PERSIAN RESPONSES

Political and Cultural Interaction with(in) the Achaemenid Empire

edited by

Christopher Tuplin

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The Classical Press of Wales, an independent venture, was founded in 1993, initially to support the work of classicists and ancient historians in Wales and their collaborators from further afield. More recently it has published work initiated by scholars internationally. While retaining a special loyalty to Wales and the Celtic countries, the Press welcomes scholarly contributions from all parts of the world.

The symbol of the Press is the Red Kite. This bird, once widespread in Britain, was reduced by 1905 to some five individuals confined to a small area known as 'The Desert of Wales' – the upper Tywi valley. Geneticists report that the stock was saved from terminal inbreeding by the arrival of one stray female bird from Germany. After much careful protection, the Red Kite now thrives – in Wales and beyond.

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PREFACE

This volume derives from a panel ('Persia and the Greeks: Reactions and Receptions') which formed part of the Celtic Conference in Classics held at l'Université de Rennes II in September 2004. Not all papers presented then are included here, and some papers included here were not presented on that occasion – which is part of the reason why the title of the present volume differs from that of the panel.

I am immensely grateful to Anton Powell for undertaking to publish the book under the Classical Press of Wales imprint. I am also grateful to Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones for his part in organizing the conference-panel and to Pierre Brulé and his colleagues in Rennes for providing a context within which we could flourish.

The final phase of editorial work was completed during the tenure of a Leverhulme Major Research Fellowship. This benefaction (for which I thank the Leverhulme Trust most heartily) was of great practical help.

Christopher Tuplin
July 2007

ABBREVIATIONS

In the case of Greek and Latin literary authors, abbreviations of author-names and titles follows normal conventions, for which see listings in e.g. S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth, *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (third edition, 1996), H.G. Liddell and R. Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon* (ninth edition, Oxford 1925–1940). Sigla for Achaemenid royal inscriptions (e.g. DB, DNa, DSf, XPa) follow the convention used in R.G. Kent, *Old Persian* (second edition, New Haven 1953). Abbreviations for other non-classical sources, fragmentary or non-literary Greek texts, reference works and modern periodical publications are given below. However, abbreviations that are used only in the chapters by Henkelman/Kleber, Raimond or Tuplin are given at the start of the notes to the relevant chapters.

Non-classical sources, fragmentary or non-literary Greek texts, reference works

BM	British Museum (inventory number)
CVA	*Corpus Vasorum Antiquorum*
FGrH	F. Jacoby, *Fragmente der grieschischen Historiker*
IG	*Inscriptiones Graecae*
IK	*Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien* (Bonn, 1972–)
LGPN	P.M. Fraser and E. Matthews, *Lexicon of Greek Personal Names* (Oxford 1987–)
LIMC	*Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae* (Zurich, 1981–)
ML	R. Meiggs and D.M. Lewis, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions* (Oxford, 1968)
NN	sigla of unpublished Persepolis Fortification Texts (transcriptions by R.T. Hallock)
PF	Text in R.T. Hallock, *Persepolis Fortification Tablets* (Chicago, 1969)
PFa	Text in R.T. Hallock, *CDAFI* 8 (1978), 109–36
PFS	Seals preserved as impressions on Persepolis Fortification Tablets (see M. Garrison and M.C.Root, *Persepolis Seal Studies. An Introduction with Provisional Concordances of Seal Numbers and Associated Documents on Fortification Tablets 1–2087*, Leiden, 1996/98 and *Seals on the Persepolis Fortification Tablets*

	I: *Images of Heroic Encounter*, Chicago, 2001)
PTS	Seals preserved as impressions on Persepolis Treasury Tablets (see E.F.Schmidt, *Persepolis* II, Chicago, 1957)
RLA	*Reallexicon der Assyriologie* (Berlin, 1932-)
Sardis VII	W.H.Buckler and D.M.Robinson, *Sardis* VII: (1) *Greek and Latin Inscriptions*, Leiden, 1932
SEG	*Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum*
SNG	*Sylloge Numorum Graecorum*
TL	J. Friedrich, *Kleinasiatische Sprachdenkmäler* VII. Lykische Texte (Berlin, 1932), 52–90. (The material in this publication is derived from E.Kalinka, *Tituli Asiae Minoris* I: *Tituli Lyciae lingua Lycia conscripti* [Vienna, 1901].)

Periodical publications

AA	*Archäologische Anzeiger*
AAH	*Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*
AASOR	*Annals of the American Schools of Oriental Research*
AC	*Antiquité Classique*
AfO	*Archiv für Orientforschung*
AHB	*Ancient History Bulletin*
AJA	*American Journal of Archaeology*
AK	*Antike Kunst*
AMI	*Archäologische Mitteilungen aus Iran*
AMS	*Asia Minor Studien*
AnAnt	*Anatolia Antiqua*
ANES	*Ancient Near Eastern Studies*
ASAE	*Annales du Service des antiquités d'Égypte*
ASNP	*Annali della Scuola Normale Superiori di Pisa*
BagM	*Baghdader Mitteilungen*
BAI	*Bulletin of the Asia Institute*
BASOR	*Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research*
BASP	*Bulletin of the American Society of Papyrologists*
BCH	*Bulletin de correspondance hellénique*
BICS	*Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*
BIFAO	*Bulletin de l'Institut français d'Archéologie orientale*
BMQ	*British Museum Quarterly*
BSOAS	*Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*
CDAFI	*Cahiers de la délégation archéologique française en Iran*
C&M	*Classical et Mediaevalia*
CP	*Classical Philology*

CQ	*Classical Quarterly*
CRAI	*Comptes rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres*
DHA	*Dialogues d'histoire ancienne*
EA	*Epigraphica Anatolica*
EL	*Études de lettres*
GJ	*Geographical Journal*
HSF	*Historische Sprachforschung*
ICS	*Illinois Classical Studies*
IEJ	*Israel Exploration Journal*
IstMitt	*Istanbuler Mitteilungen*
JAC	*Journal of Ancient Civilizations*
JAOS	*Journal of the American Oriental Society*
JARCE	*Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt*
JCS	*Journal of Cuneiform Studies*
JDAI	*Jahrbuch des deutschen archäologischen Instituts*
JEA	*Journal of Egyptian Archaeology*
JHS	*Journal of Hellenic Studies*
JNES	*Journal of Near Eastern Studies*
JRA	*Journal of Roman Archaeology*
JRAS	*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*
JSS	*Journal of Semitic Studies*
LCM	*Liverpool Classical Monthly*
MDAI(A)	*Mitteilungen des deutschen archäologischen Instituts (Athen)*
NABU	*Notes assyriologiques brèves et utilitaires*
NC	*Numismatic Chronicle*
OA	*Oriens Antiquus*
OGIS	*Orientis Graecae Inscriptiones Selectae*
PCPS	*Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society*
PdP	*Parola del passato*
PG	*Patrologia Graeca*
PL	*Patrologia Latina*
PMLA	*Publications of the Modern Language Association*
RA	*Revue archéologique*
RDAC	*Report of the Department of Antiquities of Cyprus*
REA	*Revue des études anciennes*
REG	*Revue des études grecques*
Rev.Eg.	*Revue d'Égyptologie*
RN	*Revue numismatique*
SIFC	*Studi italiani di filologia classica*
SovArkh	*Sovyetskaya arkheologiya*
ST	*Studia Troica*

TAPhA	*Transactions of the American Philological Association*
Trans	*Transeuphratène*
WZKM	*Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlands*
ZA	*Zeitschrift für Assyriologie*
ZDMG	*Zeitschrift der Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*
ZPE	*Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik*

INTRODUCTION

Christopher Tuplin

In its early days the modern institution of Achaemenid Studies was marked by colloquia (the Achaemenid History Workshop, 1981–90) and associated publications (*Achaemenid History* I–VIII, 1987–94) of quite wide thematic remit and relatively disparate contents. In more recent times conferences relevant to Achaemenid history have tended to become more thematically focused, whether in terms of geographical scope (e.g. Anatolia, Transeuphratene) or type of evidence (coinage, archaeology, historical author). This is a natural and proper development. Nonetheless there is still room for the older model, and this is perhaps particularly true in the case of a volume that goes out under the imprint of a press whose publications are primarily addressed at what we must still call (for want of a better word) classicists. The focused conference-volumes to which I have just referred are for the specialist Achaemenid Studies audience called into existence since the later 1970s. The present volume will, I trust, be read by that audience, but I hope that its wide range of contents may also serve to give to a professional but non-specialist audience some taste of the great variety of subjects and types of discourse that are at home within study of the Achaemenid Empire. The broad theme of political and cultural interaction is driven by no governing thesis about politics, culture or the way in which individuals or groups impact upon one another. It simply affirms the banal fact that the empire was immensely diverse and is known to us (as is all of antiquity) through verbal and non-verbal sources that are marked (and perhaps marred) by their own cultural characteristics. All serious engagement with the Achaemenids must keep this fact in mind at all times, and the chapters that make up this volume exemplify the point in a number of different ways. In the order in which they are presented we move from issues in Greek historiography through a series of regionally focused studies and then back to Zarathushtra, Alexander the Great and the early modern reception of Persepolis. For the purposes of the brief introduction to their contents that follows here I group the chapters slightly differently.

Greek historiography

There are all sorts of means – with many degrees of indirectness – by which

genuine information about Persia and its empire might have reached the Greek sources now available to us. One may hope that sometimes it was a matter of direct contact between a Persian source and a Greek author, though this is not a situation that is explicitly attested particularly often or always to entirely satisfactory effect. The claim that Darius III's battle-order for Gaugamela fell into the hands of the Macedonians and informs the historiography of that battle might be contrasted not only with Herodotus' un-Persian 'Persian' documents (the tribute and army lists) but also with his unblinking assertion that Persian *logioi* trace the origin of Greco-Persian conflict to the abductions of Io, Europa, Medea and Helen. Still his ability to make that unblinking assertion no doubt says something about the nature of Greek cultural interaction with Persians in the classical period, and NICHOLAS SEKUNDA's chapter reminds us of a much less well-known but (in its identification of the Persian source) much more specific example from the hellenistic era. Whether or not Boxus acquired his hellenic language and mentality in Persis itself, a plausible if not demonstrable proposition, he was as happy as his anonymous forbears to contribute to a Greek aetiological project, and Agatharchides was as happy as Herodotus to regard what he was told by a Persian as authoritative – indeed happier, for Herodotus had his own take on the ultimate origin of the Persian Wars, whereas Agatharchides is evidently content with the story of Erythras.

Later we shall see an acknowledgment of Persian authority in a different intellectual field (philosophy), but for the moment we must stick with historians and consider the figure of Tissaphernes, whose treatment in Greek historiography is evoked in two chapters. GABRIEL DANZIG notes a tension between the way in which Xenophon represents Tissaphernes in *Anabasis* and Cyrus' father Cambyses in *Cyropaedia* and uses an examination of this tension as a way of articulating more clearly Xenophon's attitude to one aspect of the art of leadership. Set in a general context of approbation, the speech of a father to his son (*Cyropaedia* 1.6.2–46) arguing that deception is part of the armoury of a good military leader is, on the face of it, a peculiarly authoritative utterance, and one likely to be expressive of Xenophon's own view of the matter: it is certainly widely understood in that way. How, then, is it to be squared with the equally common understanding that Tissaphernes' deception of the (admittedly sadly gullible) Clearchus in *Anabasis* is not an outstanding example of leadership skill deployed in loyal service of his royal master but an appalling example of perfidy? As often with Xenophon, the answer lies in (i) returning to the text, reading carefully what the author actually makes Cambyses say and replacing one's simplistic recollection of the passage with a more precise understanding and (ii) remembering that individual passages need to be judged in the context of a system of values that

emerges from the entire Xenophontic corpus. Approval of deception in fact comes with significant qualifications and its utility has to be balanced against the persuasive power of conspicuous honesty, for its misuse, however effective on a particular occasion, will undermine a leader's future ability to secure desirable outcomes by exploiting a reputation for moral probity. Leadership involves tough choices: it is not a simple art, and Xenophon's discourse about it (as about all subjects) is not simple. So far as Persian response is concerned, however, his willingness to incorporate Persians in that discourse, though familiar, bears reiteration.

For Danzig, Tissaphernes is primarily a spring-board for the consideration of Xenophontic values. It is, however, implicit in his discussion that Tissaphernes is not to be judged by different criteria from those that apply to Greeks: Persians might conceivably have distinctive characteristic strengths and failings, but the same could probably be said of e.g. Spartans, and it is not obvious that Persians seem to Xenophon to represent a categorically different type of human being. The same applies to Thucydides. His treatment of Tissaphernes, discussed in John Hyland's chapter, is also predicated on the assumption that the same principles of rational calculation apply to a Persian as to a Greek – and indeed that the context within which calculations have to be made and decisions taken about the pursuit of the state's interest is not radically dissimilar to that familiar in the Greek world. This does not mean, however, that Thucydides is entirely right in what he says about Tissaphernes: he was right that the satrap did not want either Athens or Sparta to triumph (hardly surprising since his job was to serve the interests of the Persian King) but his conviction that he actively sabotaged the Spartan war-effort is not persuasively grounded and overall his treatment may be marred by failure to consider or inability to find out about other factors in the Eastern Mediterranean or further afield which had a bearing on Tissaphernes' non-deployment of the Phoenician fleet. Thucydides is rarely thought of as a source for Achaemenid history in the same way that Xenophon and Herodotus are and it is clear that there is no powerful reason to reassess this state of affairs. Thucydides was committed to dealing with Tissaphernes by the latter's active involvement in the Peloponnesian War (by contrast any Persian dimension prior to 412 could, Thucydides believed, be largely ignored) and he was committed to allocating him a lot of space by his relevance to a persistent Athenian belief in the possibility of Atheno-Persian co-operation – a belief which Thucydides was concerned to controvert, not just as a matter of historical judgement but as a message for his contemporary Athenian audience. None of this is anything to do with study of the Achaemenid empire in its own right: Thucydides' Persian response is strictly part of Greek history.

Persian display

Greeks (and other imperial subjects too) knew that the Great King was exceedingly rich and they associated both kings and satraps with a degree of magnificence beyond the reach of citizens in city-state republics. The danger that lavish royal bounty might corrupt poor Greeks who came into too close contact with it could not be ignored. At the same time, in the light of Xerxes' defeat, it was inevitably tempting to dwell on the contrast between grand display and military failure (the shimmer of gold in the text of Aeschylus' *Persians* comes to mind here) and even to conclude that the former reflected or engendered a mentality that accounted for the latter. Historians have been ready to assume that this gave rise (in Greek minds in general and in classical historiography in particular) to a fully developed discourse about the self-indulgent luxury of the Persian court. Of course, if one draws a distinction between, on the one hand, the fact that Persian environments are reported to contain plenty of gold and silver and, on the other hand, the composition of elaborate descriptions of hedonistic living, one would have to say that surviving classical historians are at least a little disappointing in the latter respect. The contrast in a famous passage of Xenophon between Agesilaus sitting on the grass and the satrap Pharnabazus about to sit (until he thought better of it) on fine rugs is rather small beer and, in general, denunciation of luxury tends to be implicit in relatively unextravagant description of its instruments. Even Ctesias seems more interested in conspiracy and cruelty than in conspicuous consumption. But Ctesias is known only through epitomes and fragments, the fourth-century historians of Persia are barely preserved at all – and anyway is there not the evidence of Athenaeus? Well, perhaps not. In her discussion of the question Dominique Lenfant observes that Athenaeus' treatment of the *tryphē* of the Persians is intrinsically problematic, because it is based on out-of-context quotation and is dealing with a semantically and morally tricky entity. Her conclusion is that Athenaeus' judgement about the components of *tryphē* and his personal antipathy to the phenomenon as a feature of his own times inform the selection and presentation of material. We cannot be sure to what extent his sources characterized particular phenomena as examples of *tryphē* (whether they literally used that word or indicated something similar in different terms); and this means that we cannot actually be sure to what extent the lost classical sources for Achaemenid history discerned *tryphē* – especially *tryphē* in a heavy sense of the word – as a defining feature of the Achaemenid state or its royal court. That they knew, and reported, that Persia was different can scarcely be doubted: but the response to difference may not always have been hectic denunciation.

Among many markers of royal magnificence, the Great King's garments must have been one of the most notable. In his *Life* of Artaxerxes II (24)

Plutarch speaks of 'the gold, the *kandys* and the 12,000 talents' [!] worth of adornment (*kosmos*) that always enclosed the body of the king', though he does so in order to underline the fact that nonetheless the king was able to put up with the hardship of a military campaign as well as any common soldier – so there is no complaint about ennervating luxury here or presumably in the fourth-century source (Dinon?) upon whom Plutarch was drawing. One may also set this image of the King dripping with wealth alongside a different Greek *topos* about royal dress, namely the proposition that only the King may wear his tiara upright. My own chapter seeks to establish what this might be supposed to mean and in what sense it can be made to square with other evidence about royal head-gear. The answer to the first question is that it must indicate a specially stiffened version of the soft hat (bashlyk) that is normally associated with the Iranian riding costume. The answer to the second is: not without some discomfort. For the hat in question can only be seen in Greek representations (and even then surprisingly rarely), whereas it is absolutely certain that the King also sometimes wore a quite different sort of head-gear, one which is ignored in Greek representations and probably in Greek texts as well. One must conclude that, although the Great King had different dress-codes for different circumstances and although individual Greeks must have encountered these different dress codes, the Greek imagination was primarily seized by the one with military overtones. In view of the implications of Lenfant's discussion of Athenaeus, this conclusion is at least somewhat less surprising than it might otherwise have seemed. The truth is that the Greek response to the Achaemenid Empire was *not* simply to see it as a contemptible reservoir of effete orientals, and that something of the original shock experienced by sixth-century Anatolian Greeks at the arrival of a new 'Median' enemy survived deep into the classical era.

Regional studies

Two chapters look at Achaemenid Anatolia. In the first Frédéric Maffre lays out textual and archaeological evidence for the role of individual non-Iranians in the governance of Hellespontine Phrygia. The picture that emerges is quantitatively skewed towards Greeks from Anatolia and elsewhere, but one should no doubt be wary of assuming that this wholly reflects reality: the existence of a Greek historiographical tradition and the absence of non-Greek ones inevitably tips the balance hugely in one direction. The key principle is that the Great King and his satraps were perfectly happy to run the empire in part through members of non-Iranian elites, so long as their position in the hierarchy of authority remained relatively modest; and there is no reason why this should not have applied fairly equally to Greek and non-Greek elites. Over time the distinction

might, of course, become slightly complicated by the exposure of the latter to hellenization, but at the relatively low level of clarity with which Hellespontine Phrygia can be seen one cannot make much of this possibility. In another part of Anatolia, however, there is a little more to be said, as is shown by Eric Raimond's evocation of aspects of Greco-Lycian acculturation as it played out against the background of Achaemenid imperial rule, though his concern is not with the governance of the region in the Achaemenid interest or with the direct intrusion of Persians into the cultural process. This was, in fact, a cultural process with a long history (one which challenges simplistic notions about hellenic and non-hellenic and the impact of the first on the second) and it is necessary to rehearse aspects of this history in order to put the Achaemenid imperial period into context and to preserve a sense of proportion: Lycia produces some notable bits of Perso-Anatolian or Perso-hellenic material (e.g. the Payava Sarcophagus, the Karaburun tomb or the frieze on Pericles' Limyra monument) and these are prominent in discussions of Achaemenid Anatolia and as sources for Persian *Realien*. But this is not the only – or perhaps the main – cultural story of region during this era. Rather we should focus on the continuing health of distinctively Lycian culture, the philhellenism of the Lycian dynasts and social elite and the absence of passive hellenization: it was possible to pick and choose. Perhaps Persian authority served to empower Lycian identity because it empowered the Lycian elite (there could be a connection with Maffre's material here) or perhaps the particular pattern of interaction between hellenic and Lycian outlined in the early part of Raimond's chapter served to keep Greek influence at arm's length – which may only be another way of saying that historical depth (and geographical isolation?) gave Lycian culture an unusually strong character. In any event, it was not the Persians' business to interfere, and the material reflection of a Persian dimension in Lycian iconography will be just another example of Lycians picking and choosing.

Greco-Persian interaction has tended to dominate engagement with Achaemenid history, especially among those approaching it from a classical background. But the Achaemenid imperial state had to interact with a variety of distinct cultures, some of which had a coherent literate cultural history that was very much longer than that of the Greek-speakers of the Aegean basin, Thrace and western Anatolia. Two chapters illustrate aspects of this important fact.

The picture of Darius I's generally benign relationship with Egypt from which Alan Lloyd starts is, of course, partly informed by Greek sources – including Greek sources on the other Achaemenid rulers (notably Cambyses) with whom Darius is liable to be contrasted – and one of the monuments he

discusses is (albeit relatively scantily) attested in Greek and Roman sources. But this classical component remains well in the background in a chapter that investigates the direct engagement between Persian ruler and Egyptian subjects in the context of two rather different pieces of public building-work. In one case the argument minimizes such engagement. The temple at Hibis bears cartouches containing the name of Darius but these do not prove any significant degree of personal involvement on the king's part in the phase of building that took place during his time. The presence of a royal name on an Egyptian monument had always been in principle consistent with a variety of scenarios. There is no reason to suppose that this principle did not still apply during the Achaemenid era, and no positive reason to see the Hibis building-work as more than a piece of local initiative that was eventually date-stamped with the mark of the current pharaoh. The Nile-Red Sea canal is more complex – a grander project and one producing commemorative texts that are more varied (verbal presentation is in both Egyptian and three cuneiform languages) and distinctive (free-standing monumental stelae carrying narrative or commentary on the project, not mere generic cartouche decoration). The Egyptian-language stela-faces insert Darius into a near-pure Egyptian iconographic and literary context (the only oddities are representation of subject-peoples on a stela and the Persocentric listing of those peoples), and even the cuneiform faces, though bearing texts conforming to the standard typology of Achaemenid royal inscription, have a partly Egyptian appearance. Nonetheless there is no doubting that the Persian King has ordered a Persian enterprise with a Persian agenda. Greek sources knew, or thought they knew, that Darius was reviving an Egyptian project, that of Necho. But neither Egyptian nor Persian text chooses to make anything of that. The Egyptian text just treats Darius as the legitimate pharaoh without further comment, and the rhetoric that insists upon a king outperforming all predecessors takes precedence over the *topos* (illustrated in the discussion of Hibis) in which a king is moved to act by a report that a piece of work has been abandoned. The Persian text – more expressive of the *actual* power-relationship – simply makes no concession at all to the idea that Darius is an *Egyptian* ruler and therefore does not seek to assert any continuity (even a competitive one) with an Egyptian predecessor. Thus, although there is no doubt of Darius' direct involvement in the project, the engagement of ruler and subject displayed here is not much less impersonal than at Hibis. Egyptians had to have a pharaoh, so assimilation of Darius (or any other Achaemenid) into an Egyptian discourse is not a judgment on that king's actual or perceived attitude to Egypt; and, in his own discourse, Darius was always simply a Persian. Naturally this assessment can only technically apply to the particular texts in front of us. Perhaps there were other contexts in

which agents of Persian authority found it useful to dwell on the king's role as pharaoh or in which Egyptians might acknowledge with pleasure or pain the differences between successive foreign pharaohs: but, if so, they were ones that did not generate monumental texts.

Herodotus knew that Darius had a favourite wife called Artystone (7.69), and the domains of this lady and of her son Arsames (also known to Herodotus) figure in the chapter by Wouter Henkelman and Kristin Kleber. But most of the material with which they are concerned lies quite outside surviving Greek representations of the empire – not just because heartland Persia in general and Persepolis in particular are seldom explicitly evoked in pre-Alexander sources (cf. Root) but also because, whatever part of the world one is looking at, Greek historiographical discourse does not concern itself with the deployment of labour or the documentary paper-trail to which it gave rise: a Greek author might tell us that a king built a fine palace or a city-state a specially pretentious temple but would never pay much heed to the mechanics of the enterprise. This is not, of course, a specially Greek failing: we know about the building-work at Matannan and other such matters thanks to the survival of documentary archives (a survival dependent on accidents of material and climate) and not through the existence of a different historiographical mentality among authors writing in Akkadian or Elamite. The particular interest of the material in this chapter is twofold. First, the text published here provides a new illustration of the kings' exploitation of their subjects' resources for their own benefit. The forms of such exploitation varied (in the present case it was very direct), but from the subjects' point of view this was always, no doubt, the principal species of interaction with the Achaemenid imperial state. Secondly, the particular location in which this direct form of exploitation was being enacted makes the document stand out from a wider group of texts in which Babylonian labour is only deployed as far east as Elam. For here we are beyond the Zagros and in the heartland of the empire, and this means in turn that the document becomes part of the pre-history of a phenomenon (the centrally-organized use of foreign labour) attested in a quite different and profoundly important archive, that of the Persepolis Fortification tablets. We cannot quite say with absolute confidence that we are thus enabled to see exactly the same process through two different administrative viewpoints, because during the period of a decade and a half which elapsed between YOS 7,187 and the earliest Fortification tablets the imperial system suffered a major upheaval associated with the brief reign of Bardiya (Smerdis) and Darius' subsequent seizure of power – a story that started less than a year after YOS 8,187 was written. But there was continuity as well as disruption across 522–521, and it is very hard to believe that there was no system in place in Persis in 523 for the local

management of the workers supplied by Eanna of Uruk. Military conquest had given access to new resources: the Persian response was surely to organize those resources properly as soon as possible.

The limits of cultural response

Careful reading of the iconography of the decorated walls of Persepolis has played an important part in contemporary understanding of the character (or the projected character) of Achaemenid kingship and thus of the entire Achaemenid imperial project: indeed MARGARET ROOT's 1979 book on *The King and Kingship in Achaemenid Art* stands chronologically at the beginning of the first quarter-century of modern Achaemenid studies. Scholars pride themselves on trying to read pictures (as well as texts) through the imagined eyes of properly-informed contemporaries. But not all contemporaries were properly-informed and, in the context of a world-empire embracing multiple ethno-cultural groups, there must have been an expectation, indeed intention, that royal monuments would be viewed by people whose information was markedly different from that of their designers or their royal master. Root's chapter explores this by speculating about the response of a classical Athenian visitor to Persepolis to the Apadana stairway panel that depicts Greeks bringing gifts to the Great King. This is a complex exercise, partly because one of the gifts is not of objectively clear identity (i.e. *we* do not claim to know what is involved and so cannot set up a clear disjunction between our reaction and that of the putative classical Athenian visitor) and partly because the associations of particular objects (or of their iconographic representation) in that Athenian's mind are necessarily an object of speculation. But students of Athenian cultural history do standardly profess an ability to speculate in a proper fashion about Athenian 'values', so the exercise is certainly valid, and the thought-experiment is useful not only for the light it casts upon the emergence and reinforcement of Greek stereotypes about Persia but also (equally or more importantly) as a means of sharpening our response to the Apadana stairway project. Conscious as we are that the monument as a whole is intended to evoke ideas of order, stability and co-operation, we must not lose sight either of the fact that these ideas are persuasive rhetoric (otherwise known as spin) – which we are probably quite good at remembering – or of the potential for some dissonance (accidental or deliberate) when the individual images were viewed by interested parties – which is perhaps more easily forgotten and may be a lesson that does not only affect Greeks.

Some of the dissonance investigated by Root is linked with the fact that classical Athens could be receptive to Persian cultural goods as well as hostile to Persian political demands and cultural values. Everything depended on circumstance and context. This point also emerges from the

chapter by PHIROZE VASUNIA. That Greek intellectuals should be open to – even celebratory of – Persian wisdom is not necessarily a paradox. The general context – discourse about cosmogony, the good life and what lies beyond conducted by philosophers from a tradition not particularly sympathetic to prevailing democratic values – was not hostile and circumstances were variously propitious: the empire did bring potential purveyors of information about Persian wisdom into contact with the Greek world (the word *magos* discloses this, whatever the negative associations it had from the start in certain circles) and the Pythagorean strand (home-grown but edgily 'other') in one strand of Greek wisdom enabled engagement with the outsider. But it *was* a selective engagement, based on oral generality not textual specificity, focused on a relatively narrow doctrinal area and always in danger (as the hellenistic aftermath showed) of being inundated by a wash of more or less wholly inauthentic garbage: for the modest but (intellectually speaking) tolerably serious interest shown by Platonists and Pythagoreans opened the doors to a Greek Zoroaster of dismally low intellectual pretensions, though quite high market success. Moreover, the seeds of such cultural sell-out were always there: we should not forget that the first surviving Greek-language reference to Zoroaster, in the Lydian author Xanthus, is associated with talk about magi copulating with their mothers or (as Vasunia highlights) that the desire to claim some sort of validation by appeal to the ancient (or in Aristoxenus' case not-so-ancient) wisdom of the east turned into a matter of partisan Greek-on-Greek competition. Thus does the agonistic temperament intrude into what (we might think) ought to be the calm world of philosophical speculation. One is tempted, naturally, to describe that temperament as a distinctively hellenic disposition, but in truth we know nothing about the world of Iranian magi of the fifth and fourth centuries BC that actually precludes the existence of doctrinal dispute or personal rivalry in that sphere as well. To deny it (without evidence) would surely expose one to the dread accusation of 'orientalism', a concept briefly evoked by Vasunia and much hyped in the world of post-colonial *Angst* that so many historians of classical and Achaemenid antiquity claim to inhabit. But to affirm it (with no more evidence than the hints of doctrinal unorthodoxy noted by Vasunia or the potential for differentiation afforded by a putative Babylonian element in western Zoroastrianism) is perhaps just to be guilty of a different form of orientalism – a special case of the self-satisfied ethnocentrist unwillingness to acknowledge that other people may actually be different from oneself. To return from these dangerous heights to a more mundane issue: it would be nice to be more sure than the evidence can apparently allow just how much of the Plato-Zoroaster link is simply due to the inventiveness of the great man's pupils. Even if the *Alcibiades* is

authentic, its deployment of Zoroaster might justly be called a rhetorical flourish rather than a declaration of philosophical engagement, and Plato's other references to Persia have little to offer in this direction.

Post-antique reception

Vasunia describes his chapter as an exercise in *Rezeptionsgeschichte*, and it is one in which we are shown that 'reception' can, over time, take both more and less responsible forms. Two further chapters deal with a much later stage in the reception of Achaemenid Persia, focusing particularly on its heartland capital, and provoke a similar thought.

Prior to the start of proper excavation of the site in the 1930s, many modern travellers had already left a literal mark upon Persepolis. Some did so damagingly, by writing upon the monuments or by removing bits of them. Others were more benign: as the tendency for the place to be a mere sideshow to more pragmatic ventures gave way in the 1810s and 1820s and later to a more purposive engagement with the ruins, visitors attempted to clear parts of the site and to record what was there in reasonably sober descriptions or drawings or (from 1858) photographs. St John Simpson's paper outlines some features of this process, and calls special attention to the contribution of Lieutenant-Colonel Stannus, not hitherto one of the more celebrated names associated with Persepolis. Stannus was the first person to make moulds of the sculptures (this was two decades before Lottin and seven before Giuntini) and as such he made a significant contribution to raising the profile of Persepolis in the west, both through the original display of his material in the British Museum and then through its re-display in 1865 at a time of a general further increase in interest in Persian antiquities.

Simpson's discourse belongs entirely in a context where the identity of the Marv Dasht remains as Persepolis is generally accepted (and with the decipherment of cuneiform eventually guaranteed) and there is no ambivalence about the issue. Lindsay Allen is primarily concerned with an earlier stage, when the European and the Iranian-Islamic identities of the site co-existed and interacted. The proponents of these identities were different in character. Persian visitors were heir to a literary tradition that enshrined Persepolis in the mythistorical construct of Iranian history, and some of them carved *Ozymandias*-like poems on the stones of Persepolis. European visitors scratched mundane self-advertising graffiti, were brought to the site in the first place by politics and commerce, and effected a self-referential intellectual appropriation of the place that gave off a vaguely colonialist smell. (Curzon's rather positive construction of the graffito phenomenon is interesting here.) But the site's failure to fit classical norms or yield an obvious explanation of function rendered such visitors (few of whom paid any heed to Persian or

Arabic texts) open to on-the-spot native commentary, and there was perhaps some pragmatic interest in not remaining wholly aloof. From the vantage point of modern scholarship, the results varied. Continued use of the names Chilminar or Takht-i Jamshid did no harm but retention of the notion of 'harem' in the designation of part of the terrace was rather unfortunate, whatever Herzfeld's need to keep in with the local authorities. The persistence of stories about systems of wind-swept underground tunnels deceived no one in the long run, but association of Persepolis with the Iranian Nowruz (an idea current since the eighteenth century) has had a long history and exerted a surprisingly strong influence upon the scholarly literature. On the other hand, the first identification of Chilminar as Persepolis represents a rather more satisfactory example of native-European interaction: this identification crystallized in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century and its tendency to embrace all of greater Istakhr, not to say Shiraz as well, reflected contemporary Persian attitudes and was coloured by a shared ascription of importance to Alexander's destruction of the great royal city of Fars.

Alexander's Persian Empire?

And so we return to the most conclusively violent response to the Achaemenid Empire by someone whose political and cultural background placed him outside its literal and conceptual frontiers. The *doyen* of modern historians of Achaemenid Persia, Pierre Briant, first suggested that Alexander might be viewed as 'the last Achaemenid' back in the early days of the invention of Achaemenid Studies and returned to the idea at the conclusion of his great work, a history of the Persian Empire specified in both French and English versions as running from Cyrus to Alexander – not to Darius III. The end of great empires is liable to be untidy, and at some level there is bound to be continuity as well as disruption. This is particularly true where there is a relatively sharply defined act of conquest, as in the case of the demise of the Achaemenid Empire, if only because the conqueror will have an interest in stressing both phenomena: disruption in order to win plaudits from disadvantaged erstwhile subjects, continuity in order to avoid instability and win plaudits from advantaged erstwhile subjects for whom a continuing role in managing and profiting from imperial power takes precedence over affront at a change of royal identity. In these circumstances talk of Alexander as the 'last Achaemenid' is not surprising. Robin Lane Fox's chapter argues, however, that the idea is misleading. There were certainly different phrases in Alexander's engagement with the problem of succession to Achaemenid rule, but over and over again phenomena that have sometimes been viewed through an Achaemenid prism can better be seen through a Greek

or Macedonian or (most importantly?) Alexandrine one, and in the long run what the conqueror crafted was a new kingship of Asia, exercised from a point within the bounds of Darius III's realm (even literally from the palatial environments that had been familiar to his Iranian predecessors) and associated with some desire for (non-equal) partnership with those who represented the old empire's elite, but entirely distinctive in its fundamental character. Persian colour in the King's entourage or physical environment and the fitful aspiration to 'include' Persians in the imperial project should not be confused with the perpetuation or revival of Achaemenid Kingship. In the end, the king who affirmed the dead Darius by the savage punishment of his murderer and was a pragmatic 'lover of Cyrus' affirmed and loved himself and his own glory a very great deal more – and could hardly otherwise have achieved all that he did. Moreover, 'the Achaemenid Empire was only a phase in Alexander's career' – or so Alexander had hoped. There was no point in being the 'last Achaemenid' in Arabia, Carthage or Italy – or, actually, in Macedonia and Balkan Greece – and, while Alexander's unfulfilled future cannot entirely dictate our reaction to his actual past and present, it warns us to keep things in perspective. Alexander turned out not to be the 'first' anything (since his realm fell apart) and he was not the 'last' anything either: he was simply himself and all attempts at lapidary categorization are bound to misrepresent a unique reality. Such a misrepresentation would be unfair not only to Alexander the conqueror but also to the remarkable Empire that was his victim.

1

THUCYDIDES' PORTRAIT OF TISSAPHERNES RE-EXAMINED

John O. Hyland

One of the major features of the renaissance of Achaemenid Persian studies since the early 1980s has been historiographical re-examination of the Greek texts that provide the narrative framework for Persian political history. The need for a close re-studying of the Greek historians was eloquently expressed by Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg in a paper given at the 1984 Achaemenid History Workshop:

> … The frequently repeated statement as to the bias of the Greek sources should not therefore be followed by an attempt to check the Greek information against Iranian evidence that is so often deficient, but by an analysis of the literary and intellectual mould into which these data were inserted. This seems the only way to dehellenise and decolonialise Persian history.[1]

But, however many advances have been made since 1984, the work of re-examining Greek historical writing on Persia is still far from complete. One area of continued neglect is Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian War, the only contemporary source for the dramatic intervention of Darius II and his satraps in the affairs of the Greek world at the end of the fifth century BC. Thucydides' attitude towards Persia has not been treated in a comprehensive way since Antony Andrewes' frequently-cited 1961 article on 'Thucydides and the Persians', which concentrates on the composition of the history and Thucydidean omissions, but says very little about the historian's actual treatment of Persian characters in his narrative.

Modern scholarship has had a great deal to say about Thucydides' only major Persian character, the famous satrap Tissaphernes, but studies of Tissaphernes in Thucydides have lacked a historiographical focus. They can be divided into two broad groups – on the one hand, those that try to suggest alternative explanations for the satrap's actions, arguing that Thucydides misinterprets Tissaphernes' motives; on the other, those that accept Thucydides' reconstruction of events. Both approaches, though, share a desire to establish an official historical version of what actually happened and why this

Persian official behaved as he did. Neither involves the all-important consideration of Thucydides' motives, the attempt to show why the historian chose to present Tissaphernes in a certain way and rejected the interpretations of his contemporaries. In this paper, I hope to shed some light on the choices that faced Thucydides when writing about Tissaphernes and his aims in portraying the satrap as he did, and to place his presentation of Tissaphernes in a wider context of late fifth- and early fourth-century Athenian attitude towards Persia.

Thucydides and Persia

Thucydides' history as a whole concentrates on the story of the Athenian empire and the reasons, above all internal ones (cf. 2.65.12), for its ultimate collapse. Although he mentions that both Athens and Sparta sought the support of the Great King from the outbreak of the war (2.7.1), Thucydides spends little time on Persian matters in the early books. Andrewes suggested in his 1961 article that Thucydides' avoidance of Achaemenid material, particularly his failure to mention a peace treaty with the King referred to by the orator Andocides (3.29), stems from an ignorance of Persia's importance in Greek politics before 412.[2] But Thucydides' involvement in the highest levels of Athenian government during the Archidamian War at a time when Athens was actively seeking Persian alliance (4.50.3), makes this explanation somewhat doubtful. I argue elsewhere, following suggestions in recent studies of Thucydides' narrative techniques by Tim Rood and Jonathan Price, that the historian made deliberate choices to omit or exclude Persian-related events from the narrative when he found them irrelevant for the course of the war and his portrayal of Athenian behaviour.[3]

As a result of the scarcity of Persians throughout most of the *History*, readers of Thucydides are often startled when they turn to Book Eight, in which the Achaemenid empire enters the war and the historian lavishes an unprecedented amount of space on a Persian character, the satrap of Sardis responsible for Persia's initial alliance with Sparta, Tissaphernes. Thucydides refers to Tissaphernes ninety-two times in Book Eight, far more than even the famous Athenian exile Alcibiades. In the entire history, only Alcibiades and Brasidas are mentioned more often.[4]

Why should Thucydides give so much attention to Tissaphernes, who was only the first of Persia's representatives in the Ionian War? He did not play a decisive role in the war, unless to prolong it until his replacement Cyrus could arrive with greater enthusiasm for the Spartan cause.[5] If one considers the historian's selective treatment of earlier Persian material, it seems likely that Thucydides concentrates on Tissaphernes not from a deep interest in the Achaemenid aspect of the war, but because he considered this particular Persian a central figure in the story of Athens' internal decline.[6]

Tissaphernes, exactly because he failed to contribute in a significant way to Sparta's victory over Athens, was a crucial figure in a great political question that gripped the Athenians throughout the oligarchic coup of 411, the campaigns of the Ionian War, and beyond: was it possible that Persia and the King might be persuaded to transfer their friendship to Athens and save the city from its enemies? Athens' anticipation of salvation from the east continued long after the Achaemenid empire had made a decisive commitment on behalf of the Spartan alliance. Tissaphernes' conflicts with his Spartan allies in the early years of the Achaemenid intervention provided evidence for many Athenians that hope remained.

Thucydides' treatment of Tissaphernes' plans and of Athenian hopes for Persian aid constitutes a complete, carefully thought-out approach to a controversial subject, which the historian found of the highest importance. It is partly for this reason that Thucydides' eighth book contains certain unusual stylistic features, that he interjects authorial opinion into the narrative (8.46.5; 56.3; 87.4), that he includes and explicitly argues against alternative versions of events (8.87.2–6).[7]

Tissaphernes' introduction and motives for war with Athens

As one might expect from Thucydides' earlier treatment of Persian topics, Tissaphernes appears only when the narrative of the Greek war requires his presence. Thucydides introduces him as 'the general of the coastal area for King Darius' (βασιλεῖ Δαρείῳ τῷ Ἀρταξέρξου στρατηγὸς ἦν τῶν κάτω),[8] but feels no need to provide information on the satrap's personal background or the circumstances in which he attained his office.[9]

The context for Tissaphernes' first appearance in Thucydides is a Spartan debate over the best target for the offensive of 412.[10] Messengers from the Ionian cities, arriving in Sparta to lobby for support against Athens, were accompanied and supported by an emissary of Tissaphernes, conveying the satrap's promise to provide supplies for Peloponnesian troops in Ionia (8.5.4). At this point Thucydides presents the underlying thoughts that drove Tissaphernes to seek out alliance with Sparta (8.5.5).

This introduction to the Achaemenid intervention in the war makes it clear that Persia's quarrel with Athens could not be easily resolved. Thucydides' presentation of Tissaphernes' initial motives for seeking out Spartan alliance bears comparison with his earlier discussion of the Macedonian king Perdiccas' relationship with the Spartans. Perdiccas had come to the support of the Spartan general Brasidas' campaigns in Thrace and had offered to pay half of the Spartans' wages. The Macedonian-Spartan alliance had turned sour, though, after disputes about the goals of the campaign, and Perdiccas had first protested by lowering the Spartans' pay (4.83), and finally switched sides and joined the Athenians (4.128).

Thucydides writes that Perdiccas had been afraid of Athens because of past disputes, but that his primary motive for alignment with Sparta was the need for help against an internal revolt (4.79.2). In 412, Tissaphernes had one similar reason for seeking out the friendship of Sparta, the need to put down the revolt of the Persian rebel Amorges. But, although Thucydides mentions that the Great King had ordered Tissaphernes to crush Amorges' uprising, he gives pride of place to a more permanent goal for the Persian satrap, the need to recover the tribute of the Greek cities along the Anatolian coast, the collection of which was made impossible by the very existence of the Athenian empire (8.5.5).

Amorges' depredations in Caria were a threat to Tissaphernes alone, whereas the need to recover lost revenues also drew the attention of his colleague Pharnabazus, who shared Tissaphernes' goal of collecting tribute from the coastal cities by destroying Athenian power in Anatolia (8.6.1; cf. 8.99). For Thucydides, the satraps' assignment to recover tribute from Athenian-controlled cities was not only the reason that Persia went to war, but a reason for it to continue its participation in hostilities after Amorges had ceased to matter. The tribute issue was a crucial point of difference between the Athenian and Achaemenid empires that could prevent any efforts at peaceful co-existence. There might be no accommodation between the two great powers until neither impeded the other's ability to expand, and this helps to explain why Persia, unlike Perdiccas of Macedonia, was unlikely to allow differences with the Spartans to drive it into Athens' arms.

Alcibiades and the hope of Persian aid for Athens

Throughout the early events of Book Eight, Tissaphernes gives no sign of a change in purpose. His primary mission, despite the elimination of Amorges, remains the recovery of tribute and territory for the King, to be achieved by co-operation with the Spartans. Tissaphernes' relationship with Sparta, though, grew shaky in the winter of 412/11, due to a series of disagreements over treaty terms (8.36, 43) and the rate at which the satrap paid the Peloponnesian fleet (8.29).[11] Matters came to a head in a quarrel between Tissaphernes and the Spartan envoy Lichas over the territorial claims of the King, in which Thucydides makes Lichas address the satrap with colorful Herodotean overtones, expressing outrage that Darius should claim control of all lands held by his ancestors, since such a formula might imply the enslavement of much of Hellas to the Mede (8.43.3). Tissaphernes walked out of the negotiations, and the Peloponnesians temporarily broke off contact with him and withdrew from Miletus to Rhodes, bringing the alliance to a low point (8.44).

In the context of these events, Thucydides begins to suggest that the

satrap might undergo a change of heart. The historian introduces Tissaphernes' new motives, which play such an important role in the rest of Book Eight, after rewinding his narrative by several months to focus on the machinations of Alcibiades.[12]

Thucydides does not give Alcibiades all the credit for Tissaphernes' growing fear and mistrust of his Spartan allies. As he notes, the root of Tissaphernes' suspicion of the Spartans was his argument with Lichas (8.52). Alcibiades, though, has already appeared at several points in the history as a character who tells his audience what they want to hear, builds on their fears and ambitions, and drives them towards bold execution of decisions which they have already considered but not acted on (6.93; 7.18; 8.6.3).[13] It is not surprising, then, that Thucydides introduces Tissaphernes' change of policy in the form of advice from the Athenian exile. The historian uses the character of Alcibiades, in a lengthy segment of indirect speech to Tissaphernes, to introduce the complex strategic issues facing the satrap, and to explore the much-hoped-for possibility that Persia might be persuaded to side with Athens. Thucydides prefaces the Athenian's advice with the statement that Alcibiades became Tissaphernes' 'teacher in all things' (διδάσκαλος πάντων γιγνόμενος, 8.45.1), but he will return to Tissaphernes' thoughts at the end of the section to examine the extent of the satrap's agreement with Alcibiades' instructions (8.46.5).[14]

Alcibiades begins by suggesting a series of specific measures to reduce Tissaphernes' expenses, including the reduction of Peloponnesian wages by half (8.45.2). He then turns to the wider strategy of the war and the question of how Greek alliances may bring the greatest benefit to Persia. He warns Tissaphernes against reliance on Sparta, counseling him against bringing a Phoenician fleet into the Aegean or paying for more Peloponnesian ships (8.46.1). To do either, Alcibiades argues, would tip the strategic balance heavily in Sparta's favour, to the great disadvantage of the King. If Persia allows the Spartans to extend their military dominance to the sea as well as the land, the King would lose any chance of alliance with one limited Greek power against another, and would face great expense and danger (μεγάλῃ δαπάνῃ καὶ κινδύνῳ) in any future warfare against the Greek world. It would be far less costly (βραχεῖ μορίῳ τῆς δαπάνης) to promote long-term conflict among the Greeks (8.46.2).[15]

The language of cost and expense follows naturally from Thucydides' belief in the great wealth of the Achaemenid empire. This wealth is characterized by extreme generosity, and a number of examples of Achaemenid largesse occur throughout the history: Xerxes' letter promising to spare no expense (δαπάνη) to aid Pausanias (1.129.3); the reference to the custom of Persian royal gift-giving during Thucydides' digression on Thrace (2.97.4);

the land grants to Themistocles (1.138.5) and the Delian refugees (5.1); and of course the promised subsidies for Peloponnesian fleets in Book Eight. Thucydides recognizes, though, that the King and his satraps are concerned for the conservation of wealth as well as its redistribution. He states later in the book that Tissaphernes would gain greater credit with the King if he could achieve his goals while spending less money (8.87.5), and attributes to the satrap a fear that Pharnabazus would accomplish his objectives at less cost (again δαπάνη, 8.109).[16] Alcibiades' emphasis on the financial risks of the Greek situation, therefore, is a deliberate appeal to the sentiments and interests of his Persian patron.

He bolsters his argument with an explicit comparison between the empires of Athens and Persia. Athens, Alcibiades states, is the ideal ally for the Persian King because of their shared imperial experience, and would be willing to hold empire in common with the King (εἶναι κοινωνοὺς αὐτῷ τῆς ἀρχῆς). As a maritime power, it has no reason to challenge Persia's claim to dominance on land. Above all, the Athenians share Persia's taste for conquest, and would be willing partners in the enslavement (ξυγκαταδουλοῦν) of the Ionian islands and the Greeks of Asia. Sparta, on the other hand, with its talk of liberation of the Greeks (ἐλευθερώσαντας), is the opposite of everything Persia and Athens stand for (8.46.3). It is understandable that Tissaphernes requires the removal of Athenian power from Asia, but he must not allow the Spartans to grow too strong in the process. As soon as possible, Alcibiades argues, once both sides are appropriately weakened, Tissaphernes must turn against Persia's true enemy and expel the Spartans from the territory of the King (8.46.4).

Thucydides treats Tissaphernes' response to Alcibiades' suggestions with great care (8.46.5). He states that the satrap agreed with Alcibiades 'for the most part' (τὸ πλέον), a qualification which indicates that Tissaphernes did not follow all of the exile's advice.[17] In a rare expression of authorial voice in the narrative, he adds that it is necessary to determine Tissaphernes' motives from the actions that he took (ὅσα γε ἀπὸ τῶν ποιουμένων ἦν εἰκάσαι). Listing the actions by which Tissaphernes showed his agreement with Alcibiades, Thucydides mentions the reduction of the Peloponnesians' pay and the satrap's decision not to support them with a Phoenician fleet. These events convince him that Tissaphernes' unwillingness to aid the Peloponnesians was 'too obvious to miss' (τά τε ἄλλα καταφανέστερον ἢ ὥστε λανθάνειν). He says nothing, though, about Tissaphernes' response to the suggestion that Persia should join forces with Athens.

Alcibiades spends the rest of Book Eight in efforts to bring Tissaphernes over to the Athenian side. Thucydides portrays his attempts as unsuccessful, but emphasizes that the Athenians thought otherwise, convinced by the

claims that Alcibiades made in order to negotiate for his own recall from exile. Athenians from all walks of political life were willing to consider Alcibiades' terms in the hope that alliance with the Great King was a real possibility. Oligarchs like Peisander used the potential friendship of the King as a reason for the abolition of democracy, since common wisdom had it that Persia would not support popular government (8.48.1, 53).[18] Thucydides writes that the naval *okhlos*, although angered by threats to the democracy, was placated by the thought that the King might agree to pay its wages (8.48.3).[19]

Thucydides presents Alcibiades' efforts to seduce Tissaphernes in two phases. In the first, playing on the satrap's distrust of the Spartans, Alcibiades employed simple persuasion. Thucydides writes that he tried his hardest, as he was competing for great stakes (περὶ μεγάλων ἀγωνιζόμενος, 8.52), but was unable to win Tissaphernes over to friendship for Athens, and the negotiations between Tissaphernes and an Athenian embassy led by the oligarch Peisander were unsuccessful (8.56). According to Thucydides, Alcibiades acted as Tissaphernes' spokesman and disguised his lack of influence over the satrap by presenting the envoys with overly harsh terms for Persian support. Peisander and his colleagues were forced to walk out of the talks before Tissaphernes could declare his unwillingness to help them.[20]

After this failure, Alcibiades lost the confidence of the oligarchs, who subsequently dropped their efforts at winning Persian aid but successfully overthrew the government. Alcibiades transferred his attentions to the naval men on Samos, dedicated to restoring the democracy, and promised them the support of Tissaphernes and the King if they could bring about his recall from exile. The democratic leader Thrasybulus met with Alcibiades, escorted him back to the fleet, and secured his election as general. Alcibiades' claims of Persia's sympathy for Athens continued to convince his audience, although Thucydides states that they were greatly exaggerated (ὑπερβάλλων ἐμεγάλυνε τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν, 8.81.2). He reports Alcibiades' promise that Tissaphernes was willing to melt down and coin his own bed to keep the Athenians supplied, and would bring the Phoenician fleet to help the Athenians rather than the Peloponnesians, as long as they recalled Alcibiades and treated him well (8.81.3).[21]

Alcibiades had recognized, despite his grandiose boasts, that simple persuasion would not be enough to win Tissaphernes over. In the second phase of his relationship with Tissaphernes, therefore, Thucydides makes him turn to a strategy of coercion, trying to use his new authority as Athenian general to intimidate the satrap (8.82.3). When Tissaphernes left for Aspendus to assemble the Phoenician fleet that he was supposed to lead up in support of his allies, Alcibiades set out after him with a small naval squadron, claiming he would either bring the Phoenicians over to the Athenian side or prevent

them from joining the Spartans (8.88). His actual plan, Thucydides writes, was to convince the Peloponnesians of Tissaphernes' friendship to Alcibiades and Athens, thus driving a rift between the allies and forcing Tissaphernes to take Athens' side.

A serious fracture did in fact develop between Tissaphernes and his allies, and the Spartan fleet, convinced that the Phoenicians would never come, sailed up to the Hellespont to seek assistance from Pharnabazus. Alcibiades, returning to Samos, reported 'that he had diverted the Phoenician fleet from coming to the Peloponnesians and that he had made Tissaphernes friendlier to the Athenians than before' (ἀγγέλλων ὅτι τάς τε Φοινίσσας ναῦς ἀποστρέψειε Πελοποννησίοις ὥστε μὴ ἐλθεῖν καὶ τὸν Τισσαφέρνην ὅτι φίλον πεποιήκοι μᾶλλον Ἀθηναίοις ἢ πρότερον, 8.108.1). This version of events seems to have gained popularity, and appears in Isocrates' speech in defence of Alcibiades' son almost fifteen years later as one of Alcibiades' many benefactions to Athens (16.20).

Thucydides' account of Tissaphernes' actual decision not to bring the fleet (8.87), however, has nothing to say about Alcibiades, and it is clear that the historian does not share in the belief that Alcibiades played any significant part in sending the Phoenicians home.[22] Immediately after Alcibiades' final optimistic report to the Athenians, Tissaphernes sets out for the Hellespont to repair his alliance with Sparta (8.109).

For Thucydides, despite the initial convergence of Tissaphernes' actions with Alcibiades' advice to harm the Spartans, there was never a real chance that Athenian hopes of Persian friendship would be fulfilled. The historian's treatment of Alcibiades' relationship with Tissaphernes, with its increasing divergence between Alcibiades' advice and Tissaphernes' actual actions and motives, constitutes an extended and careful argument against the idea that Persia could have been brought over to the Athenian side. Thucydides attempts to show as clearly as possible that whatever Tissaphernes thought, he did not give serious consideration to a friendship with Athens, which remained Persia's rival in empire despite all of Alcibiades' imaginative promises of partnership.

Tissaphernes' fear of Sparta and the strategy of balance

It is doubtful, given Thucydides' careful undermining of Alcibiades' statements about Tissaphernes, that he relied on Alcibiades as a source for the satrap's motives.[23] His statement on the necessity of inferring Tissaphernes' intentions from his actions (8.46.5) implies that the historian did just that, reconstructing what Tissaphernes was likely to have thought based on his own views of the satrap's subsequent behaviour and the interests of the Persian empire.

Why did Thucydides believe that Alcibiades was so unsuccessful at winning Tissaphernes over? There is of course the issue of the Ionian cities and Persia's lost tribute, but Peisander and the Athenian embassy that met with Tissaphernes showed themselves willing to concede all this in exchange for the friendship of the King (8.56.3). There must have been further reasons for Tissaphernes' reluctance, and Thucydides finds them in the satrap's conflicting fears.[24]

The one Athenian who speaks out against the likelihood of Persian support for Athens, Alcibiades' bitter enemy Phrynichus, states that even if the Great King did not distrust the Athenians, it would be difficult for Persia to switch sides with a Spartan army present in its territory (8.48.4). Thucydides had commented earlier on Phrynichus' intelligence (8.27.5), and he certainly shares his analysis of the unlikelihood of Persian aid, which the historian introduces shortly after Alcibiades' advice to Tissaphernes.[25] Phrynichus' warning, disbelieved by the Athenians in their deep hope for Persian aid, is confirmed in Thucydides' comments on Tissaphernes' aversion to joining the Athenians, which emphasize the satrap's fear of his Spartan allies (8.52; 8.56.2–3). If he had been swayed by the apparent willingness of the Athenians to concede tribute and territory, Tissaphernes would have to count on retaliation by the sizeable Peloponnesian fleet.

When the Athenian embassy went home and Tissaphernes concluded a new treaty with the Peloponnesians, Thucydides takes care to insist that the agreement did not reflect a new Persian eagerness to help the Spartan cause. The satrap sought out yet another arrangement with the Spartans, Thucydides writes, in accordance with a general plan to balance both Greek combatants against each other (ἐπανισοῦν τοὺς Ἕλληνας πρὸς ἀλλήλους, 57.2), weakening both sides.[26]

The historian explains Tissaphernes' alleged divide-and-conquer strategy as the logical response to his fears of both the Athenian and Spartan armies on his borders (57.1). He wished to bring the Peloponnesians back to Miletus, supply their crews, and prevent their disagreement from degenerating into outright hostility. The tension with Sparta could not be allowed to escalate for two reasons: first, because it might weaken the Spartans enough to bring about an Athenian victory, which was hardly in Tissaphernes' interests, and second, and most importantly (ἔτι δὲ ἐφοβεῖτο μάλιστα), because open conflict with his former allies could drive the Peloponnesians to ravage the satrap's territory in search of food and supplies. The threat of Spartan violence against Tissaphernes' lands was precisely what Thucydides believed responsible for checking the Persian flirtation with Peisander's Athenian embassy.[27]

In the face of the competing Athenian and Spartan threats to his satrapy, Tissaphernes' only option, as Thucydides saw it, was to support the Spartans

for the time being and help them to keep the Athenians at bay, despite his deeper misgivings about Spartan ambitions in Asia Minor. The historian compliments Tissaphernes' handling of the situation as a model of rational political thought (πάντων οὖν τούτων λογισμῷ καὶ προνοίᾳ, 8.57.2).[28]

The apparent reconciliation and third treaty between the Persians and Spartans, failed, however, to convince the Greek world that Tissaphernes was not harbouring a secret preference for Athens. As we have seen, the majority of Athenians were ready to believe Alcibiades' promises of Persian friendship. While Thucydides takes care to emphasize his own opinion that Tissaphernes did not actually favour Athens in any way, he also writes that the majority of the Peloponnesians came to believe in Alcibiades' influence over the satrap. The growing tension between the allies in the summer of 411 centred around the belief that Tissaphernes was betraying the Spartans and 'atticizing' at the Athenian exile's instigation (8.78; 83.1; 85.2; 87.1).

The climax of Thucydides' portrayal of Tissaphernes comes with the satrap's journey to Aspendus to meet the Phoenician ships which, according to the terms of the third treaty, he was to bring into the Aegean in support of the Spartans and their allies. The report of the satrap's departure begins a lengthy explanation of the reasons for which Tissaphernes failed to bring the promised fleet. Thucydides acknowledges that the subject is a matter of great disagreement (8.87.2–3), and proceeds to demonstrate the scale of the controversy by listing several alternative versions of Tissaphernes' motives, a tactic common in Herodotus but rare in Thucydides' history.[29] The variant explanations are as follows:

1. Tissaphernes wished to delay a decision and weaken the Peloponnesian fleet (ἵνα διατρίβῃ τὰ τῶν Πελοποννησίων), as also suggested by the negligence of his deputy Tamos in paying the Peloponnesians' wages.
2. Tissaphernes wished to extort money from his Phoenician crews in exchange for sending them back home (for, the historian adds, he had no intention of using them).
3. Tissaphernes actually went to Aspendus to justify himself against the attacks being made in Sparta, with the sincere intention of raising the full complement of promised Phoenician ships.

As Thucydides' language has made clear from the start, the historian finds the third version unacceptable. Tissaphernes' fear of his Peloponnesian allies and wish to limit their power throughout Book Eight make it impossible for the historian to believe that Tissaphernes had any desire to help them win the war. The second suggestion is strange for Thucydides in implying a satrapal motivation unconnected to Greek events, but may have been recorded out of a simple interest in the money-making stratagem involved. It is unsurprising, then, that when Thucydides gives his verdict

on Tissaphernes' actual motives, he chooses something much like the first variant. The historian is convinced that the satrap could have handed immediate victory to the Spartans if he had brought them the Phoenician ships in a timely fashion (8.87.4), and takes the fact that Tissaphernes did not do so as solid proof that he never wanted to.

It is important to stress, however, that Thucydides' solution to the problem (8.87.4), expressed boldly in authorial first person as the clearest explanation possible (ἐμοὶ μέντοι δοκεῖ σαφέστατον εἶναι), is not completely identical to the first variant. The satrap made the decision not to bring the Phoenician fleet, Thucydides believes, not only to weaken the Peloponnesians, but to bring about weakness and stalemate for all the Greeks (διατριβῆς ἕνεκα καὶ ἀνοκωχῆς τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν).

In his explanation of the affair of the phantom fleet, Thucydides hammers home the theme that he has stressed throughout Book Eight. Tissaphernes' mistreatment of his Spartan allies cannot be taken as evidence of favouritism, for it is always balanced by an equal desire to bring harm to the Athenians. Despite the boasts of Alcibiades and the accusations of the Spartans, Tissaphernes' actions do not imply an interest in the benefit of Athens. They are calculated for the advantage of Persia alone, and do not require sympathy for either side in the wars of the Greeks.

Tissaphernes' apology: in search of a Persian version

As Book Eight comes to an end, Thucydides' explanation of the events surrounding Tissaphernes and the early tensions in the Spartan-Persian alliance is clear. He shares a common assumption with the Peloponnesians and Alcibiades' supporters in Athens, the view that Tissaphernes deliberately sabotaged the Spartan war effort. He diverges from popular belief by rejecting the idea that Tissaphernes' hostility towards the Peloponnesians required friendship for Athens.

But the widespread Greek belief in Tissaphernes' wish to undermine his allies contained a series of problems and logical inconsistencies. Thucydides' endorsement of this conspiracy theory makes his account problematic as a source for Tissaphernes' actual intentions and the policies of Darius II during the Peloponnesian War. Although he may be correct to argue that Persia had no interest in alliance with Athens, Thucydides fails to present a convincing case for Tissaphernes' desire to harm the Peloponnesians.[30]

First and foremost, it remains unclear, beyond vague notions of decay and loss of time for the Greek combatants, what Tissaphernes stood to gain in the long run from failing to bring the Phoenician fleet into the Aegean.[31] It seems plausible, on the contrary, that the fleet could have been the solution to all the satrap's problems and fears as Thucydides presents them.

According to the terms of the third treaty quoted by Thucydides, the requirement for Tissaphernes to provide wages for the Peloponnesians would have ended with the arrival of the Phoenician ships (8.58.5). The loss of guaranteed funding would have been a serious blow to Peloponnesian strength, and the presence of a naval force of his own, outnumbering the Spartans, would have gone far to calm Tissaphernes' fear of Peloponnesian raids against his territory. The Greek cities of Anatolia might have thought twice about expelling Persian garrisons or refusing to pay tribute with several hundred Phoenician triremes anchored offshore. Thucydides makes Tissaphernes fear that Pharnabazus would steal his credit for successes over Athens (8.109). What better way to forestall his rival than bringing the Phoenician fleet into action?

As an afterthought, having already given his own verdict on the reasons for Tissaphernes' failure to bring the fleet, Thucydides refers to and summarily dismisses the satrap's official explanation of his actions, that he had not succeeded in collecting the full number of ships that the King had ordered him to assemble.[32] For Thucydides, this is a mere excuse (πρόφασις), because Tissaphernes could have achieved great royal favour by going into action and winning a victory with the smaller contingent of ships, thereby saving the King extra expense (87.5). Thucydides discounts this Persian version because of his pre-existing theory on Tissaphernes' motives, but also because of his belief in the importance of wealth and its conservation for the Great King, and his faith in Achaemenid military power. He considers it a fact that Tissaphernes' intervention with a fleet would have brought the war to a decisive end.

He does not mention another version of Tissaphernes' motives, which appears in Diodorus and probably comes from the fourth-century universal history of Ephorus. Although the account of Ephorus-Diodorus follows Thucydides on Tissaphernes' secret strategy of balancing off the Greek powers (13.37.4–5), it puts a different self-justification in the satrap's mouth, making him claim that he sent the ships back home because of threats to Phoenicia from the Kings of the Arabs and the Egyptians (13.46.6).

A small number of modern scholars have accepted this explanation as the true cause of Tissaphernes' failure to bring the ships, pointing to possible evidence of unrest in Egypt in 411.[33] The majority of historians have been more cautious on the subject, doubting the seriousness of the trouble in Egypt.[34] Where did Ephorus obtain such specialized information on Tissaphernes if not from Thucydides? Bruno Bleckmann's recent work on the Ionian War makes the disquieting suggestion that he invented it, with reference to Persia's mid-fourth-century wars against independent Egypt.[35]

The episode raises the possibility, however, that events elsewhere in the Achaemenid empire, unaddressed due to Thucydides' strict focus on the

Greek players in his narrative, affected Tissaphernes' use of the fleet. An interpolated passage in Xenophon's *Hellenica*, for instance, refers to the end of a serious Median revolt in 409 (1.2.19).[36] Closer to the Aegean world, the rise of Evagoras of Salamis and his wars against Phoenician Cypriote tyrants, roughly contemporary to the events of Book Eight, may have given the Levantine Phoenician kings cause for alarm and a reluctance to leave their own coasts unguarded.[37] In searching to connect these events with Tissaphernes' actions in Thucydides' narrative we enter the realm of speculation, but it is clear at least that Thucydides' narrow focus on the Greek world deprives us of a full understanding of the Phoenician fleet affair.

As for Thucydides' claim that Tissaphernes paid the Peloponnesians insufficient wages in order to hinder their fighting ability, there are countless references to difficulties encountered by fourth-century Greek cities and generals in raising funds for their troops.[38] Why should Tissaphernes' failure to provide complete pay for the Spartan fleet be different? Early in Alcibiades' time at Tissaphernes' court, Thucydides makes him dismiss Ionians who have come to ask the satrap for money, protesting that Tissaphernes is waiting for funds from the King and is in financial difficulty (8.45.6). It is quite plausible that the royal demand for arrears of tribute placed a serious strain on the satrap's resources while he attempted to keep the Peloponnesian fleet supplied.[39]

Financial hardship and the rapid rise in the numbers of Peloponnesian ships seem obvious explanations for Tissaphernes' reductions in Peloponnesian pay. At the outset of the Ionian War in 412, it seems likely that Tissaphernes shared the belief that Thucydides claims was prevalent throughout the Greek world (8.2.2, 24.4–5), that the Athenian empire would not survive one summer's fighting.[40] For a short war one could afford to be generous, but the prolonged nature of the naval campaigns and the increasing size of the forces involved could have led naturally to a recalculation of how much the satrap could afford to spend. Even Cyrus, the enthusiastic supporter of the Spartans who saw the war through to the finish, refused to raise the rate of pay back to the full drachma a day promised at first by Tissaphernes (Xenophon *Hellenica* 1.5.4–7).[41]

One fourth-century source, a continuator of Thucydides' history, supports the idea of financial difficulty as the root of the satraps' failure to pay acceptable wages. The Oxyrhynchus historian claims that the King was to blame, and that he habitually provided his lieutenants with insufficient funds at the start of military campaigns (22.2).[42] Unfortunately, the fragmentary nature of the Oxyrhynchus narrative and our ignorance of the author's identity make it difficult to establish a wider context for his opinions on the Persian empire or to speculate on his sources.[43] But his comment supports our pre-existing

doubts about Thucydides' reconstruction of Tissaphernes' motives, and reminds us that parts of Thucydides' audience might have disagreed with his interpretation of events.

Conclusions

Thucydides' portrayal of Tissaphernes and the Persian empire, therefore, contains serious flaws, and the modern historian must proceed with extreme caution in using Book Eight as a source for Achaemenid policy towards the Greek world. Unfortunately, despite its problems and incompleteness, the history of Thucydides is the only coherent source. Fragments of later Greek evidence, like the passages in the Oxyrhynchus historian or Diodorus, do not offer any sort of large-scale alternative version that may be preferred to that of Thucydides. Even if they were complete, they would no doubt present difficult historiographical problems of their own.

Achaemenid sources for the period, which might help to construct a more balanced account of events, are almost entirely non-existent. The three surviving royal inscriptions of Darius II confine themselves to recitation of royal genealogy, assertion of the power of Ahuramazda and notification of building work at Susa and so shed no light on his relations with the Greek world. No references to the Peloponnesian War appear in Babylonian legal documents or Egyptian papyri. The only non-Greek text that refers to Persia's role in the Greek war is the Lycian inscription on the Xanthus Stele (TL 44), broken in parts and only partially translatable. While it contains some interesting references to Tissaphernes' activities in Lycia and to the involvement of a Lycian dynast with the Spartans and Persians during the war, it adds little to our knowledge of broader Achaemenid policy towards the Greeks.[44] Tissaphernes' surviving coinage cannot be dated to precise periods of his career and is of little use in the reconstruction of satrapal grand strategy.[45]

We are left with Thucydides, then, and must ask what can be gained from his problematic portrayal of Tissaphernes' behaviour towards Athens and Sparta. It is possible to make a positive answer to this question. Thucydides' treatment of the Persian intervention in 412–411, while inadequate to explain why the Great King's subordinates acted as they did during the early years of the Ionian War, does provide powerful evidence for Athenian views of Achaemenid Persia at a decisive moment in the history of both. Thucydides is by no means representative of Athenian popular opinion, but he reveals a great deal about contemporary attitudes towards the Persians through his criticism.

Thucydides' portrayal of Persia and Tissaphernes was almost certainly meant to influence contemporary political debate at Athens.[46] There is considerable controversy over the time-frame of Thucydides' writing, but

the desire for alliance with the Great King was a major issue in Athenian politics in both periods which have been suggested for the composition of Book Eight.

If Thucydides was working on Book Eight soon after 411, he would have been aware of Alcibiades' continuing efforts to bring Persia over to Athens' side (Xenophon *Hellenica* 1.3.8–13).[47] As late as 407, after Darius' appointment of Cyrus the Younger to revitalize the war effort against Athens, Xenophon reports that the Athenians sent envoys asking Tissaphernes to intervene on their behalf (*Hellenica* 1.5.8–9).[48] A fragmentary inscription that might date to this period (*IG* I^3 113), granting proxeny to Evagoras of Salamis, contains a rider which mentions Tissaphernes ([Τισ]σαφρένεν, 38–9) and seems to refer to the King as an ally ([Ἀθεναίος καὶ βασι]λέα καὶ τὸς ἄλλ[ος χσυμμάχος], 35–6).[49] If Thucydides was aware of these events, his treatment of Tissaphernes' motives makes particular sense as a reaction against the unreasonable optimism of his countrymen.

Similar considerations will have influenced the historian, perhaps to an even greater degree, if one accepts the arguments for a later period of Thucydidean composition in the post-war era, possibly well into the 390s.[50] Thucydides' prophetic statements on Sparta's threat to the Persian possession of Ionia, put into the mouth of Alcibiades as a warning to Tissaphernes (8.46.4), are easily understood if written while Spartan armies made war on the same Tissaphernes for control of the Ionian cities, from 399 to 395. From 397 on, the Athenian exile Conon worked to assemble a Persian fleet that would drive the Spartans from the Anatolian coasts. As Athens itself began to dream of rebuilding the empire, the populist politicians Epicrates and Cephalus argued for official alliance with Persia, and in 396 Athenian ambassadors tried to reach the King (*Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* 10.1).[51]

Alcibiades' exploits came back into the spotlight with the trials of his son between 397 and 395; in one of the surviving speeches for the defense, Isocrates reminds the audience of Alcibiades' success with Tissaphernes and the Phoenician fleet (16.20), while the prosecution, represented in Lysias 14, attacks Alcibiades' failure to live up to his promises of Persian gold (14.37).

The renewed hopes of Persian alliance and the references to Tissaphernes' role in the last war make the first half of the 390s a likely context for Thucydides' treatment of Persia. As the Athenians argued about the legacy of Alcibiades and tried to win the favour of the Great King, one can imagine the ageing Thucydides recording his version of events, trying to come to an understanding of why Tissaphernes had acted as he had, so that his audience could draw informed lessons from the past for the coming conflict.

For Thucydides, Achaemenid Persia was a dangerous neighbour, trusted too much by the gullible population of Athens, a natural enemy to any