship, at the time when John of Reading and William of Ockham were there as bachelors. While in Oxford, he improved his commentary on the *Sentences*. When he was on the point of finishing the edition of Scotus' *Ordinatio*, Alnwick moved to Paris and it is to this period between Oxford and Paris that we date the discussion of *Quaestiones disputatae de esse intelligibili*. Then he moved on to Montpellier where he completed the quodlibetal questions, and to Bologna where he composed *Determinationes* and expressed his views on poverty. During his stay in Bologna in 1322 he was numbered among the judges in the trial against Raymond and Opizone of Este, Ferrara. In 1323, proceedings were taken out against him by the Bishops of Bologna and Ferrara, on the instance of Pope John XXII, for having endorsed the decree *De paupertate Christi et Apostolorum* of the General Chapter of the Franciscans in Perugia (1322), and arguing in public that Christ and his apostles possessed nothing, either personally or in common. This theme

1 See Ledoux 1937, pp. X–LVIII.

is repeated in the last of *Determinationes*, of which we possess only the ms. Florence, Laurentian Library, plut. 31 dextr. (here denominated F), ff. 80v–82v. Attempting to escape the risk of sentence, he therefore took shelter in Naples and obtained from King Robert of Anjou the bishopric of Giovinazzo in 1330. In 1333 he died in Avignon, where he was then residing in order to plead the cause of the spiritualist *fraticelli*, Peter of Cadeneto and Andreas of Galiano. While there he also pronounced the sermon *in domo Praedicatorum*.[2]

We have already examined Alnwick's stay in Naples and the debate on the beatific vision.[3] The studies by Guido Alliney are an essential reference in order to understand the stratification of the codices of Alnwick's works: he endeavoured to clarify the manuscript stratification of the six Codices conserving the three *Quaestiones de tempore*, corresponding to the second distinction of Book II of *Sentences*. In Alliney's view, while ms. Naples, National Library, Conv. Suppr., VII C 6 (here denominated N) preserves the first edition of the commentary, which was the fruit of a bachelor lecture held in Paris between 1312 and 1315, ms. Assisi, Town Library, 172, here denominated A, ms. Padua, Antonian Library, 291, denominated P, and the ms. vat. lat. 869 should be attributed to the period when he was master at Oxford in 1316, at the end of Harclay's Chancellorship. There are, however, a few differences among these three manuscripts, in that the ms. vat. lat. 869 conserves the *Quaestiones disputatae*, which were later included in the commentary to *Sentences* according to the P edition, whereas A contains an abbreviated version. Finally, the other two Codices, namely ms. Vatican City, Apostolic Library, vat. lat. 1012 (here denominated V) and ms. Krakow, Jagellonic Library, 732 (here denominated C) are thought to conserve some excerpts of the largely lost *Quodlibet*, which Alnwick discussed in 1318–1320 during his period in Montpellier, between his second stay in Paris and his period in Bologna.[4]

Here it should be added that N or part of it may have been brought by Alnwick to Naples where he could revise some questions of the second book, for example those on creation and time, and take part in the debates at the Studium sancti Lorentii. At ff. 10va–14rb, after five questions of the first book of William of Ware's commentary on *Sentences* (ff. 1ra–6vb) and fifteen quodlibetal questions by Alexander of St. Elpidio (ff. 7ra–10rb), N transmits two questions attributed to a "magister Guillelmus" by their *incipit*; the *incipit* classifies these questions as the second and the seventh of a series, but the other questions are lacking. Furthermore, the attribution to this *magister* is not made using the genitive case but rather "secundum" and the accusative case. Considering the use of this construction in the classification, it can be deduced that

2 See Courtenay 2011, pp. 175–229; Piana 1982, pp. 191–231, in part. 191. Piana's previous contribution was focused on Alnwick's teaching in Bologna; see Piana 1947, pp. 49–80, in part. 52; Stella 1968a, pp. 331–387, 614–641, in part. 622–637; Valente 1988, pp. 52–54.

3 See Fiorentino 2010b, pp. 211–244.

4 See Alliney 1999, pp. 117–142; Alliney 2002, pp. 3–158.

the two questions may have been extracted from a sort of *Collationes*, i.e. a cycle of lectures in which various masters alternated as *determinantes*. As a result, the classification of the first question as the second and of the second question as the seventh does not mean that there were at least five other questions by master William, but rather that, very probably in Naples, a cycle of lectures was held, in which master William determined the second and seventh questions. A complete reading of the two questions should go some way toward determining the identity of master William; a clue can be discerned based on an internal principle: N contains questions by three Williams, specifically named as Alnwick, Ware and William Amidani of Cremona O.H.S.A. (ff. 72rb–73va, before the questions edited by Alliney). In reference to William of Cremona, only two quodlibetal questions appear and the second is numbered as the sixth, concerning the beatific vision: "Utrum fruitio sit essentialiter ipsa beatitudo vel actus beatificus". The first question attributed to Master William asks "Utrum Deus sit obiectum fidei et visionis beatae sub infinita ratione", whereas the second inquires "Utrum anima sit tota in toto et tota in qualibet parte". This conjunction seems to favour the attribution of the two questions to William of Cremona and not to Alnwick; but, together with the Neapolitan debate, it further testifies to the importance assigned to the theme of the beatific vision during Alnwick's stay in Naples.

This volume provides the critical edition and the English translation of questions 1–6 of the Prologue of Alnwick's commentary on the Sentences and of the two questions *de scientia* which, as we will see, are directly connected to this Prologue. The fundamental contents of these questions will be analyzed according to the doctrinal-historical method, in the context of the complexity of Alnwick's thought and of his cultural background.

This edition includes the first two prologue questions, already edited by Joachim D'Souza[5] and Stephen F. Brown,[6] respectively, for at least three reasons:

1) both Joachim D'Souza[7] and Stephen F. Brown[8] produced non critical editions of qq. 1–2 of Prologue, without taking into account C and P, respectively;
2) D'Souza deliberately refrained from transcribing from A and P the §§ 89–108 and 241–321 of the first prologue question;
3) by reading only A, Brown has handed down an imperfect text, in which the second question is also shorter than the one in P.

Therefore, we will now proceed to focus on Alnwick's works.

5 See D'Souza 1973, pp. 437–475.
6 See Brown 1967, pp. 39–107, in part. 61–107.
7 See D'Souza 1973, pp. 437–475.
8 See Brown 1966, pp. 36–65; Brown 1967, pp. 39–107.

1. The Works

In the light of the available data, a detailed list of these works by Alnwick is reported below, question by question for the reader's convenience. It is combined with a verification of the prologue questions in the relative codices and with the observation of C, N and V. The list has been completed by making a subdivision of the questions in the commentary to *Sentences* in the appropriate Distinctions, and recording the editions in the notes.

Quaestiones in quattuor libros Sententiarum

Prologus

q.	Titulus	Locus
1	Utrum ab eodem intellectu eadem obiecta possint simul esse credita per fidei adhaerentiam et scita per rei evidentiam[9]	A, ff. 1r–11v; C, ff. 1ra–6rb; P, ff. 13ra–20vb
2	Utrum theologia sit scientia speculativa vel practica[10]	A, ff. 11v–20v; P, ff. 20vb–27vb
3	Utrum habitus practicus et speculativus distinguantur principalius per obiecta vel per eorum fines	A, ff. 20v–25r; C, ff. 10rb–12va; P, ff. 27vb–31va
4	Utrum finis quo fit talis distinctio sit propria operatio intellectiva an alterius potentiae operatio bona	A, ff. 25r–29v; C, ff. 12vb–14vb; P, ff. 31va–35ra
5	Utrum theologia in canonica Scriptura explicata sit proprie scientia	A, ff. 29v–34r; P, ff. 35ra–38va
6	Utrum notitia intellectiva fruitioni ultimi finis conformiter elicita sit simpliciter practica	A, f. 34r; P, ff. 38va–39va
7	Utrum possibile sit intellectum nostrum coniunctum cognoscere de Deo quid est per creaturas[11]	A, ff. 34v–37v; P, ff. 39va–42rb
8	Utrum Deus sit cognoscibilis a nobis quid est secundum aliquem conceptum communem univoce sibi et creaturis ut secundum conceptum entis[12]	A, ff. 37v–44v; C, ff. 7ra–10rb; P, ff. 1ra–6va
9	Utrum scientia possit advenire intellectui absque omni mutatione a parte sui intellectus noviter intelligentis	P, ff. 6vb–12vb; P1[13], ff. 44ra–49vb; V, ff. 41v–45r
	Utrum scientia possit causari a Deo immediate in intellectu nostro sine obiecto praeostenso[14]	P1, ff. 49vb–51rb; V, ff. 39r–41v

9 D'Souza 1973, pp. 437–475.
10 Brown 1967, pp. 61–107.
11 Bassi 1993, pp. 133–156.
12 Dumont 1987, pp. 35–75.
13 = ms. Padua, Antonian Library, 295 scaff. XIII.
14 This question follows q. 9, but it is not countable.

Liber primus

d.	q.	Titulus	Locus
1	un.	Utrum necesse sit voluntatem frui ultimo fine sibi ostenso a ratione[15]	A, ff. 44v–48r
3	1	Utrum necesse sit ponere species intelligibiles impressas in memoria praeter speciem que est in phantasia	A, ff. 48r–49v
3	2	Utrum intellectus agens sit aliquid ipsius imaginis vel alicuius partis eius	A, ff. 49v–51v
4	un.	Utrum generatio in divinis sit aequivoca vel univoca	A, ff. 51v–52v
5	un.	Utrum Filius generetur a substantia Patris	A, ff. 52v–54v
7	un.	Utrum principium elicitivum actus generandi sit aliquid absolutum vel respectivum	A, ff. 54v–55r
8	un.	Utrum simplicitati divinae repugnet habere diversas perfectiones essentiales seu diversa attributa distincta ex natura rei	A, ff. 55r–57v; P, ff. 42rb–44rb
10	un.	Utrum voluntas divina sit principium producendi personam	P, ff. 44rb-vb
11–12	1	Utrum Spiritus Sanctus procedat a Patre et Filio	P, ff. 44vb–45vb
11–12	2	Utrum Pater et Filius spirent Spiritum Sanctum in quantum sunt unum	P, ff. 45vb–47ra
11–12	3	Utrum, si Spiritus Sanctus non procederet a Filio, realiter distinguitur ab eo	P, f. 47rb-va
17	un.	Utrum caritas vel aliqua forma possit augeri secundum essentiam	A, ff. 57v–59r; P, ff. 48va–50va
18	un.	Utrum Spiritus Sanctus dicatur esse donum proprietate relativa, per quam constituatur in esse personali, sive utrum donum dicat proprietatem personalem Spiritus Sancti	P, f. 50va-b
19	un.	Utrum personae divinae sint in se invicem per circumimcessionem	P, ff. 50vb–52ra
20	un.	Utrum personae divinae sint aequales in potentia	A, f. 59rv; P, ff. 52ra–53vb
25	1	Utrum in divinis sint aliquae relationes reales ad intra praeter relationes originis	P, ff. 53vb–55vb
25	2	Utrum relatio originis vel quaecumque alia relatio distinguatur ab essentia divina ex natura rei	P, ff. 55vb–57vb
26	un.	Utrum personae divinae constituantur in esse personali et distinguantur per relationes originis	P, ff. 57vb–59ra
27	un.	Utrum verbum mentis nostrae sit operatio intellectualis vel notitia actualis vel terminus eius	P, ff. 59ra–60ra

15 Alliney 1993, pp. 113–128.

35	un.	Utrum, ad hoc quod Deus sciat alia a se, requiratur relatio aliqua essentiae divinae ad scita	P, ff. 60ra–61rb
36	un.	Utrum necesse sit ponere ideas in Deo ad hoc quod cognoscat distincte alia ab ipso	A, ff. 59v–61r; P, ff. 61rb–62va
42–44	un.	Utrum potentia Dei activa sit infinita secundum vigorem	A, f. 61rv; P, ff. 62va–64ra
45	un.	Utrum voluntas Dei sit alicuius effectus causa necessario productiva	P, f. 64ra-va

Liber secundus

1	1	Utrum creatio-actio et creatio-passio sint idem actus realiter et in eodem subiecto formaliter	N, ff. 74ra-vb; P, ff. 66ra–68rb
1	2	Utrum creabile, antequam crearetur, habuerit essequidditativum distinctum realiter a Deo creante	N, ff. 74vb–75va; P, ff. 68rb–71rb
1	3	Utrum Deus possit de nihilo aliquid producere	P, ff. 71rb–73va
1	4	Utrum Deus possit illam potentiam [creandi] communicare creaturae	P, ff. 73va–76vb
1	5	Utrum mundo repugnet fuisse ab aeterno	N, ff. 75va–76vb; P, ff. 76vb–79vb
1	6	Utrum creatio sit idem quod esse creaturae	N, ff. 76rb–77ra
1	7	Utrum cognitio creaturarum in Patre praeintelligatur productioni Verbi	N, ff. 77ra-va
1	8	Utrum relatio creaturae ad Deum sit aliquid positivum additum differens re a substantia creaturae	N, ff. 77va–78rb
1	9	Utrum in permanentibus creatio et conservatio sint idem	N, ff. 78rb-va
1	10	Utrum omnia esse producta a Deo effective possit demonstrari	N, ff. 78va–79va
2[16]	1	Utrum tempus habeat aliquod esse reale extra animam	A, ff. 61r–64r; N, ff. 79va–80ra; P, ff. 79vb–82rb; ms. vat. lat. 869, ff. 119rb–121ra; V, ff. 95v–96v
	2	Utrum tempus secundum esse reale, quod habet extra animam, differat realiter a motu	A, ff. 64r–66r; N, ff. 80ra-vb; P, ff. 82rb–85ra
	3	Utrum omnium temporalium sit unum tempus	A, ff. 66r–69r; P, ff. 85ra–87va
3	1	Utrum natura angelica individuetur per aliquid positivum additum super naturam angelicam[17]	A, ff. 69r–71v; P, ff. 88va–91va; ms. vat. lat. 869, ff. 121ra–123va; V, ff. 96v–99r
3	2	Utrum possibile sit apud Deum duos angelos esse in eadem specie	P, ff. 91va–95ra
4–7	1	Utrum angelus cognoscat se per essentiam	P, ff. 95ra–96vb

16 Alliney 2002.
17 Stella 1968a, pp. 338–374.

4–7	2	Utrum angelus possit cognoscere Deum puris naturalibus	P, ff. 96vb–98rb
4–7	3	Utrum angelus cognoscat alia per suam essentiam	P, ff. 98rb–99vb
4–7	4	Utrum angelus cognoscat quidditates distinctas per eandem rationem	P, ff. 99vb–102va
4–7	5	Utrum [angelus] in primo instanti suae creationis peccaverit	P, ff. 102va–104va
8	1	Utrum [angeli] ex puris naturalibus possint diligere Deum plus quam se super omnia	P, ff. 104va–105ra
8	2	Utrum angeli proficiant in cognoscendo, accipiendo cognitionem a rebus	P, ff. 105ra–107ra
9	un.	Utrum angeli superiores possint illuminare inferiores	A, ff. 71v–72v; P, ff. 107ra–108rb
10	un.	Utrum omnes angeli mittantur	P, ff. 108rb-va
11	un.	Utrum angeli possint proficere in cognitione rerum, recipiendo aliquas species de novo	A, ff. 72v–74r; P, ff. 108va–111ra
12	un.	Utrum materiam esse sine formam includat contradictionem	P, ff. 111ra–113ra
13	un.	Utrum lumen productum a corpore seu a corpore luminoso sit productum de potentia medii sive originaliter ab ista luce	P, ff. 113ra–114va
14	un.	Utrum motus caeli sit naturalis	P, ff. 114va–116vb
15	un.	Utrum forma sensitiva bruti producatur in esse a generante vel a creante	P, ff. 116vb–119rb
16	un.	Utrum imago Dei in angelo et in anima intellectiva sit eiusdem speciei	P, ff. 119rb–121rb
17	1	Utrum anima intellectiva sit forma hominis	P, ff. 121rb–122vb
17	2	Utrum potentia intellectiva sit formaliter et per essentiam suam libera	P, ff. 122vb–123vb; V, f. 79rv
		Utrum intellectus sit liber per essentiam sicut voluntas	V, f. 79v
		Utrum ens sit obiectum intellectus	P, ff. 123vb

Liber tertius

d.	q.	Titulus	Locus
1	1	Utrum possibile sit Verbum divinum incarnari	A, ff. 74r–75v
1	2	Utrum possibile sit plures personas divinas unam et eandem naturam humanam assumere	A, ff. 75v–76v
2	un.	Utrum totalitas et integritas naturae humanae fuerint assumpta a Verbo	A, ff. 76v–78r
3	un.	Utrum beata Virgo fuerit plus gavisa de conceptione Filii Dei quam de eius passione doluerit	A, f. 78r
10	un.	Utrum Christus secundum humanam naturam sit persona	A, f. 78rb
11	un.	Utrum de virtute sermonis haec sit vera “Christus est creatura”	A, ff. 78v–79r

23	um.	Utrum habitus habeat rationem principii activi respectu actus eliciendi	A, f. 79rv
26	1	Utrum passiones concupiscibilis praecedant naturaliter passiones irascibilis	A, f. 79v
26	2	Utrum spes passio sit prima inter passiones irascibilis	A, ff. 79v–80r
26	3	Utrum spes sit virtus theologica distincta a fide et caritate	A, ff. 80r–81r
28	1	Utrum praeter caritatem infusam sit necesse ponere caritatem adquisitam	A, f. 81rv
28	2	Utrum caritas infusa sit unus habitus secundum speciem specialissimam	A, ff. 81v–82v
33	un.	Utrum virtus seu habitus ex ratione sua formali sit forma absoluta vel respectiva	A, ff. 82v–84r; V, ff. 125v–126r
35	un.	Utrum sit una prudentia specie directiva circa omnia agibilia, in qua connectantur omnes virtutes morales	A, ff. 84r–85v
36	un.	Utrum circa diversa agibilia secundum speciem sit alia et alia prudentia secundum speciem	A, ff. 85v–86v

Liber quartus

1	1	Utrum sacramenta novae legis habeant aliquam causalitatem respectu gratiae sacramentalis	A, ff. 89r–91r
1	2	Utrum in sacramentis novae legis sit aliqua virtus ad gratiam in anima inducendam	A, ff. 91r–93v
1	3	Utrum sacramenta novae legis imprimant caracterem in anima suscipientis ea	A, ff. 93v–95v
1	4	Utrum caracter impressus sit aliqua forma absoluta vel respectiva	A, ff. 95v–97r
1	5	Utrum caracter sit subiective in essentia animae vel in aliqua eius potentia	A, ff. 97r–98r
1	6	Utrum sacramentum possit definiri	A, ff. 98r–100r
2	1	Utrum baptismus sit ablutio corporis exterior facta sub forma verborum praescripta	A, ff. 100r–101r
2	2	Utrum sacramentum baptismi sit omnis culpae exclusivum et gratiae collativum	A, ff. 101r–103r
7	un.	Utrum confirmatio sit sacramentum	A, ff. 103r–104v
11	1	Utrum substantia panis possit converti in verum corpus Christi	A, ff. 104v–106r
			A, f. 87r

Tabula quaestionum

11	2	Utrum, facta conversione, substantia panis adnihiletur
12–13	1	Utrum totus Christus contineatur vere et realiter in sacramento eucharestiae
12–13	2	Utrum Christus possit facere corpus suum esse simul et semel localiter in diversis locis

12–13	3	Utrum in sacramento eucharestiae post conversionem factam sit aliquod accidens sine obiecto
12–13	4	Utrum alia accidentia quae sunt in sacramento eucharestiae praeter dimenssiones sint in subiecto
12–13	5	Utrum accidentia remanentia in sacramento eucharestiae post conversionem possint agere in aliquid extrinsecum
14	un.	Utrum poenitentia sit virtus
23	1	Utrum extrema unctio sit sacramentum
23	2	Utrum sacramentum extremae unctionis sit iterabile
24	un.	Utrum sint tantum septem ordines
25	un.	Utrum in quolibet ordine imprimatur caracter
26	un.	Utrum sacramentum matrimonii sit de lege naturae
43	1	Utrum resurrectio mortuorum sit possibilis
43	2	Utrum in resurrectione reformatio corporis sit possibilis per naturam
43	3	Utrum iteratio unionis animae ad corpus reformatum sit possibilis per naturam
44	un.	Utrum quidquid est de veritate humanae naturae in aliquo homine, resurget in ipso
49	1	Utrum beatitudo naturae rationalis consistat in operatione seu in actu secundo
49	2	Utrum beatitudo hominis sit vitae humanae ultimus finis

As can be seen, many distinctions are completely missing and many others appear either in A or else in P but not both. In the Prologue, q. 8 is actually to be found at the beginning of P, preceding q. 9, that is not present in A, but in p1 and V.[18] A note in the margin at the beginning of P states that these two questions should be postponed until after the seventh prologue question. In fact, in that very section of the Codex there is another note that confirms the insertion,[19] which a later scribe took care to repeat in the lower margin, specifying the titles of the two questions to prevent any doubt from arising.[20] Qq. 1, 3, 4 and 8 are also to be found in C, but in a different order, i.e. 1–8–3–4 and with an added question between q. 1 and q. 8, namely "Utrum intellectus sit

18 P, f. 2r: "Nota quod istae duae questiones primae debent ordinari inferius post questionem de cognoscibilitate Dei a nobis vel natura".

19 P, f. 42rb: "Nota quod duae primae quaestiones debent ordinari hic".

20 P, in mg.: "Nota quod hoc debent ordinari primae duae quaestiones istius voluminis, videlicet de conceptu entis quoad Deum et creaturam et utrum scientia adveniat intellectui absque mutatione".

unus in omnibus hominibus". This question, which evidently takes for granted the Averroist theory of the separate intellect, is in a different handwriting and lacks a number. In C, q. 8 presupposes q. 7, that is missing, since it starts with the *formula* "Visum est in quaestione praecedente quid est cognoscibilis a nobis quid sit secundum ipsius proprium conceptum".

Only A contains the dd. 1, 3–5, 7 of Book I, the whole of Book III, the question of d. 33 on the absolute or relative character of moral virtue being also available in V, and all of Book IV, which ends abruptly at d. 11, despite the fact that the *tabula quaestionum*, written in the same Codex, continues by indexing other questions which have evidently been lost.

While A is a commentary to all four books on the *Sentences*, P contains a commentary only on the first two books; in P the commentary is more voluminous because of the large number of questions inserted from P. As to Book I, dd. 10–12, 18–19, 25–27, 35–36, 45 can be found only in P. Book II starts with the first distinction, that is present in P, but this distinction, like part of the second, is shared by N. In the first distinction only the qq. 1–2 and 5 are common to both N and P; the other 7 are all present either in N or in P. In fact, while P adds qq. 3–4 which deal with the divine power to create from nothing and the communicability of this power to the creatures, after the question on the eternity of the world, common to N and P, N introduces no less than 5 questions that consider creation in regard to the nature of the creatures' being, the order of divine persons, conservation, the existence of a relationship between creatures and God, and the demonstrability of universal production by God. N contains only the first two questions of the second Distinction *de tempore* and the first question of this distinction survives in the two Vatican versions, too; these Vatican versions also preserve the first question of the third Distinction. Only in P the second question of the third Distinction can be found, as well as the dd. 4–8, 10, 12–17, of which the last question also appears in V; in this Codex there is also another question on a similar topic, whereas P continues with a question on being as an object of the intellect. The commentary to *Sentences* in P ends here.

In the light of all this evidence, A and P seem to conserve two independent commentaries, the first which extends over all four books, but in a rarefied form, while the second ends at Book II, but is presented in a denser form. The remaining codices transmit too few questions to justify further commentaries. Rather, what they conserve is a series of separate treatises to be inserted or excluded from one or another commentary to *Sentences*.

Comparing the scheme of the four books on *Sentences* with those of *Quaestiones ordinariae*, *Quodlibet*, *Determinationes* and *quaestiones variae*, we can see that there are several affinities among the issues faced. For example, the ninth prologue question deals with the possibility that the formation of the scientific habit may alter the intellect where this habit arises; this theme is connected to that of whether this habit is located in the senses or the intellect, and this issue is the object of the first *determinatio* and the first *quaestio varia*. The first *determinatio* of the second series openly faces the Averroist theory of the separate

intellect which underlies the other questions. Another recurrent theme is the formal distinction *ex parte rei*; this is considered in d. 8 of Book I on *Sentences* regarding the question of the compatibility of the divine essence with its attributes, in the second question of d. 25 regarding the essence and the divine relationships and in the second question of the first distinction of Book II, which poses the question whether the quidditive being of the creature was distinct from God before the creation. This theme is presented again in the first questions, ordinary and quodlibetal, in *Determinationes* 14–16 and *quaestio varia* 3. Investigation is made in the d. 35 of Book I of the commentary to *Sentences* on the necessity of a relationship of God with the known thing for the divine science of things other than God. This science returns in *determinatio* 3, which is proposed in order to support this very science. The eternity of the world is discussed in the fifth question of the d. 1 of Book II, and then recurs widely in *Determinationes* 8–10, which refer this eternity to the subsequent permanent beings, as well as to the world. The next part in Book II of the commentary to *Sentences* is a question that probes the issue as to whether the creatures' cognition is to be considered inherent in the Father before the production of the Word, as the second Trinity person; this question is extended to the three divine persons in the fourth quodlibetal question. *Determinatio* 14 deals with the continuous or discrete character of time, linking up with the second distinction of Book II on *Sentences de tempore*. Instead, the second *quaestio varia* examines the principle of individuation, which is related only to the angel in the first question of the third distinction of Book II. *Determinatio* 5 intends to demonstrate precisely what is analyzed in the first question of d. 17 of Book II on *Sentences*: the intellective soul as the substantial form of man. D. 33 of Book III of the commentary to *Sentences* and *determinatio* 4 have this same theme in common: the absolute or relative character of the moral virtues. Although missing, d. 39 of Book IV on *Sentences* was intended to deal with the nature of human beatitude, stemming from which the fifth quodlibetal question aims to discover how to attain this. Finally, the possibility that God knows infinite things is examined both in the ninth quodlibetal question and in *determinatio* 22, which is announced in the future tense as providing the answers to the main arguments in *determinatio* 2, relating to the number of parts of diverse continuous quantities[21].

21 ms. Vatican City, Apostolic Library, vat. palat. lat. 1805, f. 14r: "Ad ista respondebam diffuse in illa quaestione An Deus cognoscat infinita".

Quaestiones disputatae de esse intelligibili

q.	Titulus	ed. Athanasius Ledoux, *Guillelmi de Alnwick Quaestiones disputatae de esse intelligibili et de quodlibet*, Florentiae 1937, pp.
1	Utrum esse repraesentatum obiecti repraesentati sit idem realiter cum forma repraesentante	1–28
2	Utrum esse intelligibile conveniens creaturae ab aeterno sit idem realiter cum Deo	29–63
3	Utrum esse intelligibile conveniat ab aeterno creaturae intrinsece et formaliter	64–93
4	Utrum esse intelligibile conveniens creaturae ab aeterno sit causatum ab essentia divina	94–117
5	Utrum esse intelligibile aeternum creaturae sit productum ab intellectu divino	118–143
6	Utrum esse intelligibile conveniens creaturae ab aeterno sit productum	144–178

Quodlibet

q.	Titulus	ed. Ledoux, *Guillelmi de Alnwick Quaestiones disputatae de esse intelligibili et de quodlibet*, pp.
1	Utrum ad aliqua non esse eadem formaliter sequatur ista esse formaliter distincta	179–200
2	Utrum perfectiones simpliciter sint eaedem formaliter in Deo	201–248
3	Utrum in divinis sit prioritas et posterioritas secundum rem	249–286
4	Utrum notitia actualis creaturarum praesupponatur in Deo Patre productionibus passivis aliarum personarum	287–336
5	Utrum homo possit consequi omnem beatitudinem per naturam quam naturaliter appetit	337–365
6	Utrum perfectiones creaturarum contineantur in Deo	367–403
7	Utrum omnes perfectiones creaturarum contineantur in Deo unitive per unicam perfectionem ex parte Dei	404–443
8	Utrum perfectiones creaturarum, prout contineantur in Deo virtualiter, distinguantur a Deo et inter se formaliter sive ex natura rei intentionaliter	444–487
9	Utrum Deus cognoscat infinita	488–551
10	Utrum intellectus creatus, videns Deum per essentiam, possit videre omnia quae Deus videt	552–644

Determinationes

q.	Titulus	Locus
1	Utrum habitus scientiae sit subiective in intellectu[22]	V1[23], ff. 1r–6v
2	Utrum in maiore quantitate continua sint plures partes in potentia quam in minori	V1, ff. 6v–17r; vat. lat. 6768, ff. 89vb–95ra; ms. Oxford, Bodleian Library, laud Misc. 226, ff. 77vB–81vB
3	Utrum ratione naturali possit evidenter ostendi Deum intelligere alia a se ipso	V1, ff. 17v–34r
4	Utrum virtutes morales sint per se et essentialiter formae respectivae vel absolutae	V1, ff. 34r–43v
5	Utrum ratione naturali possit evidenter ostendi quod anima intellectiva sit forma corporis humani[24]	V1, ff. 43v–52v
6	Utrum ratione naturali possit evidenter ostendi ipsam esse immortalem[25]	V1, ff. 52v–60v
7	Utrum ratione naturali possit evidenter ostendi quod multiplicietur ad multiplicationem corporum humanorum	V1, ff. 60v–66r
8	Utrum possibile fuerit entia successiva, ut locum et tempus, fuisse ab aeterno	V1, ff. 66r–74r
9	Utrum possibile fuerit entia permanentia alia a Deo fuisse ab aeterno	V1, ff. 74r–84r
10	Utrum asserere mundum fuisse ab aeterno fuerit de intentione Aristotelis[26]	V1, ff. 84r–92v; ms. vat. ottob. lat. 318, ff. 50v–55r
11	Utrum Deus de necessitate produxit mundum	V1, ff. 92v–101v
12	Utrum intelligere aliud a Deo sit perfectio simpliciter	V1, ff. 101v–107r
13	Utrum Deus cognoscat futura contingentia per essentiam suam repraesentantem vel per voluntatem suam determinantem[27]	V1, ff. 107r–112r
14	Utrum quaecumque sunt distincta ex natura rei, sunt distincta realiter[28]	V1, ff. 112r–114v
15	Utrum in Deo essentia et relatio distinguantur formaliter ex natura rei	V1, ff. 114v–120r
16	Utrum potentiae animae sint eaedem realiter cum essentia animae[29]	V1, ff. 120r–128r; ms. vat. Ottob. Lat. 318, ff. 28va–36rb
17	Utrum tempus sit quantitas discreta aut continua[30]	V1, ff. 128r–136v
18	Utrum voluntas humana possit se movere ad actum intelligendi[31]	V1, ff. 137v–148r

22 Stella 1968b, pp. 769–787.
23 ms. Vatican City, Apostolic Library, vat. palat. lat. 1805.
24 Prezioso 1966, pp. 35–85.
25 Prezioso 1964a, pp. 36–90.
26 Prezioso 1962, pp. 27–69.
27 Schmaus 1932, pp. 201–225.
28 Noone 1993, pp. 245–261.
29 Piana 1982, pp. 199–231.
30 a. 4, ed. T. B. Noone, in: Alliney 2002, pp. 159–170.
31 Prezioso 1964b, pp. 55–112.

19	Utrum motus sit de genere termini ad quem est	V1, ff. 148r–151r
20	Utrum minimus ignis possit corrumpi	V1, ff. 151r–154r
21	Utrum quies opponatur motui privative	V1, ff. 154r–155r
22	Utrum Deus actu cognoscat infinita	V1, ff. 155r–161v
23	Utrum realitas relationis extra animam, qua una creatura refertur ad aliam, sit alia a realitate sui fundamenti	V1, ff. 161v–166v
24	Utrum relatio habeat esse suum proprium et completum extra animam et non per operationem intellectus	V1, ff. 166v–177r
25	Utrum una et eadem relatione numero idem potest referri ad duos terminos, ut eadem paternitate ad duos filios	V1, ff. 177r–181v; ms. vat. ottob. lat. 318, ff. 42v–50v
26	Utrum relatio sit aliquid compositum ab absoluto et respectivo	V1, ff. 181v–186r
27	Utrum relationis inesse distinguitur a suo ad aliud esse	V1, ff. 186r–187v
28	Utrum aliquid aliud a Deo sit formaliter necesse esse	V1, ff. 187v–193v

Aliae Determinationes

q.	Titulus	F, ff.
1	Utrum intellectus agens sit substantia separata	79v–80r
2	Utrum consilia Evangelica includant perfectionem	80v–82v

The scheme of *Quaestiones variae* comes next. This title is purely a convention and is not found in any codex. The numeration is arbitrary, too, inserted only for the purpose of precisely indicating each question.

Quaestiones variae

q.	Titulus	Locus
1	Utrum scientia vel habitus sit in intellectu[32]	ms. vat. Ottobr. lat. 318, ff. 176v–177v
2	Utrum individuum sive singulare addat supra naturam specificam aliquam differentiam sui generis sibi intrinsecam[33]	Ms. vat. lat. 6768, ff. 112ra–114vb
3	Utrum simplicitas divina compatiatur secum aliquam distinctionem ex natura rei, praeviam distinctioni personarum	V, ff. 87rb–88va
4	Utrum actio sit subiective in agente	ms. Florence, National Library, Conv. Suppr., I III 6, ff. 121ra–122vb
5	An virtus moralis sit forma absoluta vel relativa	V, ff. 125va–126ra.

Questio varia 5 is recalled in the first *determinatio*[34].

32 Kuksewicz 1961, pp. 18–24; Stella 1968b, pp. 795–798.
33 Stella 1968a, pp. 338–374.
34 See Guillelmus Alnevicanus *Determinationes quaestio 1*, a. 4, p. 786.

2. The witnesses

A (= ms. Assisi, Town Library, 172)[35]
A is a composite, membranaceous work that measures an average of 259x180 mm, and consists of 269 sheets. A was kept at the sacred Convent of Assisi and dates back to the 13th–14th centuries, and was written by several scribes in *scriptio continua* up to f. 207 and then in two columns, and bound on paper rods. Forty-eight folios are missing, namely ff. 107–112, 170–142, 208–241, while ff. 88rv, 123–124v, 267v and 268r are blank.

The codex consists of four parts, that retain the ancient numbering; only the last of them dates back to the 13th century and is written on two columns. The first part, written in an elegant *anglica scriptio continua* with the capitals painted red and light blue, contains Alnwick's commentary to the *Sentences* with a few, rare, corrections in the margin in the same script as the text.

Alnwick's commentary is followed by some *Collationes*, messy questions by Scotus and various questions by Harclay, James of Ascoli and anonymous authors in the second part (ff. 113–172), some quodlibetal questions by Harvey of Nedellec and Nicholas of Lyra in the third part (ff. 173–207), the quodlibetal questions by Bonaventure of Balneoregio and excerpts of the commentary by Peter of Tarantaise to Sentences in the fourth part (ff. 242–268).

C (= ms. Krakow, Jagellonic Library, 732)[36]
C is a composite, membranaceous work which consists of 93 folios and measures an average of 320x220 mm; it can be dated back to the first quarter of the 14th century, and was written on two columns by various different hands. C belonged to the master of Nysse, Professor and Rector of the University of Krakow in the second half of the 15th century.

C includes a number of collections of questions by different authors. Apart from Alnwick's, there are many others, which quote the opinions of Alnwick, Thomas Aquinas called 'frater Thomas', Henry of Ghent, Giles of Rome, Scotus, Robert of Cowton, Richard of Conington, James of Ascoli, Peter Auriol and Landulph Caracciolo of Naples. A large part of these questions can be found in V and in the ms. vat. Lat. 869.

P (= ms. Padua, Antonian Library, 291 scaff. XIII)[37]
P is membranaceous, measures an average of 350x250 mm, and consists of 125 folios. It is transcribed in a fairly inelegant *libraria* script on two columns

35 This witness has been described by Doucet 1932, pp. 257–274, 378–389, 502–524, in part. 258; Stella 1968a, p. 614.

36 This witness has been described by Wlodek 1967, pp. 117–133, in part. 117–119. I thank Zofia Wlodek for having sent to me her description contained in Kozlowska 1993, pp. 222–226.

37 This witness has been described by Abate/Luisetto 1975, pp. 278–279; Ledoux 1937, pp. 46–48.

averaging 54 lines, and the capitals are painted red and light blue, and bound on brown leather rods. Dating back to the 14th century, in the upper margin of the first cover sheet P bears a contemporary inscription that clearly describes the content: "Quaestiones super Sententias Alnveik magistri Anglici". On the second cover sheet is marked the name of the owner, namely Ioannes de Crusania de Padua, together with the *tabula quaestionum*.

The codex conserves Book I (ff. 1r–65v) and Book II (ff. 66r–122v) of Alnwick's commentary, as stated in the note found at the end of the commentary, i.e. "Quaestiones Alnweik super primum et secundum Sententiarum". The two books consist of two independent parts, transcribed by two distinct hands and numbered according to two different primary numerations that were later replaced by successive numbering. The first part enumerates 5 sexterns and 2 diplomes, originally numbered from 1 to 64 and now from 2 to 65, while the second part is made up of 4 sexterns and 1 quintern, originally numbered from 1 to 59 and now from 66 to 123. Both parts are faced with an equal number of cover folios, that report the various indexes.

P1 (= ms. Padua, Antonian Library, 295 scaff. XIII)[38]
P1 is a composite, membranaceous work which measures an average of 320x220 mm, and consists of 93 folios. It is written in Gothic script by several different copyists on various quinterns, and can be dated back to the 14–15th centuries. It is bound on axes with a white leather back and two metal clips.

P1 conserves a *Quodlibet* by Harvey of Nedellec (ff. 1r–26r), Peter Auriol's *Tractatus de principiis naturae* (ff. 26r–43v), Alnwick's two questions *de scientia*, written by a 14th century scribe (ff. 44r–51b) and a miscellaneous theological collection, transcribed in 15th century handwriting (ff. 52r–93v). The first part of this is, in fact, Alnwick's *Quodlibet* but with the questions set in a different order. F. 82ra is recognized to pose a question that deals with formal distinction. In it, Alnwick's arguments have been copied and are repeatedly recalled in the margin, for the purposes of discussion. This question seems to be the first of a *Quodlibet* that deals with the Scotist theories of *prioritas originis in quo* and with the absolute properties of God. The other questions declare[39]:

- Utrum Pater in priori originis quo praecedit Filium possit beatificari (f. 84va);
- Utrum Deus possit videre essentiam divinam, non videndo attributa (f. 86ra)
- Utrum per se et immediatum obiectum fruitionis sit Deus visus vel ipsa visio (f. 88vb)

Another *Quodlibet*, which begins at the f. 90ra, seems to conclude the codex. It is composed of two questions *de Verbo in divinis*: "Utrum Verbum in divinis aliquid libere repraesentet" and "Utrum quilibet beatus videre possit in Verbo infinita". But in fact, the codex ends with a question that is mutilated at its

38 This witness has been described by Abate/Luisetto 1975, pp. 278–279; Ledoux 1937, pp. 46–48.
39 See Fiorentino 2010a, pp. 7–36.

end, namely "Utrum praescientia humana actuum suorum repraesentet suo libero arbitrio" (f. 93va).

V (= Vatican City, Apostolic Library, vat. lat. 1012)[40]
V is a composite, membranaceous witness, and can be dated back to the 14th century. It measures an average of 341X252 mm., consists of 127 folios on two columns and the capitals are frequently painted red and light blue. It is preceded by two cover folios.

V consists of four sections, the first of which contains Alnwick's *Quaestiones disputatae*, *Quodlibet* and Alnwick's two questions *de scientia* (ff. 1ra–45rb). The second part has bequeathed to us the quodlibetal collection and five ordinary questions by James of Ascoli (ff. 46ra–66rb), while the third collects 56 questions on various topics by anonymous authors, including Alnwick (ff. 66va–109vb).

V ends with 27 questions of a *Quodlibet* III by an anonymous author who could be Alnwick in a question on the absolute or relative character of moral virtue (ff. 110ra–127va). In the margin, there are quotes of the opinions of Alexander of St. Elpidio, Giles of Rome, Henry of Harclay, Henry of Ghent, James of Viterbo, John Duns Scotus, Godfrey of Fontaines, Richard of Middletown, Robert of Cowton, Robert Grosseteste and Thomas Aquinas. William O. Duba has provided a complete list of these questions, identifying the authors as far as possible.[41]

3. The commentary to *Sentences*

As we have seen, it is commonly accepted that A and P conserve two distinct editions of Alnwick's commentary on *Sentences*. But scholars disagree as to the nature of the individual editions. For example, while Pietro Tommaso Stella has claimed that the teaching is one and the same, whereby A was presumably the Bachelor report and P the Master *ordination*,[42] in D'Souza's opinion, P was the complete transcription of a *Scriptum*, that has been abbreviated in A.[43]

The greater length of P than A has been stressed by Alliney,[44] Maria Elena Bassi[45] and Stephen D. Dumont, according to whom A and P could be independent copies from a common source which had already undergone several revisions.[46] However, they are not able to form teachings or commentaries which are entirely or partially different. According to Bassi[47], while P is longer

40 This witness has been described by Pelzer 1931, pp. 493–499.
41 See Duba 2007, pp. 640–650.
42 See Stella 1968a, pp. 620–621.
43 See D'Souza 1973, pp. 427–428.
44 See Alliney 1999, pp. 117–142.
45 See Bassi 1993, pp. 130–132.
46 See Dumont 1987, pp. 35–75.
47 See Bassi 1993, pp. 130–132; Dumont 1987, pp. 32–33.

and completes the references to the arguments mentioned above, A is more precise in the citations of the authorities[48]. Alliney believes that N conserves the first bachelor draft made in Paris, while the second, Oxford draft has survived in a more extensive form in P and abbreviated form in A.[49]

All this debate seems to feature one element in common, namely, that P can be judged more extensive than A. This element conditions the definitions of the nature of the two drafts. In fact, if an *ordinatio* may be considered more extensive than a *reportatio*, perhaps because the reportator was in a hurry, then P becomes the *ordinatio* and A the *Reportatio*. Instead, if it is thought that a *reportatio* may be longer than an *ordinatio* thanks to the master's greater concision, then P becomes the *Reportatio* and A the *Ordinatio*. In any case, it is the criterion of the greater length of P than A that might be cast in doubt, bearing in mind that although the individual question may seem *prima facie* to be longer in P, in the latter copy the last two books of the commentary to the *Sentences* are entirely omitted, as we have already noted. This finding warrants a more global view, not confined to the individual question each time when drawing up the edition, but embracing the entire commentary according to the scheme reported above. On this basis it is easy to see that the difference between A and P cannot be limited to the simple question of the greater length of P, but that this difference is inherent to the deeper structure of the commentary, since this commentary is decidedly different in A as compared to P. In other words, we are faced with two distinct commentaries which could reasonably correspond to two different readings. This could mean that in A the author is shown to have read all four books of *Sentences* even if not in great detail, whereas in P the author seems to have read only the first two books, but in greater depth. It can therefore be justifiably presumed that since both commentaries are attributed to Alnwick, he prepared two readings on *Sentences*, albeit for different purposes, for instance as bachelor and as master, bequeathing us two commentaries, the one in A and the one in P alternatively. As compared to these latter, N could contain yet another draft, but of this only the first two distinctions of Book II have survived. If we accept with Alliney that N predates A and P, Alnwick could have made use of N or a part of it in the S. Lorenzo Neapolitan Study to hold a cycle of conferences or lectures on the creation and on time.

48 See Bassi 1993, p. 131.
49 See Alliney 1999, pp. 117–142.

4. *Quaestiones de scientia*

The two questions *de scientia* have been handed down by three witnesses, namely P, ff. 6vb–13vb, P1, ff. 45ra–52va and V, ff. 39ra–45rb. In V the two questions follow immediately after Alnwick's *Quodlibet*, which ends at f. 39ra.[50] At f. 45va, which is the end of the two questions, a sort of index has been inserted:

Incipiunt tituli quaestionum de quolibet Wylhelmi de Alnewych de Ordine Fratrum Minorum doctoris sacrae theologiae

- Utrum esse intelligibile cognitum obiecti repraesentati sit idem realiter cum forma repraesentante et est idem utrum esse cognitum obiecti sit idem realiter cum actu cognoscendi
- Secundo quaeritur utrum esse intelligibile conveniens creaturae ab aeterno sit idem realiter cum Deo. [...]
- Sexto decimo utrum intellectus creatus videns divinam essentiam vel Deum perfecte possit videre omnia quae Deus videt

Explicit quodlibet fratris Wilhelmi de Alnwyck.
Sequentur duae aliae <quaestiones> ab eodem disputatae et determinatae.

- Prima est utrum scientia possit causari in intellectu nostro a Deo immediate, sine obiecto praeostenso
- Secunda est utrum scientia possit advenire intellectui scientis absque omni mutatione a parte sui intellectus noviter intelligentis.

This index, which clearly attributes the two questions to Alnwick, qualifies them as *disputatae et determinatae*, implying that they are contiguous not only in space but also in time with the quodlibetal questions. In other words, the two questions on science and the quodlibetal questions appear to be contemporary and to belong to the same cultural environment.

This contiguity seems to be partly confirmed by the fact that what appears in V as the second question *de scientia*, in P is inserted between what counts as the eighth prologue question in A and the first prologue question. This insertion, that has been added by a different scribe from the one that transcribed the subsequent questions, has the purpose of incorporating this question *de scientia* in the Prologue after the eighth prologue question, to be taken as the ninth prologue question, as suggested in the margin notes reported above.

In P the question *de scientia* is found to be shorter than in V, because it terminates at § 185, i.e. at the first paragraph of the answer to an argument opposing a missing "superior opinio", leaving space for the first prologue question. In P1 the two questions *de Scientia* are inserted after the *Tractatus de principiis naturae* of Peter Auriol, with two precise indications marked at the beginning

50 See V, f. 39ra: "Explicit quodlibet fratris Wilhelmi Alnwyc de Ordine Minorum, quod disputavit Oxoniae. Amen".

of each question, i.e. "Quaestio magistri Guillelmi Angliae"[51] and "Quaestio magistri Guillelmi de Anglia", but in inverse order as compared to V.

5. The variants

Now let us proceed to examine the variants, firstly of the six prologue questions and then of the two questions *de scientia*.

In general, as we have already noted, the prologue questions have been handed down *in toto* in witnesses A and P and in part in C. In P "ergo" is generally preferred to "igitur" and moved to serve as the first word in the sentence, unlike in A and C; in A "vel" is preferred to "sive", whereas in C "vero" has been copied instead of "autem".

Unlike A, P opts for "quamvis" instead of "licet", "Item" instead of "Praeterea" and "Constat" rather than "consistit". While in A the adjective tends to be placed after the noun, in P it appears before. P has the habit of marking Scotus' opinions in the margin, whereas in the text they appear in the form of *aliqui*, as they do in A and C. But only in the first and fifth questions are the authors and exact textual locations specified in the body of the text in both A and P. As to qq. 1–6, there is a sufficient number of distinguishing variants among all three witnesses to be able to exclude the possibility that each might be a copy of one of the others. Interpolations of A in C and P are rare[52]. Instead, there are frequent interpolations of P in A and C, since P generally adds the text of A in the margin, sometimes also adopted in C, in the revision phase. This phenomenon is particularly recurrent in q. 2 and then terminates as from q. 5[53]. In the first two questions there is no lack of cases where only P omits the text present in A or AC[54].

While at §§ 107, 119 of the third question, interpolations of P are simply juxtaposed at the end of the passages already present in A and C, elsewhere P receives fragments of the texts in A and C and adds them in the margins. For example, at the end of § 113, in the margin P adds "finis", that is already

51 See P, f. 45ra.

52 See below, q. 1, §§ 32, 101, 131, 134, 146–147, 247, 262. This § sees also an omission of A as regards CP, as well as at §§ 275–276, 282, 295, 300, 302. The interpolations of A in regard to CP recommence in q. 4 at § 61 and in q. 5 at § 24.

53 See below, q. 1, §§ 24, 57, 94, 98, 138, 257, 269, 283, 303, q. 2, §§ 16, 22–23, 25, 27, 34, 38, 48, 57–58, 68, 71, 73, 83, 87–88, 90, 95, 97, 100, 106, 109, 121, 136, 138, 144, 153, 157, 171, 176, 197, 203, 205, 207–208, 216–218, 220, 231, 236, 239, q. 3, §§ 107, 117, 119, 125, 128, 134–135, q. 4, § 17.

54 See below, q. 1, §§ 8, 253, 255, 295, 301–302, q. 2, §§ 27, 49, 102, 109, 213, 215, 249–252, 256. There are cases where only P interpolates A or AC (q. 1, §§ 148, 173, 240, 252–253, 278, 301, q. 2, §§ 20–21, 24, 36–37, 49, 60, 69, 101, 103, 120, 167, 182, 186, 217, 230–231, 234, 236–237, 241). In other cases it is C that interpolates (q. 1, §§ 33, 45, 60, 246, 258, 262, 274–275, 279, 291, 314), omits (q. 1, §§ 63–64, 68, 266, 305, 308, 313–314) or modifies the text of AP q. 1, §§ 91, 95, 100, 116, 132).

present in A and C behind "est", omitted by P. At § 125 the last passage interpolated in P with a note in the margin is taken from the body of the text in A and C. At § 128 two simple interpolations of P, to be seen in the central zone, are accompanied by a final note in the margin deduced from A and C. At § 134 the *syntagma* "originaliter organicus" in P is the result of two interpolations, i.e. that of "originaliter" with the margin note, which reports the text of A and C, and the immediately following "organicus", absent in A and C. Two other margin additions in P, drawn from A and C, appear at the next §. Here, what is numbered correctly for P as the next question, for A is simply another question whose real position is evidently not known, while C completely ignores the existence of the other question in A, as if it did not exist or were completely unknown. At § 17 of the fourth question there is another addition in the margin in P; a concomitant variant is found at the level of "ita" in A; this has been changed to "ita se habet" in C and "sic" in P.

All this evidence combines to establish that the group AC is antecedent to P, or more precisely, to the revised P. In other words, after its transcription P was revised by someone – perhaps the author himself – who introduced the notes in the margin. This reviser had the AC text at hand, in other words it pre-existed the revised P. Using this text, the reviser of P corrected the text of P as it had been previously transcribed. The revision of P seems to involve the correct order of the questions, too. But half-way through the fourth question P inserts a long interpolation that in all likelihood is resumed in the fifth question as from § 149.

q. 3, ms. P, f. 34vb	q. 4	§
de credibilibus intellectis scientifice cognoscatur modo, quo aliae causae humanae adqquiruntur ex sensibus per memoriam et rationes.	ex prioribus credibilibus intellectis scientifice cognoscitur modo, quo causae humanae adquiruntur ex sensibus per memoriam et rationes.	49
Contra hanc opinionem arguit Godefridus VIII Quolibet quaestione 7 sic [...]	Contra hanc opinionem arguit Godefridus VIII *Quolibet* quaestione 7 [...]	50

There is substantial agreement between the two texts as long as the interpolation lasts, i.e. up to § 54 of the fourth question.

The sixth question reads differently according to the two distinct redactions in A and P. In fact, it is presented in A in the form of a rough draft, which provides the compiler with instructions on how to retrieve the opinions and arguments and arrange them in the correct order.

This type of writing is also adopted by Ockham in *Quaestiones variae*. For example, in *quaestio varia* 2 there are frequently missing parts, which the compiler is invited to "quaerere alibi", mainly in the Prologue and in the third distinction of Ockham's Book I. This occurs at the end of the discussion about the Scotist opinion on the subject of science, for example,[55] on two Aristote-

55 See Guillelmus de Ockham *Quaestiones variae* q. 2, a. 2, p. 44, lin. 398.

lian authorities regarding the second condition of science,[56] as well the third condition[57] and the subsequent doubts.[58] Other "quaerere alibi" are present as regards the distinction between the subject and the property,[59] the identity of the apprehensive and judgmental habits,[60] the causal relation between the principle and the conclusion of the syllogism[61] and the definition of the subject as the middle term of the syllogism.[62] Elsewhere, the search for the missing part is addressed "in alio quaterno", or to another issue, for example as regards the Scotist distinction between quidditive and denominative concepts,[63] and the Scotist opinion of the unity of science.[64] On the subject of the order of concepts it was Ockham himself who recommended that the compiler should order the paragraphs "quaerere alibi" as "meliori modo quo posses".[65] As regards the habit of wisdom, Ockham invites the compiler to "reducere ad propositum bono modo" the paragraphs that are elsewhere "diffuse"[66]. In other words, Ockham is asking him to operate a "reduction", or summary of the contents to be found in a more extended version in the original.

At § 6 of Alnwick q. 6 in A, that is the beginning of the *divisio quaestionis*, the scribe of A invites the reader to "quaerere opinionem Scoti dicentis quod omnis cognitio intellectiva, quae extenditur ad fruitionem ultimi finis, respectu cuius conformiter elicitur, est practica, et eius improbationem supra quaestione Ultrum theologia sit scientia practica vel speculativa". The three articles are advised at § 8 on the issue and the solution of the arguments should be sought. Therefore, the compiler cannot do other than turn to Alnwick's second prologue question and copy down Scotus' opinion of the practical nature of theology, his confutation, the solution of the arguments of this confutation and the three question articles. This task has been undertaken by the scribe of P, further supporting its later date. In fact, in P Scotus' opinion appears immediately under the guise of "*aliqui*", identified as Scotus in a note in the margin according to the habit in P. But the question is mutilated because the third article has been abruptly shorn to leave space for the seventh question. This mutilation can be owed to the fact that, by his own admission, the compiler of P copied the sixth question from a notebook which included this question

56 See Guillelmus de Ockham *Quaestiones variae* q. 2, a. 2, p. 45, lin. 412–418.
57 See Guillelmus de Ockham *Quaestiones variae* q. 2, a. 2, p. 45, lin. 419–430.
58 See Guillelmus de Ockham *Quaestiones variae* q. 2, a. 2, p. 46, lin. 432–445, p. 56, lin. 447–452, p. 57, lin. 457–458.
59 See Guillelmus de Ockham *Quaestiones variae* q. 2, a. 3, p. 49, lin. 504–551.
60 See Guillelmus de Ockham *Quaestiones variae* q. 2, a. 3, p. 51, lin. 555–560; p. 52, lin. 577–579.
61 See Guillelmus de Ockham *Quaestiones variae* q. 2, a. 4, p. 52, lin. 589–597, p. 53, lin. 605.
62 See Guillelmus de Ockham *Quaestiones variae* q. 2, a. 4, p. 53, lin. 609–614.
63 See Guillelmus de Ockham *Quaestiones variae* q. 2, a. 4, pp. 48–49, lin. , 495–503, p. 49, lin. 513–514.
64 See Guillelmus de Ockham *Quaestiones variae* q. 2, a. 4, p. 50, lin. 334–336.
65 See Guillelmus de Ockham *Quaestiones variae* q. 2, a. 4, p. 49, lin. 504–512.
66 See Guillelmus de Ockham *Quaestiones variae* q. 2, a. 4, p. 51, lin. 555–560.

first and had a *deletio* which is not found either in A or in P. This can attest the existence of a witness other than A and P that evidently has not survived.[67]

Having established that P is posterior to the other two witnesses, we will now pass on to examine the relationships of C with A and P. C and P have in common several conjunctive variants.[68] In particular, we should note the concomitant variant of C and P as compared to A at § 34. In other words, this same passage in A is mutated in both C and P, but in a different way. Another concomitant variant emerges at § 75, where there is also a simple conjunctive variant of C and P. In fact, while "Similiter" is transcribed in A, in P we find "eodem modo" and in C "eodem modo intellectus", as if to show that C accepted the P variant and added "intellectus". This phenomenon can be observed in a more evident form at § 100, where the variant of P as compared to A reappears in C but in a slightly manipulated form.

There is no lack of conjunctive variants of A and C, which can be observed as from the end of the third question.[69]

At § 115, where there is "activum" in P, in A it is reported as "scientificum", and in C returns with an addition, to "factivum". At § 125 two variants of A and C are accompanied by other distinguishing variants of A as compared to C and P and of C compared to A and P. At § 93 of the fourth question the conjunctive variant of A and C is presented in a slightly more elaborate form in C; but there is also a variant of A as compared to C and P.

All this accumulated evidence seems to indicate that P and A are not dependent on C. It could be hypothesized *prima facie* that C follows first P and then A, but this hypothesis is confounded by the co-presence of conjunctive variants of A and C, on one hand, and of C and P, on the other. Here are some examples drawn from the fourth question. At § 30 the conjunctive variant of A and C is to be found at the beginning, when "quia" introduces the relative causal factor, while the variant of C and P is placed at the end. At § 54 P adds the *syntagma* "sive potentiae operativae inferioris", received by C except for the last adjective. Instead, C receives from A "ut patet inductive. Nam potentia frenefactiva", apart from a few slight changes.

C also presents independent variants[70]. In particular, the entire § 50 of the third question is interpolated in C, whereas at § 96 of the third question and § 29 of the fourth, C omits the final sentences. At § 85 of the third question there are two omissions in C. At the first § of the fourth question A and P employ "praecedens" to describe where the third question is located; instead, C uses "prior", or "first of two", allowing it to be understood that in C the third and fourth questions are an autonomous thematic block, independent of the

67 See below, q. 6, § 8.

68 See below, q. 1, §§ 32, 101, 131, 134, 146–147, 247, 262, 275–276, 282, 295, 300, q. 3, §§ 34, 51, 67, 74–75, 100.

69 See below, q. 3, §§ 115, 125–126, q. 4, §§ 7, 21, 30, 93.

70 See below, q. 3, §§ 50, 85, 96, q. 4, §§ 1, 29.

other prologue questions, reported in A and P. At § 29 C betrays a poor knowledge of Greek, transcribing "experientiam" instead of "eupraxiam".

Analysis of the minor variants of the first question *de scientia* or ninth prologue question does not yield interesting results owing to the high number of conjunctive and distinguishing variants among all three witnesses[71]. The variability of this question is not transferred to the second question *de scientia*, which is not conserved in P. But it is significant that the only variant (here pointed out in a note) of the second question is annotated in the margin in P1, attributed to John Duns Scotus, still a Bachelor "Duns", and mentioned in anonymous form in the text, whereas it has been incorporated in the text in V, in the name of *Doctor Subtilis*, now a well-known master.

As to the first question *de scientia* it should first of all be observed that P generally notes down the main passages of the text in the margin, creating a sort of recall system which the reader can easily browse to seek the desired information. Many of the variants distinguishing P from the other two codices reveal a certain copyist skill, as the latter did not mar the meaning of the text but simply reworded or transformed it. For example, see "praedictam" instead of "praescriptam" at § 4, "divisionem" as opposed to "distinctionem" and "fundamentum" instead of "formatur" at § 11. At § 14 in P "fundamentum" is preferred to "fundamentaliter" and at § 90 "fundamenti" is interpolated twice in the margin, whereas it is in the body of the text in P1V. At §§ 90 and 128 P does not feature two *vacat* adjacent to "primum" and "locum", unlike P1 and V. At § 15 "nullo" becomes "non" in P and at § 90 "mutata re" is transformed to "mutante".

The variants distinguishing V from P and P1 are revealed in all their technical character. For example, in V "transmutatur" is mutated to "transitur" at § 4, simple "huius" to the complex "differentiam primo illius" at § 11, "est ad aliquid" to "refertur ad scibile" at § 14, "unionem" to "mutationem" at § 117.

There are very few distinguishing variants of P1. Some examples are "sensitive" used instead of "subiectiva" at § 14, and "ad relationem" interpolated behind "primum" at § 15.

Let us now move on to the more consistent variants, all present in the first question *de scientia*. The first phenomenon which leaps to the eye is that P1 conserves the most extensive text. In fact, there is the least number of omissions in P1, present only at §§ 51, 72 with two cursory "etc." and at § 127. Here P1 fails to transcribe the last sentence of the argument it is answering.

P shows the greatest number of omissions, to be found at §§ 35, 136 at the beginning and the end, 23 and at §§ 36, 48 in association with other omissions of V. At § 125 P omits a sentence that is needlessly repeated in P1 and V, while at § 96 P unnecessarily repeats the last period, perhaps because of *homoioteleuton*. But there are three places in the text where P does not behave independently of P1 or V. For example, at § 76 the same omission at the end of the paragraph figures in both P and V. The entire § 139 is omitted by V and P, which continues

71 See below, q. 9, §§ 4, 11, 14–15, 90, 117, 121, 128; q. 2 de scientia, § 15.

with the omission started at the beginning of the previous paragraph. The concordance between P and V is lost at §§ 16–17. Here, P omits § 16, present in P1 and V, and interpolates it at the end of § 17, present in all three witnesses. But the interpolation reflects the text transcribed at § 16 in P1 but not V, because it demonstrates acceptance of the variants of P1 but not those of V. At § 136, V replaces the reading of P1, namely "qui secundum se est sicut tabula rasa" with "in qua nihil depingetur".

P accepts this reading in V and incorporates it in the text immediately after that of P1. But in the same § after "respectu scientiae" the interpolation of V is not handed down in P nor in P1.

V also features a large number of variants, for example at § 10 at the end, 18, 23, 27 at the end, 28, 34 at the end and at § 37. At §§ 36 and 48 the omissions in V are concomitant with those in P. However, V tends to fill in or reword the *vacat* found in P and P1. This occurs at § 27, for instance. At § 100 in P1 there are two *vacat*, the first of which has disappeared in V, while the entire relative sentence has been reworded in P; the second, present in P and P1, is filled in by the addition of "contrarium" prior to "affirmativum", which precedes the *vacat* in P and P1. The omissions of V as compared to P1 continue in the second question, for example at §§ 45–46 and 55, with "etc." which cuts out whole sentences. At §§ 3 and 17, V modifies the text at the end of the paragraph, and even lengthens it in the second case, by adding a statement that denies the *locutio Dei interior*, already ascribed to the prophets, to creatures and the angels. Apart from these major variants, the texts of P1 and V are co-ordinated to a marked degree.

Thus it can be concluded that the last draft of Alnwick's commentary to *Sentences* is certainly the P witness. As to the six prologue questions, P reworks the text in A, whereas C is influenced by a series of contaminations handed down by both A and P or by a lost witness very similar to both of these. As regards the two questions *de scientia*, P modifies the text of V, or more probably of P1. This would explain why these questions were firstly debated together with the *Quodlibet* or *Quaestiones disputatae* at Oxford, and then the first one was juxtaposed in P to become the ninth prologue question. The juxtaposition should have preceded the insertion of this question in the correct position but this insertion never took place. This phenomenon illustrates that P is not the final text but what immediately precedes it; P hands down the last but not definitive edition of Alnwick's commentary.

6. The editing criteria

This edition has been prepared by taking P as the reference codex and collating it and amending it on the basis of the other witnesses. Such amendments have been made *ope ingenii* in cases where only two codices are present, namely for the second prologue question, conserved in A and P; this method has also been used for the second question *de scientia*, which survives in P1 and V. In the other cases the procedure has been *ope codicum*.

The major variants in terms of contents have been recorded in the due *apparatus*. There is then the *apparatus* of the sources.

During the amendment phase the Latin text was normalized, as was the numbering of the passages, and modern punctuation was inserted. Titles are given in square brackets if not present in the manuscript witnesses. The titles of the works are highlighted in italics, while the names of the authors are distinguished by wider spacing.

7. Fundamental contents

This short presentation of the fundamental contents of this edition is focused on two of the main themes, namely theology as science or wisdom, and theology as practical or speculative science.

7.1 Theology as science or wisdom

In the first prologue question Alnwick defines the epistemological status of faith, opinion and science on the basis of two criteria, namely evidence and the absence of free will.[72] In the case of opinion, the assent whereby the intellect adheres to a certain proposition is free, voluntary and associated with certitude on the part of the opiner. In the same way unbelievers, who are not afraid of error, mistake a contingent reality for a necessary reality and do not realize they are using a probable medium as a necessary medium. Instead, assent is necessary both in the case of science and of faith. When referring to the field of faith, Alnwick is not thinking only of believers but also of Aristotle, that he generally inserts among the philosopher authorities with their testimonies, as in the first book of *Physica* or the twelfth of *Metaphysica*, following up after the arguments and demonstrations of evidence. Faith and science are distinguished by evidence, that is present in the form of the object in the case of science, whereas in the case of faith evidence descends from an authority

72 Guillelmus Alnevicanus *In Sententias*, Prologus, below, q. 1, §§ 181–184.

that is external to both the subject and the object, and is founded on signs and miracles received by divine revelation through miracles.[73]

The reference to Henry of Ghent is overtly manifest in the two types of evidence; but founding the second type of evidence on signs and miracles, the reference seems to openly declare their descent from William of Nottingham's experimental evidence in terms of induction. In other words, an inductive procedure that, starting from sensory evidence that is immediate or mediated by memory rather than signs, miracles and prodigies, leads to an understanding of the universal. This is the principle of syllogistic deduction, and can yield what Robert Grosseteste named "principium universale experimentale".[74]

Alnwick's definition of science is somewhat cursory, owing to his plan to deal with it in a further treatise, but this is phrased in hypothetical form and it is not clear whether it was ever done. Since what is defined here is not so much science as knowledge, or the act whereby the intellect acquires the *habitus* of science, Alnwick could be referring to the ninth prologue question, or first question *de scientia*, that deals with the scientific *habitus* as an absolute relation and quality.

"Scire autem est aliquod verum complexum ex alio vero complexo magis noto, ad ipsum per discursum syllogisticum applicato, evidenter cognoscere [...]"[75]

Here knowledge coincides with a particular type of knowledge distinguished by evidence; this knowledge has as its object a "verum complexum", or true proposition. It is the conclusion of a syllogistic deduction because it is drawn from another true proposition, the principle of the syllogistic process. The cursoriness of this definition prevents it from being precisely placed in its relative speculative context but at first glance it seems to come within the Scotist area, despite the absence of certitude and necessity, the prerequisite conditions of science.[76] Given the necessity of assent to faith and science, Alnwick raises the problem of harmonizing this assent with human free will, that loses the power to contradict but gains the power to do the reverse. This means that free will cannot prevent the intellect from assenting to truth, that is the object of faith or science. What free will can do is to take into account or not take into account the truth that is already known through the scientific method, or to

73 This evidence belongs to the faith in theological sense, i.e. the voluntary adhesion to a non evident matter in itself; but Alnwick, answering the argument of Godfrey of Fontaines, specifies another sense of faith on basis of Aristotle's *Topica*. In this sense faith is a particular form of the opinion which aquires a stronger epistemological value as *vehemens*, i.e. founded on *evidentia rationis*. This sense aproaches the faith to the science more than to the opinion; see Guillelmus Alnevicanus *In Sententias*, Prologus, q. 1, §§ 283–291.

74 See Fiorentino 2014, pp. 57–62, 172–186.

75 Guillelmus Alnevicanus *In Sententias*, Prologus, q. 1, § 207.

76 See Fiorentino 2014, pp. 84–90.

believe or not believe the truth that is already the object of faith.[77] Therefore, Alnwick can raise the objection to Aquinas "in Secunda Secundae, q.2, a. 9, in responsione ad secundum argumentum", claiming that science does not require the will to assent because of the power of the demonstration, because the will, although it cannot eliminate the habitus of science, can "avertere a sua operatione" the intellect. In other words, it can distract it from accomplishing all the operations necessary to achieve the demonstration process, as occurs in sleep, for example.[78]

After having contested both the Thomist theory of the subordination of *theologia nostra* to the science of the blessed ones and God and Henry of Ghent's theory of the *lumen medium*,[79] Alnwick is not willing to renounce the scientific value of theology, that derives from the use of natural reason, being distinct from the authority of the holy Scriptures. This reason is able to produce the *rationes necessariae*, like that of Richard of Saint Victor, to explain the truths of faith.[80]

"Ex hoc concedo principale propositum, quod cum theologia sit, quo de Trinitate verum dicimus, et non est ars nec prudentia nec fides, quae est hhabitus principalior credibilium, ut probatum est, sequitur quod sit sapientia sive scientia, cuius notitia fidei incohatur et rationibus necessariis perficitur".[81]

So the characterization of theology as a science or wisdom is not established in itself, but is based on extrinsic factors, in other words the process of exclusion, that leads to the rejection of the other *habitus intellectuales* of Aristotelian descent,[82] and the definition of theology as "id, quod de Trinitate verum dicimus", as stated by Augustine.[83] This "scientia vel sapientia" is sustained by faith but not limited to it because it is brought to a conclusion by what Alnwick calls "rationes necessariae". It is implicit that without these arguments theology would be imperfect as a discourse which determines the truth of the Trinity. In the mingling of science and wisdom, the introduction of the *rationes necessariae* and the Augustinian background, Alnwick's opinion is seen to be in common with that of Peter of Tarantaise.[84] This opinion seems to have been known to John of Reading, although the latter never openly cited his source.[85]

77 See Guillelmus Alnevicanus *In Sententias*, Prologus, q. 1, §§ 189–196.
78 See Guillelmus Alnevicanus *In Sententias*, Prologus, q. 1, §§ 200–204.
79 See Guillelmus Alnevicanus *In Sententias*, Prologus, q. 5, §§ 28–30, 33–37, 65–79; Fiorentino 2014, pp. 29–33, 84–90.
80 Guillelmus Alnevicanus *In Sententias*, Prologus, q. 5, §§ 57–60.
81 Guillelmus Alnevicanus *In Sententias*, Prologus, q. 5, § 101.
82 See Aristoteles *Ethica Nicomachea* VI, 7, 1139 b 14–36, pp. 255–256, lin. 1–13; Aristoteles *Analytica Posteriora* I, 33–34, 88 b 30–89 b 20; AL vol. IV, pp. 65–68, lin. 11–8.
83 See Aurelius Augustinus *De Trinitate* XIV, 1 , 1, p. 424.
84 See Fiorentino 2014, pp. 72–82.
85 See Ioannes de Radingia *Scriptum in primum librum Sententiarum Prologus quaestiones 1–5*, q. 4, p. 262.

In Alnwick's plan theology is a form of knowledge that exploits the combination of supernaturally, divinely revealed faith and the natural exercise of rational study. While the theologian needs faith to teach theology to those who, since they do not possess faith, must simply believe the master, the exercise of study is useful to discover that which is distant and difficult to know owing to the weakness of the wayfarer's intellect. Despite this weakness, the intellect is able to corroborate faith and defend it by apology using the *rationes necessariae*. Therefore, Alnwick adopts Isaiah's famous sentence "Nisi credideritis, non intelligetis".[86] With this statement, Alnwick establishes the priority of faith over natural reason:

" [...] sed oportet quod intellectus noster primo eis adhaereat per fidem et secundo per distinctionem in lumine naturali intellectus ea intelligat per rationem, ut sic primo intellectus noster sit persuasus auctoritate dicentis et postea motus auctoritate credibilis".[87]

With the use of *rationes necessariae*, the defense of the Catholic faith by apology and Isaiah's sentence, in fact Alnwick can be observed to be drawing near to his contemporary brother Raymond Lull, and especially to the latter's later works that were the fruit of the periods he spent in Paris, Sicily and finally Tunisia between 1312 and 1316.[88] But the continuation of the text indicates who Alnwick's true sources were, namely Anselm of Canterbury and Richard of Saint Victor,[89] sources that were probably also Lull's,[90] although he was condemned for having introduced the rationes necessariae in the theological ambit.[91]

Alnwick explains what he means by *rationes necessariae*, that he sees as two rational and natural tools serving to help to know God. On one hand the wayfarer's intellect apprehends terms in order to discover whether the relative proposition is true, necessary and self-evident or not. In other words, whether the relation of the predicate with the subject is not impossible, where non-impossibility is, for Alnwick, automatically equivalent to possibility. In his view it is sufficient to know all the rules of the *fallaciae* in order to determine the logical value of the propositions and work back from the conclusions to the principles and to the immediate propositions, that are not known in themselves. Otherwise there could be no certitude of the principles and conclusions. On the other hand, the intellect, starting from the immediate propositions, deduces

86 See Guillelmus Alnevicanus *In Sententias*, Prologus, q. 5, § 105; *Is.* 6, 3; *Apoc.* 4, 8.

87 Guillelmus Alnevicanus *In Sententias*, Prologus, q. 5, § 130.

88 See Egea i Ger 2000, pp. 385–394; Fiorentino 2008, pp. 43–84; Fiorentino 2012, vol. II, pp. 1109–1117; Francia 2000, p. 330; Garay 1965, pp. 32–38; Llinàs Puente 1998, pp. 475–489; Mendía 1950, pp. 5–39; Nicolau 1978, pp. 117–130.

89 Alnwick shares with them the identification of the necessity to the evidence in the sense that these arguments are so evident that they must be accepted; See Guillelmus Alnevicanus *In Sententias*, Prologus, q. 5, §§ 123–128.

90 See Chodkiewics 1994, pp. 136–149; Lohr 2003, pp. 553–558; Lohr 2006, pp. 335–347.

91 See Bauza 1968, pp. 21–32; de Puig i Oliver 2000, pp. 297–388; Perarnau y Espelt 1997, pp. 7–14.

all the conclusions according to the Scotist theory of *continentia virtualis*.[92] Alnwick proposes the essential elements of this, but with one substantial variation: the very concept of God as such is not supernaturally induced in the wayfarer but is naturally gained by him through the *discursus*, or syllogistic deduction, deriving this concept from the creatures. In fact, according to Alnwick, the syllogistic process comes to an end when the concept of the Deity becomes naturally intelligible to the wayfarer.[93]

Nevertheless, an objection was raised by William Ockham, based on the famous distinction between knowledge apprehended and knowledge judged.[94] This means that the intellect must know the concepts of the terms that compose the proposition before and not after having understood its meaning. Therefore, through syllogistic deduction the intellect does not simply reach a knowledge of the concept but of an entire proposition with all its logical value. Thus, by virtue of *continentia virtualis*, the knowledge of the concept of the Deity as the subject of theology is not gained at the end but must be present at the beginning of the demonstration process. Instead, at the end the intellect discovers ever new properties, like infinity, that are different from the concept of the Deity Himself.[95] According to Reading, if the latter concept were to be awaited until the end of the syllogistic process, it might never end.[96]

Alnwick, however, does not intend to ignore the weakness of the wayfarer's intellect, responding to objections by those who wish to eliminate faith and fall back on *rationes necessariae* alone, and aligning with a point that characterized William of Ware's opinion.[97] Alnwick explains that faith is consulted to succour the intellect as it attains the truth, but "cum admixtione errorum, ut patet in libris philosophorum; ut igitur certius habetur veritas de divinis, necessarium fit eam nobis revelari".[98] This conclusion would surely have appealed to Gonsalvus of Spain who admitted the coexistence, in the same intellect, of the beatific vision with the faith *de potentia Dei absoluta*, as revealed in Paul's trance, for instance.[99]

92 See Fiorentino 2014, pp. 99–106.

93 See Guillelmus Alnevicanus *In Sententias*, Prologus, q. 5, §§ 97–118.

94 See Alféri 1989; Alanen/Yrjönsuuri 1997, pp. 155–174; de Muralt 1976, pp. 107–158; Maurer 1996, pp. 49–65.

95 See Guillelmus de Ockham *Scriptum. Ordinatio. Prologus*, q. 7, pp. 202–203, lin. 23–8.

96 See Ioannes de Radingia *Scriptum in primum librum Sententiarum Prologus quaestiones 1–5*, q. 4, p. 262.

97 Despite its perfection *in se*, theological science cannot be attained through the human intellect for its weakness; this intellect is similar to the eye of a bat not able to see the sun for an intrinsic defect; See Guillelmus Varro *In Sententias* Prologus, q. 3, f. 5v.

98 See Guillelmus Alnevicanus *In Sententias*, Prologus, q. 5, § 133.

99 See Gonsalvus Hispanus *Quaestiones disputatae*, q. 9, p. 140.

7.2 Theology as practical or speculative science

Alnwick outlines the plan of the second question in the light of four opinions, that contemplate the entire range of logical possibilities, in other words that theology is practice, that it is speculation, that it is practice and speculation and that it is neither practice nor speculation.[100] This same plan was adopted by Robert of Cowton.[101]

Alnwick's plan allows three principal opinions to be discerned, attributable to Giles of Rome, Godfrey of Fontaines and John Duns Scotus. Giles of Rome rejects both the practical and the speculative nature of theology in favour of an affective nature, in the sense that the end of theology is not truth nor the *opus*, but *affectus*, whose fulfilment is *charitas* and *dilectio* toward God.[102] Giles' opinion had a strong resonance within the Order of Friars Minor, for instance with William of Ware, who concurred with the idea of theology as knowledge, but endowed only with a contemplative character that is not practical nor speculative nor yet affective.[103] Alnwick devotes the least number of counter-arguments to this opinion and refuses to accept any concept of its nature as neuter or midway between practical and speculative. Therefore, despite approving *dilectio* as the end of theology, he prefers to conceive of theology as wisdom, endowed only with a speculative nature.[104] But this solution coincides with the one preferred by Giles, if obliged to choose between only these two natures of theology.[105]

Godfrey of Fontaines sustains that theology is both practical and speculative, because the theologian envisages both eminently moral virtues, that are the domain of the moral philosopher, and separate substances, that are the metaphysician's subject. Because theology has many subjects, it is not a unique science except as regards the supreme, extrinsic end, that is eternal beatitude, which unifies all these subjects.[106]

In Alnwick's view, this opinion is an evident violation of the Aristotelian epistemological ideal, that requires each science to have a subject, principles and conclusions. Because the subject of theology is God Himself, it is unique and does not deal primarily either with moral virtue or with separate substances, that are the pertinence of moral science and metaphysics, respectively. On the contrary, all the sciences are summarized in theology.[107]

In questions 2–4 and 6 of the Prologue it is to Scotus' opinion that Alnwick devotes the greatest attention, both in expounding the arguments and in con-

100 See Guillelmus Alnevicanus *In Sententias*, Prologus, q. 2, § 12.
101 See Robertus de Cowton *In Sententias Prologus quaestio 7*, p. 42.
102 See Guillelmus Alnevicanus *In Sententias*, Prologus, q. 2, §§ 93–94; Porro 2009, pp. 237–238.
103 See Guillelmus Varro *In Sententias,* Prologus, q. 4, f. 6r.
104 See Guillelmus Alnevicanus *In Sententias*, Prologus, q. 2, §§ 95–96.
105 See Aegidius Romanus *Primus Sententiarum,* Prologus, pars IV, q. 1, f. 8ra.
106 See Guillelmus Alnevicanus *In Sententias*, Prologus, q. 2, §§ 104–121; Godefridus de Fontibus *Quodlibet XIII,* q. 1, pp. 169–184.
107 See Guillelmus Alnevicanus *In Sententias*, Prologus, q. 2, §§ 121–129.

futing them. In all these questions, unlike Alexander of Hales, Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines, Scotus is always anonymously cited in the body of the test, under the heading of "tenentes primam opinionem"[108] or "quidam", that are identified only in witness P, in the answer, to Scotus.[109] Again, the *una opinio* on the fourth question is attributed to Scotus in P in a note in the margin.[110] But this attribution is corroborated in the development of the question by Alnwick himself, who attributes to those who hold this opinion the theory of the practical nature of theology in the terms of the second question.[111]

Although the opinion set out in the four questions – apart from the fourth – certainly seems to belong to Scotus, the anonymous form of the citations may be justified by the fact that the practical nature of theology was endorsed by a large number of the authors who were Alnwick's contemporaries. For example, Richard of Middleton determined the practical nature of theology on the basis of the operations that the wayfarer can accomplish on its object.[112] Gonsalvus of Spain, when discussing Giles' opinion, would not concur with any third status or intermediate status midway between speculation and *praxis*. Therefore, because theology is aimed at inflaming the affections, it is classified among the practical sciences.[113] At this stage, the practical nature must permeate theology to such an extent as to make it a wisdom "non a scire, sed a sapore".[114] This definition of theology was common to Alexander of Hales,[115] Henry of Ghent,[116] Matthew of Aquasparta[117] and Peter of Tarantaise.[118]

Peter Auriol claimed that theology is a practical *habitus* but is to be found in the contemplative intellect and is superior to any acquired speculative *habitus*.[119] Ockham concludes that the nature of theology is practical because the wayfarer's will has the power to accomplish many good and evil actions that can be operated in regard to God.[120]

Alnwick draws Scotus' opinion from *Ordinatio* rather than from *Lectura*, that is less dense, or from the commentary to *Metaphysica*, in which Scotus

108 See Guillelmus Alnevicanus *In Sententias*, Prologus, q. 2, § 13.
109 See Guillelmus Alnevicanus *In Sententias*, Prologus, q. 3, § 45.
110 See Guillelmus Alnevicanus *In Sententias*, Prologus, q. 4, § 10.
111 See Guillelmus Alnevicanus *In Sententias*, Prologus, q. 4, § 73.
112 See Richardus de Mediavilla *In Sententias Prologus*, q. 4, pp. 286–288.
113 See Gonsalvus Hispanus *Quaestiones disputatae* q. 5, pp. 75–79; Porro 2006, vol. V, pp. 4961–4962.
114 See Gonsalvus Hispanus *Quaestiones disputatae* q. 5, pp. 80–82.
115 See Alexander Halensis *Summa,* pars i, q. 1, vol. I, pp. 2–3.
116 See Porro 2009, p. 221.
117 See Matthaeus ab Aquasparta *Commentarius in Sententias,* Prologus, q. 7, f. 6r.
118 See Petrus de Tarantasia *Commentarius in Sententias,* Prooemium, q. un., a. 4, f. 5b.
119 See Petrus Aureoli *Scriptum super primum Sententiarum* Prooemium, sect. 3, vol. I, pp. 185–189, §§ 83–91; Petrus Aureoli *Quodlibeta sexdecim* q. 15, a. 1, p. 139A; a. 3, p. 146B.
120 See Guillelmus de Ockham *Scriptum. Ordinatio. Prologus,* q. 12, p. 328, lin. 333–334.

briefly skims over *praxis*.[121] Being extremely voluminous, Scotus' opinion is not copied *verbatim* but is summarized by Alnwick, albeit with a high degree of precision. In Alnwick's q. 2, Scotus firstly defines *praxis*[122] and then illustrates the theme of the practical nature of theology.[123] The definition states that *praxis* is "actus alterius potentiae quam intellectus, naturaliter posterior intellectione, natus conformiter elici rationi rectae ad hoc quod sit rectus".[124] These conditions of praxis mean that knowledge can become *practice* thanks to an action that cannot be fulfilled by the same intellective faculty because it is purely speculative. Therefore, this action must be carried out by another faculty of the soul. This faculty is the will, in whose power the operation lies because the will has the prerogative of being able to choose this operation and command the inferior faculties of the soul to execute it. Thus, the will is able to ensure the contingency of the object.[125] But Scotus needs to harmonize this prerogative with the morality of the action so that, because it is morally good, it can be the foundation of the practical nature of theology, which is the matter at stake in this question. Therefore, Scotus combines this prerogative with the guidance of the intellect, that "dictat" rather than simply "ostendit" the operation to the will, because it is morally good and so operable by virtue of rightful reason. In this way, the will needs not do other than follow the *consilium* of the intellect, in the sense that the will must take account of this, although without necessarily being determined by it. This allows the will to remain free, so that it can make a choice without commanding the inferior faculties, because in the latter case it would be transformed into a merely extrinsic action.[126] In Scotus' intent, the fact that the will cannot dissent from rightful reason is in agreement with free will because this prerogative depends on the perfection of the will not of the intellect.[127]

Given Scotus' definition of *praxis* – Alnwick continues – not only are the sciences dealing with external and moral actions to be considered as practical, like art, ethics and politics, in the Aristotelian sense, but science that has as its object a non operable reality is also practical, provided that the study of this science is not directed toward pure knowledge but seeks to know for the purpose

121 See Ioannes Duns Scotus *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis* I, q. 7, vol. I, pp. 155–158.

122 See Ioannes Duns Scotus *Ordinatio Prologus*, pars V, q. 1, vol. I, pp. 155–160, §§ 228–235.

123 See Ioannes Duns Scotus *Ordinatio Prologus*, pars V, q. 1, vol. I, pp. 207–208, § 314; Guillelmus Alnevicanus *In Sententias*, Prologus, q. 2, § 13.

124 See Guillelmus Alnevicanus *In Sententias*, Prologus, q. 2, § 14.

125 See Ioannes Duns Scotus *Ordinatio Prologus*, pars V, q. 2, vol. I, p. 190, § 281. This account is debated by Scotus with Henry of Ghent; see Da Costa Santos/Marion 2001, pp. 247–255; De Armellada 2008, pp. 575–605; Dekker 2000, pp. 55–72; Dumont 1995, pp. 149–167; Sylwanowicz 1996, pp. 154–187; Todisco 2010, pp. 59–105.

126 See Guillelmus Alnevicanus *In Sententias*, Prologus, q. 2, §§ 14–21.

127 Scotus underlines that the divine will, being co-esential and co-eternal to the divine intellect, does not follow the intellection of this intellect. Therefore theology is not practical in the divine intellect; see Ioannes Duns Scotus *Ordinatio Prologus*, pars V, q. 2, vol. I, p. 214, § 329.

of some form of operation. Hence, since the first object of theology is God as the supreme end, this object conforms to the action whereby the will loves God, and this action makes theological knowledge, too, a practical science.[128]

Contingency and the will modify Scotus' definition of *praxis*, that Alnwick understands as an operation that is freely chosen by the will, and with which it commands the operations of the senses and the appetite and the moral virtues, rather than the operation through which the will becomes intimately united with the ultimate end.[129] The modification lies in the exclusion of the guidance of the intellect, and the consequent disconnection between the ultimate end and the act of the will, whose choice is not bound by any moral rule, by good or evil and hence by *dilectio* toward God, that was the *focus* of the third problematic knot. Dilectio is founded on a property that is inherent to God, but in a relative manner, in other words to the way that the creature relates to God.[130] This *dilectio* cannot be practical because the choice of the will does not receive the *ratio* through which the intellect directs the will to love and desire God.[131] For this reason, according to Alnwick, *dilectio Dei*, that is the equivalent of Christian beatitude or Aristotelian happiness, comes into the context of speculation and wisdom and is necessary – despite being realized through the will not the intellect – because it is not possible to avoid or to be wrong in loving supreme good.[132] This *speculatio* gives rise to a contemplative life, that is more meritorious than the active life.[133] Otherwise metaphysics should be more practical than theology.[134] This observation solves an objection made by Cowton against Scotus: *dilectio* belongs more to the field of metaphysics, that deals with God according to His essential properties, including goodness, than to theology, that studies God also according to His personal properties. So Alnwick can summarize:

"Ex praedictis patet quomodo praxis, ad quam cognitio extensa dicitur practica, non est operatio, qua diligitur Deus; sed est electio voluntatis vel operatio, ex electione procedens, et electio primo, sed huiusmodi operatio imperata secundario et minus principaliter, ut propter dicta patet".[135]

128 See Guillelmus Alnevicanus *In Sententias*, Prologus, q. 2, §§ 22–30.

129 See Guillelmus Alnevicanus *In Sententias,* Prologus, q. 2, §§ 132, 163. This conclusion lies again in q. 6 where, however, the intellect falls within the faculties under the domain of the will; see q. 6, a. 3, § 36.

130 On contrast *deitas* is an absolute propriety belonging to the divine essence in itself; see Guillelmus Alnevicanus *In Sententias*, Prologus, q. 2, § 56.

131 See Guillelmus Alnevicanus *In Sententias,* Prologus, q. 2, §§ 66, 165.

132 See Guillelmus Alnevicanus *In Sententias,* Prologus, q. 2, §§ 105–107, 113; q. 6, a. 2, § 26; q. 2, § 153.

133 See Guillelmus Alnevicanus *In Sententias,* Prologus, q. 2, § 162; q. 6, a. 2, § 35. These theories are recalled by *altera quaestio* in q. 3 of Prologue; see q. 3, § 136.

134 See Guillelmus Alnevicanus, *In Sententias* Prologus q. 2, §§ 118–120; q. 6, a. 2, § 30.

135 Guillelmus Alnevicanus *In Sententias*, Prologus, q. 2, § 186.

The move away from Scotus could not be less decisive. In fact, while for Scotus the will cannot but follow the directives of the intellect to make the act morally good, Alnwick grants the will a complete control of its actions, accepting the risk of making them simply amoral, in other words neither good nor evil but simply free. The most immediate consequence is that God as the ultimate end and supremely good object disappears off the horizon of the will, that can exist even without concretely achieving its desires. This conclusion is opposed by Reading, in defence of Scotus.[136]

Alnwick's move away from Scotus continues with the practical or speculative nature of theology.[137] This nature is inherent to theology as *sapientia* in the sense of sapience or taste, that is derived from affectus of the supreme good, as well as from speculation about the supreme truth.[138] This conclusion, that is proposed once more in the sixth question,[139] is the direct result of Alnwick's view of the scientific nature of theology – that could be seen at work already in the previous questions – and could *prima facie* draw Alnwick nearer to Henry of Ghent, who inclines toward the purely speculative nature of theology.[140] However, it is Alnwick himself who clearly expressed his authentic intentions, rooted in the more ancient Franciscan tradition:

"Praedicta autem opinio videtur esse magistri Alexandri de Alis et non solum magistri Henrici de Gandavo. Nam frater et magister Alexander dicit in prima parte Summae super 1quod theologia est sui gratia et per consequens theoretica sive speculativa. Et tamen dicit quod est sapientia a sapore, movendo ad bonum. Unde dicit quod est scientia perficiens cognitionem secundum veritatem et movens affectum ad bonitatem. Prima est ut cognitio secundum visum – et ideo dicitur scientia absolute –; secunda est ut scientia secundum gustum – et ideo debet dici sapientia a sapore affectionis, secundum quod dicitur Ecclesiastico 6: Sapientia doctrinae secundum nomen est eius. Theologia ergo perficit animam secundum affectionem, movendo ad bonum, et ideo est principaliter scientia . Haec ille".[141]

In fact, Alexander of Hales distinguished "scientia percipiens cognitionem secundum veritatem" from "scientia movens affectionem ad bonitatem", which is the science that moves the will to inflame the affections and inspire the heart of the wayfarer so that by contemplating the divine realities he may operate good in his life. The latter sense is purely practical and allows theology to be considered as *sapientia*.[142] The sapient nature of theology became the hallmark of Franciscan epistemology in the 13th century, even if after Oddon de Rigaud

136 See Ioannes de Radingia *Scriptum in primum librum Sententiarum Prologus quaestiones 11–12*, q. 11, pp. 15–18, §§ 54–77, pp. 58–93, §§ 178–279; q. 12, p. 240, § 720; pp. 238–239, §§ 710–712.

137 See Guillelmus Alnevicanus *In Sententias*, Prologus, q. 2, § 130.

138 See Alliney 2009, pp. 68, 101; Porro 2009, pp. 211, 221, 232.

139 See Guillelmus Alnevicanus *In Sententias*, Prologus, q. 6, a. 3, § 37.

140 See Porro 2009, p. 221.

141 Guillelmus Alnevicanus *In Sententias*, Prologus, q. 2, §§ 190–191, 216.

142 See Fornaro 1998, pp. 3–22, 134–150, 513–537; Fornaro 1999, pp. 14–35; Olszewski 2000, pp. 129–146; Sileo 1996, vol. II, pp. 645–698.

and Bonaventure the Aristotelian concept of a practical science was widely applied to theology seen as a practical science, or both practical and speculative. Alnwick's opinion is well known to have been transcribed by Ockham in his twelfth prologue question;[143] but it must be added that through Ockham this opinion also filtered down to Reading, who in turn transcribed it in his twelfth prologue question in a version nearer to Cowton.[144]

Rebus sic stantibus, Alnwick's conclusion seems to widen the gap away from Scotus. Nevertheless, it is marked by some significant elements in common with a text that Alnwick's immediate contemporaries would have had no difficulty in recognizing as Scotian, namely the third prologue question on what the modern scholar considers to be Henry of Harclay's commentary to the *sentences*.[145] Unlike the previous two questions, the third has not survived only in the ms. Casale, Library of Seminar, B 2, but also in the ms. Vatican City, Apostolic Library, vat. Lat. 13687. It was long believed that this witness conserved a copy of Scotus' commentary to the *sentences* and it is perhaps in this guise that we can find an explanation for why Aufredo Gonteri Brito started to copy it *verbatim* from the d. 4 of the first book.[146] In other words, Aufredo believed he was copying what he thought was Scotus' commentary but that was in reality Harclay's, whose close adherence to Scotist thought has been recognized since Carlo Balìc pointed it out.[147]

This belief is borne out by two elements. The first has to do with the *Tabula quaestionum*, set at the end of the first book (f. 98ra-va). Here the scribe was careful to note that these questions were "ex Ordinatione eiusdem Duns Scoti extractae" (f. 98ra). The *explicit* of the *Tabula* reiterates this belief, stating "Explicit tabula primi libri magistri venerabilis I. Duns Scoti de Ordine Minorum" (f. 98va). The second element is the *incipit* of the third question (f. 12vb). It is easy to see a faint resemblance between the Casale and the Vatican testimonies. In fact, despite the similarity of the first main argument, the Casale witness opens the question with two favourable arguments and one unfavourable.[148] By contrast, the Vatican witness presents four favourable arguments and two unfavourable.[149] Then, while the Casale witness contains a report of Henry of Ghent's opinion and the beginning of its confutation,[150] the Vatican witness introduces an *altera quaestio incidentalis*, implying that there are only two questions of this type.[151] The title of this question, namely "Utrum theologia dicitur scientia practica ex ordine ad finem" has aroused the interest of all scholars of

143 See Guillelmus de Ockham *Scriptum. Ordinatio. Prologus*, q. 12, pp. 325–328.
144 See Ioannes de Radingia *Scriptum in primum librum Sententiarum Prologus quaestiones 11–12*, q. 12, pp. 195–201, §§ 579–594.
145 See Fiorentino/Schabel 2011, pp. 97–116.
146 See duba/Friedman/Schabel 2010, vol. II, pp. 266–269, 313–334.
147 See Balić 1959, pp. 93–121.
148 See Henricus de Harclay *In Sententias Prologus*, q. 3, §§ 8–14.
149 See Henricus de Harclay *In Sententias Prologus*, q. 3, §§ 1–10.
150 See Henricus de Harclay *In Sententias Prologus*, q. 3, §§ 16–25.
151 See Henricus de Harclay *In Sententias Prologus*, q. 3, § 1–4.

Scotus because this title, together with that of the other incidental question, inevitably recalls the structure of the last part of the Prologue to *Ordinatio*, in which Scotus deals with this very question of the concept of *praxis* and of theology as a practical science.[152] A cursory check is enough to demonstrate the close agreement between the Vatican witness and Scotus', as it has been handed down in the Vatican edition.[153] But immediately after this, the Vatican witness starts to reflect the Casale witness, moving away from Scotus' text.

Among the various opinions, Harclay rejects Giles' because he is not willing to concede – just like Alnwick – any position midway or a third of the way between operation and contemplation, under which *affectio* ends up by being subsumed.[154] This subsumption triggers the formation of a tripartite scheme in which not only *affectio*, but also *dilectio* itself is more inherent to contemplation or to some particular form of this than to action. This form is the equivalent of what Harclay respectfully identifies as the opinion held by Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure:

„Ista etiam fuit opinio doctorum antiquorum Alexandri, Bonaventurae, bene notorum doctorum sacrae theologiae. Licet enim videatur dicere quod sit principaliter speculativa in principio Scripti et Summae, tamen hoc dicit non negando quin cum hoc quod sit speculativa sit nihilominus affectiva. Unde dicit ipse prima parte Summae questione 64 articulo 1, respondendo ad questionem, quod duplex est cognitio veritatis, una quidem quae habetur per gratiam, altera vero quae habetur per naturam. Et illa, quae habetur per gratiam, duplex est: una quae est speculativa tantum, sicut est quaelibet, qua divina scripta revelantur, altera vero affectiva, producens amorem Dei. Et haec proprie pertinet ad donum sapientiae. Et certum est quod illa scientia non est alia scientia quam theologia nostra".[155]

The close similarity of this quotation to Alnwick's leaps to the eye: even if Harclay combines Alexander of Hales' authority with that of Bonaventure and does not highlight the difference compared to Henry of Ghent, what actually emerges is Alexander of Hales' theory describing the conditions of speculative and of affective science. But it is at this very point that the similarity ends, because Harclay also rejects Alexander's and Bonaventure's theory and advances his own original view of theology as a practical science,[156] whereas Alnwick is prone to support the solution of a purely speculative science.[157]

152 See Amoros 1934, Pp. 261–273; Chiodi 2009, pp. 56–80; Crivelli 1995, vol. II, pp. 611–632; Manzano 1974, pp. 159–195.
153 See Ioannes Duns Scotus *Ordinatio Prologus*, pars V, q. 1, pp. 151–153.
154 See Henricus de Harclay *In Sententias Prologus*, q. 3, §§ 62–69.
155 Henricus de Harclay *In Sententias Prologus*, q. 3, § 74.
156 See Henricus de Harclay *In Sententias Prologus*, q. 3, §§ 75–79.
157 See Guillelmus Alnevicanus *In Sententias*, Prologus, q. 2, §§ 190–191, 216.

GUILLELMI ALNEVICANI
COMMENTARIUM IN SENTENTIAS

Prologus

ms. Assisi, Town Library, 172, ff. 1r–34v (=A)
ms. Krakow, Jagellonic Library, 732, ff. 1ra–6vb, 10rb–14vb (=C)
ms. Padua, Antonian Library, 291, ff. 13ra–40va (=P)
Stephen F. Brown: "Sources for Ockham's Prologue to the Sentences. II Robert Cowton and William of Alnwick", in: Franciscan Studies 27 (1967) 39–107, in part. 61–107 (= Brown)
Joachim D'Souza: "William of Alnwick and the problem of faith and reason", in: Salesianum 35 (1973) 437–475 (= D'Souza)

Quaestiones de scientia

ms. Padua, Antonian Library, 291, ff. 6vb–13vb (=P)
ms. Padua, Antonian Library, 295, ff. 45ra–52va (=P1)
ms. Vatican City, Apostolic Library, vat. Lat. 1012, ff. 39ra–45rb (=V)

Guillelmi Alnevicani
Commentarium in Sententias

Prologus

[Quaestio 1
Utrum ab eodem intellectu eadem obiecta possunt esse credita per fidei adhaerentiam et scita per rei evidentiam]

(1) Quia negantes theologiam esse proprie scientiam sive sapientiam, hic praecipue nituntur probare hanc incompossibilitatem fidei ad scientiam, ideo, antequam quaeratur de theologia an sit scientia, quaeratur utrum ab eodem intellectu eadem obiecta possint simul esse credita per fidei adhaerentiam et scita per rei evidentiam.

[Argumenta] quod non
[1. Primum argumentum]

(2) Arguitur primo ex incompossibilitate fidei ad opinionem et scientiam, quoniam nullum medium secundum naturam suam perfectum compatitur secum alterum extremorum in actu; sed fides est medium inter opinionem et scientiam; ergo fides non compatitur secum opinionem nec scientiam.

(3) Maior patet ex V *Physicorum*: «Medium enim contrariatur utrique extremorum.»

(4) Unde medium respectu utriusque est quodammodo utrumque extremum. Et ideo sicut extrema contraria non compatiuntur se in actu, ita nec medium compatitur secum alterum extremorum propter contrarietatem eius ad utrumque.

(5) Minor probatur per Hugonem *De Sacramentis* libro I parte 10 capitulo 1, ubi dicit quod, «Si quis plenam ac generalem definitionem fidei signare voluerit, dicere potest: fidem esse certitudinem animi quandam de rebus absentibus, supra opinionem et infra scientiam constitutam.» Quod

7 esse proprie] *inv.* C | hic] licet C **8** hanc incompossibilitatem] ex incompossibilitate CP **9** utrum] *in mg.* P **10** possint] -unt P | simul esse] *inv.* C **15** secundum] per *exp.* C; secundum *in mg.* C | naturam suam] naturas suas P **18** opinionem nec scientiam] *om.* A **22** compatiuntur] patiuntur P ; compapantiuntur D'Souza **28** et] *om.* C

19 Aristoteles, *Physica* V, 5, 229 b 19–21; AL vol. VII, p. 210, 13–18; Averroes, *In Physicam* V, com. 52, ed. Venetiis 1562, apud Junctas, f. 239raA («Opera omnia», 4). **25** Hugo de S. Victore, *De sacramentis* I, 10, 2, ed. R. Berndt, Aschendorff, Münster 2008, p. 226, 14–16 («Corpus Victorinum Textus Historici», 1).

GUILLELMI ALNEVICANI
COMMENTARIUM IN SENTENTIAS

Prologus

Question 1

Whether by the one intellect the same objects can be believed by adherence to faith and known by the evidence of the things themselves.

(1) Since those who deny that theology is properly a matter of knowledge or of wisdom, here try to prove particularly the incompossibility of faith and knowledge, we therefore ask whether the same objects can by the same intellect at the same time be believed by adherence to faith and known by the evidence of the things themselves before we ask whether theology is a science.

[Arguments] that this is not [possible].

[1. First argument]

(2) The first argument is from the incompossibility of faith with opinion and knowledge, since no middle which is perfect in virtue of its own nature is actually compatible with either of its extremes; but faith is a middle between opinion and knowledge; therefore faith is not compatible with opinion or knowledge.

(3) The major premise is clear from the fifth book of *Physics*: 'For the middle is opposed to each of the extremes.'

(4) Therefore the middle with respect to each extreme is to a certain extent like the extremes. And therefore just as contrary extremes are actually incompatible, so the middle is not compatible with either of the extremes because of its contrariety to each of them.

(5) The minor premise is proved through part 10 of chapter 1 of book 1 of Hugh of St. Victor's De Sacramentis. He says there, 'If someone wants to indicate a full and general definition of faith he can say that faith is a sort of certainty of the mind about things not present which has been established